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The failure of the Reserve Primary Fund, a US money market fund, in September 2008 
triggered a widespread withdrawal of assets from other money market funds in the US. The 
withdrawals led the US Government to adopt emergency measures to maintain market stability. 
The ability of money market funds to rapidly withdraw funding from the financial system also 
showed during the European sovereign debt crisis in the summer of 2011. The crisis prompted 
further regulatory debate on both sides of the Atlantic on how to make money market funds more 
resilient to investors’ runs and systemic shocks. The solutions that are currently discussed 
propose to eliminate the essential bank-like feature of money market funds – their ability to 
transact at a stable share price – and thereby reduce their attractiveness to investors seeking cash 
management options outside the banking system. This thesis detaches from those discussions 
originally enquiring on how should money market funds be regulated in the US and in the EU. 
As a theoretical premise, this research identifies two overarching goals for money market funds 
regulation, namely, investor protection and systemic stability. The prevalent proposals for 
regulation are thus seen as misguided because the change in money market funds pricing 
mechanisms and the accounting convention would demonstrably not satisfy these goals. 
In order to formulate the new propositions for the regulation of money market funds in 
the US and the EU, therefore, this thesis first critically evaluates the existing US and EU 
regulatory frameworks applicable to money market funds from the standpoint of the dual policy 
goal of investor protection and systemic stability. Secondly, it introduces an alternative path for 
achieving this dual goal. It is argued that the blueprint of the international money market fund 
regulation ought to focus on full disclosure of the funds’ assets and liabilities – portfolio 
holdings and fund investors – as the primary measure of investor protection. Such disclosure also 
addresses systemic stability concerns by empowering regulators to properly monitor the 
transmission channels of funding risk. While my study does not purport to do away with risk 
limiting rules for money market funds, it cautions against copying the US-centric view of the 
investment standards to the much shallower European markets under the banners of 
harmonisation. Instead, this thesis advocates a harmonised international approach to the 
transparency of money market fund activities and the creation of a global database of market 
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exposures that would subject asset managers to public scrutiny and enable regulators to monitor 
the major risk transmitting channels. By these means the dual regulatory goal in money market 
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Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free  




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
In the summer of 2011, when the first draft of my thesis was being written, my college-
age daughter obtained a summer internship at Fitch Ratings, where I work as a money market 
fund analyst. That was a ‘hot’ summer for large European banks, critically exposed to debt 
issued by European peripheral countries. The situation of the European banks in turn caused 
serious concerns for the US money market funds, who were important investors in these banks’ 
short-term debt. As I encouraged my daughter to learn more about money market funds, because 
“it is where banks get money”, the words of mother were answered with her shrug: “banks get 
money from exploiting proletariat”. I wish it was that easy. Banks’ business is to make loans; 
and just like any other enterprises banks have to find ways of financing their lending activities.  
Here money market funds enter the picture as providers of liquid capital to various 
economic actors from governments to banks and retail investors. Their importance as global 
financial intermediaries of cash is match by their sturdy and mounting size. Assets under 
management of money market funds reached their all times high of $5.8 trillion in the first 
quarter of 2009, exceeding the gross domestic product of Japan registered in the same year.1 
Clearly, a study of these funds managing capital of such a size presents the most immediate 
practical significance. Money market funds have a profound impact on the contemporary 
financial landscape introducing millions of individuals to financial markets and investments. 
Money market funds facilitate household savings, serve as a source of funding for corporations 
and financial institutions worldwide and arguably came to re-define the very notion of cash. 
Furthermore, the role of money market funds in transmitting risk in the financial system 
identified this sector with the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009, the worst financial meltdown since 
                                                 
1
 Sources: for the assets under management of money market funds the source is the European 
Fund and Asset Management Association at www.efama.org; for the gross domestic product by country 
the source is the International Monetary Fund at www.imf.com.   
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the Great Depression.2 Yet, until very recently these funds have remained a quiet, under-
researched corner of the capital markets.  
These are the considerations that led me to undertake a doctoral thesis on the regulation 
of money market funds. This thesis amalgamates over ten years of professional experience as a 
rating agency analyst in charge of assigning ratings to money market funds.3  Working first for 
Moody’s Investors Services and, later, for Fitch Ratings, I had the opportunity to learn about 
money market funds from portfolio managers of major global investment management firms. 
Nonetheless, this study is conceived as an independent and original work upholding the best 
standards of academic research.  
This thesis comprises descriptive, comparative and normative parts. The descriptive part 
is based on exhaustive research into details of origin and development of money market funds in 
the US and the EU and accompanying changes in regulatory practices. The comparative part 
delves into applicable laws and regulations in the realm of money market funds along 
jurisdictional lines. The method of this study is a syncretic critical approach that cuts across 
exclusive academic boundaries and challenges the basic premises of financial economics 
commonly applied to the money market fund analysis. Rather I consider economical, political 
and ethical dimensions and take the best or most useful concepts.  
Most importantly, in addition to its extensive descriptive and comparative contributions, 
this thesis offers normative proposals for a desirable money market fund regulation. This 
                                                 
2
 See generally Financial Regulatory Reform. A New Foundation -- Rebuilding Financial 
Supervision and Regulation (The US Department of the Treasury 2009). The blueprint for financial 
regulatory reform mandates the US Securities and Exchange Commission to “…move forward with its 
plans to strengthen the regulatory framework around money market funds to reduce the credit and 
liquidity risk profile of individual money market funds and to make the money market fund industry as a 
whole less susceptible to runs”. PAUL TUCKER, Shadow Banking, Financing Markets and Financial 
Stability  (Remarks of the Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England at Bernie 
Gerald Cantor (BGC) Partners Seminar, London  21 January 2010) [Shadow Banking] at 2-3. The Deputy 
Governor expresses the view that money market funds operating like banks should be regulated like 
banks. 
3
 Money market funds are described in section 1.1.1 infra. The legal definitions of money market 
funds in the US and the EU are analysed in chapters 3 and 4, respectively. It should be noted that money 
market funds can also be referred to as money market mutual funds or abbreviated as MMFs or MMMFs. 
These terms and abbreviations are often used interchangeably in various sources.        
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introductory chapter presents my research question, lays out my theoretical framework, discusses 
the aims and objectives of this research and highlights its significance.             
1.1.1 Research subject: money market funds in the US and the EU 
The scope of my inquiry specifically regards money market funds. It is noted that despite 
all the attention these funds have received in the recent years, a common definition of a money 
market fund remains elusive.4 Indeed, we shall see within this thesis that there exist numerous 
types of money market funds in numerous jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it is possible to provide a 
general, broad stroke description of money market funds. Money market funds essentially are 
low risk collective investment schemes that serve as a conservative investment option for risk-
averse investors and a temporary parking place for cash. Exhibit 1 illustrates this view in a form 
of a diagram presenting the main features of a money market fund structure. 
Exhibit 1: Money market fund structure 
 




* Operational support could structured differently depending on jurisdictional requirements
** Oversight could be provided in a different form depending on jurisdictional requirements
*** Issuers of securities purchased by money market funds are not necessarily entities located in the US or the EU, but could be organised/registered in different countries

















The diagram depicts a flow of investments into a money market fund in exchange for 
shares and dividends. A money market fund, in turn, invests the proceeds from the sale of its 
shares in securities issued by various entities such as banks, corporations, municipal and state 
governments that could be located in any country. When investors need their cash back, the 
process reverses. To raise cash, a money market fund may rely on due proceeds from securities 
or sell its portfolio assets in the secondary market. Because money market funds only invest in 
high quality securities5 with short maturities, generally within one year, it is expected that a 
money market fund would be able to sell its assets without incurring material losses.6 Therefore, 
investors in a money market fund, in turn, expect to sell their shares back to the fund with no loss 
of the purchase price. This expectation explains an essential characteristic of a money market 
fund for investors: it is a collective investment scheme that provides safety of principal, liquidity 
and yield consistent with short-term market rates.7         
A substantial part of this thesis is devoted to an analysis of various formal definitions of 
money market funds adopted in the US and the EU. Specifically, the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission defines the US money market funds under federal securities laws by 
referring to their principal characteristics, which include limitations on investment risks, specific 
operational and accounting practices as well as unique disclosure requirements.8 The definition 
                                                 
5
 In the money markets, high quality securities are normally understood as securities having the 
strongest capacity for timely payment of financial commitments. Such securities are often rated by credit 
rating agencies in the highest short-term rating category, e.g., P-1 (by Moody’s Investors Service, see 
www.moodys.com), A-1 (by Standard & Poor’s, see www.standardandpoors.com) or F1 (by Fitch 
Ratings, see www.fitchratings.com) or judged to be of comparable quality by the investor.   
6
 For a discussion of what could be considered a “material loss” of value of an individual debt 
security see JILL E. FISCH & ERIC D. ROITER, A Floating NAV for Money Market Funds: Fix or Fantasy?, 
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 11-30 (2011) at 12. The materiality threshold could 
be as little as one-tenth of one per cent. However, for a money market fund portfolio as a whole, a 
deviation of its per-share price of one-half of one per cent from the fund’s stable value is considered 
material enough for the fund’s Board of Director to consider actions with respect to such a deviation. See 
17 CFR § 270.2a–7 Money market funds  (c)(8)(ii)(b). See also section 3.3.3.3 infra for an in-depth 
analysis of this rule.       
7
 Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets "Money Market Fund Reform 
Options"  (2010) [PWG Report] at 7. The report defines money market funds as ‘intermediaries between 
shareholders who desire liquid investments, often for cash management, and borrowers who seek term 
funding’. See also Investor Bulletin: Focus on Money Market Funds, US Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  (2011), at http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/mmf-investoralert.htm. The bulletin 
highlights use of money market funds as cash storage.   
8
 The principal characteristics of the US money market funds are codified in 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 
Chapter 3 infra contains a detailed analysis of the US money market fund regulation. 
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of money market funds in the EU is formalised under the “CESR’s Guidelines on a common 
definition of European money market funds” that came into effect only in July 2011 and are 
currently administered by the European Securities and Markets Authority.9 The CESR’s 
Guidelines outline a two-tier money market fund industry structure in the EU comprising 
European short-term money market funds and European money market funds, with funds in each 
tier having different investment characteristics.10  
The linguistic ambiguity of the CESR’s Guidelines with respect to the use of the term “a 
money market fund” should be noted.11 On the one hand, the CESR’s Guidelines uses the term 
“a money market fund” in a generic sense to encompass those collective investment schemes 
subject to the said Guidelines. On the other hand, the CESR’s Guidelines refer to money market 
funds as a special type of “money market funds” that are managed to a broader risk profile.12 
Understandably, investors perceive this definition as cumbersome and unduly confusing.13 To 
avoid confusion, in this thesis I refer to those funds managed to a broader risk profile under the 
“CESR’s Guidelines for a common definition of European money market funds” as “(regular) 
money market funds” inserting the word ‘regular’ into brackets to distinguish these funds from 
short-term money market funds.14  
                                                 
9
 CESR's Guidelines on a common definition of European money market funds (European 
Securities and Markets Authority  19 May 2010) [CESR’s Guidelines]. See section 4.3.4 infra for a 
detailed analysis of a common definition of European money market funds. It should be noted that the 
territorial applicability of the CESR’s Guidance is not completely clear; while the title of document refers 
to ‘European money market funds”, it is unlikely that European money market funds outside the EU 
would be subject to its rules. To be more specific, in this thesis I focus on those European money market 
funds operating in the EU. 
10
 Investment characteristics of European money market funds set out by the CESR’s Guidelines 
are analysed in section 4.3.4 infra. 
11




 See, e.g., JP Morgan Asset Management response to CESR consultation paper 09-850 “A 
common definition of European money market funds”  (31 December 2009) [JP Morgan Comment to 
CESR] at 2. The letter stated that it would be desirable to see “a single definition that is closer in nature to 
the ‘short term’ money market funds”. The letter further stated that other longer-term money market funds 
should not be allowed to operate as money market funds and belong in the short term fixed income 





Lastly, the majority, but not all of money market funds in the EU are registered under the 
Undertaking for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities Directive.15 The UCITS 
Directive does not specifically target money market funds, but it nonetheless provides certain 
investment, operational and disclosure standards that are essential for money market fund 
activities. Prior to the CESR’s Guidelines being adopted in July 2011, other Community 
regulators have introduced bespoke definitions of money market funds, which are still used for 
their internal purposes.16 It will be shown in this thesis that those multiple money market fund 
definitions are dissimilar, given their different purposes. For the purpose of this thesis money 
market funds are defined by their common characteristics of safety, liquidity and investment 
return consistent with the short-term market indices. These characteristics have been extracted 
from examinations of various regulatory definitions, which will be closely analysed later in this 
thesis.17  
The importance of money market funds has manifested itself during the recent financial 
crisis that started in August 2007 and continued through the end of 2009.18 During this period an 
ability of these funds to transmit funding risk has captured attention of regulators and academic 
researches.19 The ability of global banks to source funding from the US money market funds 
                                                 
15
 DIRECTIVE 2009/65/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to 
undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS)  (OJ L302/32  17 November 
2009). See also section 4.3.1 infra for a detailed overview of the UCITS framework applicable to money 
market funds. 
16
 REGULATION (EC) No 2423/2001 OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 
November 2001 concerning the consolidated balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector 
(ECB/2001/13) (OJ L333/1  17 December 2001). The European Central Bank’s definition of money 
market funds used for statistical purposes aiding in collection of banks’ balance sheet information. 
COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating conditions 
for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive (OJ L 241/26  2 September 
2006). The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive introduced a definition of a qualifying money 
markets fund deemed appropriate for holding clients’ money. 
17
 See 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (analysed in section 3.3.2 infra covering the US money market funds) 
and CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 (analysed in section 4.3.4 infra covering money market funds in the 
EU). The concepts of safety and liquidity will be further qualified to highlight differences in their 
meanings to different types of investors and variety of regulatory approaches. 
18
 Throughout this thesis references to the financial crisis mean the time period starting in August 
2007 through the end of 2009 unless noted otherwise.  
19
 Funding risk, also referred to as funding liquidity risk is defined as the possibility that over a 
specific horizon the bank, or any other entity, will become unable to settle its obligations with immediacy. 
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during the European sovereign debt crisis unravelling in 2010 and 2011 further exacerbated the 
regulatory concerns related to systemic stability.20 Lost in the heated debate was the positive role 
that money market funds play as providers of capital and liquidity to various economic actors.21 
To fill this gap, I review in this thesis both positive and negative aspects of money market fund 
activities from multiple angles taking in social, political, legal and economic dimensions across 
the US and the EU.22  
From the jurisdictional standpoint, I focus my study on those money market funds 
domiciled in the US and the EU because of a high level of concentration of money market fund 
assets in these regions.23 My historical journey starts in 1971, when the first US money market 
fund applied for registration and extends through the end of 2011 covering 40 years of the money 
market fund industry and regulatory developments.   
                                                                                                                                                             
See, e.g., MATHIAS DREHMANN & KLEOPATRA NIKOLAOU, Funding liquidity risk: definition and 
measurement 316 BIS Working Papers (July 2010) at 1.  
20
 Throughout this thesis references to the European sovereign debt crisis mean the time period 
starting in the spring of 2009 through the end of 2011. Chapter 2 infra contains an exhaustive review of 
the essential functions of money market funds in the global capital markets. 
21
 It is worth mentioning that money market funds have been regarded as the most significant 
financial product innovation of the past half-century. See Report of the Money Market Working Group 
Submitted to the Board of Governors of the Investment Company Institute (Investment Company Institute 
17 March 2009) [ICI Report] at 1.  
22
 Chapter 2 infra. 
23
 According to the Investment Company Institute, at the end of 2010, money market funds 
managed $4.5 trillion worldwide with $2.7 trillion in the US money market funds and $1.6 trillion in 
Europe. The rest of the world accounts for $0.2 trillion of money market fund assets. See Worldwide 
Mutual Fund Assets And Flows: Q4 2010, Investment Company Institute (2010), at 
http://www.ici.org/research/stats/worldwide/ww_12_10. See also The China Bank Money Market Fund -- 
Performance Update.  (31 May 2011), at http://www.chinabank.ph/pdf/MM_Fund_Update.pdf. Despite 
the focus of this research on the US and the EU, money market funds could nowadays be regarded as a 
global phenomenon with this type of funds found in the Asian markets, Africa and Latin America. 
However, due to relative novelty of money market funds outside the US and EU markets, an immaterial 
size and lack of comparability I excluded other regions form the scope of my research. See, e.g., ORAWAN 
KAROONKORNSAKUL, et al., TMB Money Fund - Full Rating Report  (Fitch Ratings  29 July 2011). The 
TMB Money Fund is domiciled in Thailand. DEEP N MUKHERJEE & ARVIND RANA, Fitch Affirms 
Benchmark Liquid BeES Mutual Fund at 'AAAmmf(ind)' (Fitch Ratings  12 July 2011) The Benchmark 
BeBS Mutual Fund is a money market funds domiciled in India. AYMERIC POIZOT & NICOLAS BENETON, 
Fonds monétaire Rapport de notation: BMCI Trésorerie  (Fitch Ratings  16 juin 2010). BMCI Trésorerie 
is a money market fund domiciled in Morocco. All Fitch Rating reports are available at 
www.fitchratings.com.    
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1.1.2 Research question: regulation of money market funds 
My research question relates to money market fund regulation. Since the mid-1980s, the 
financial systems went through extensive changes in credit intermediation. Traditional banking is 
no longer the only way for business and households to obtain credit. New types of financial 
intermediaries, of which money market funds were a part, emerged contributing to the 
availability and affordability of credit by converting risky, less liquid assets into seeming less 
risky and shorter-term liabilities.24 The inability of financial regulators to adequately control the 
idiosyncratic25 and systemic risks26 of these intermediating activities was at the core of the recent 
crisis and triggered a wholesale review of the regulatory canon particularly in the US and the 
EU.27  
Faith in the self-correcting nature of the free market and in the ability of financial 
institutions to effectively police themselves has been challenged amidst calls for tighter, more 
stringent government supervision of financial entities and their employees.28 One of the most 
notable lawmaking initiatives in response to financial abuses of the era of credit expansion in the 
late 1990s through the early 2000s is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 enacted on 21 July 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act emphasises accountability 
and market transparency, and intends to improve consumer protection from abusive practices in 
financial services.29 Similarly, in Europe, Basel III – a comprehensive set of guidance documents 
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 Financial entities operating outside of the traditional banking system are often referred to as 
“shadow banks”. See, e.g., ZOLTAN POZSAR, et al., Shadow Banking  (Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York Staff Report no. 458  July 2010). 
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 See Morningstar Investing Glossary: Idiosyncratic Risk, Morningstar (2012), at 
http://www.morningstar.com/InvGlossary/idiosyncratic_risk_definition_what_is.aspx. Idiosyncratic risk 
is the risk of incurring volatility or permanent loss of capital based on the unique circumstances of a 
security, rather than general market movements.   
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 For the definition of systemic risk see section 1.3.4 infra. 
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 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report  (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission  January 2011) 
[FCIC Report] at xviii. The report on the causes of the financial and economic crisis in the United States 
concluded that “widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to the 
stability of the nation’s financial markets”. 
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 See, e.g., Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability  (The Group of Thirty  15 
January 2009) at 12 – 14. 
29
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Pub.L. 111-203, 
H.R. 4173) at 1. The act is to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘‘too big to fail’’, to protect the American 




developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – is aimed to improve the banking 
sector’s financial profile, risk management and governance. 30  
Money market funds, however, still remain an open regulatory issue. Financial regulators 
on both sides of the Atlantic point out to the money market funds’ vulnerability to investor runs 
and call for policy steps to mitigate the associated risks.31 Specifically targeted to the oversight 
and better regulation of the market-based financial system role, the Financial Stability Board has 
been developing recommendations for money market fund regulatory reform and has asked the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions to undertake work in this area.32 To be 
clear, money market funds in the US and the EU are already tightly supervised entities.33 
Operating rules of the US money market funds have been sufficiently re-drafted post-crisis, 
while European money market funds have become subject to specific investment standards under 
the CESR’s Guidelines implemented in July 2011.34 Nevertheless, the lingering question remains 
whether the existing regulatory framework is effective enough.35 Not only should the regulatory 
review take into account vulnerabilities that manifested themselves during the financial crisis, 
but strive to forestall potential unintended consequences and foreseeable types of abuses.36 
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 See Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems  
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  2010) [Basel III Global Regulatory Framework] and Basel 
III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring  (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision  2010) [Basel III Liquidity Framework]. Both reports are available at 
www.bis.org. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is an international forum for cooperation on 
banking supervision. Its objective is to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the 
quality of banking supervision worldwide.  
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 See, e.g., TUCKER,   supra note 2 at 2 – 3. See also MARY L. SCHAPIRO, Remarks at SIFMA’s 
2011 Annual Meeting, US Securities and Exchange Commission.  (7 November 2011), at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch110711mls.htm. Mary Schapiro, the chairwoman of the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission stated that additional steps should be taken to address the structural 
features that make money market funds vulnerable to runs. 
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 Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation  (Financial Stability Board  21 
October 2011) [FSB Report] at 20 – 21. 
33
 See chapters 3 and 4 infra presenting money market regulatory frameworks in the US and EU, 
respectively. 
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 SEC Rel. No. IC-29132 Money Market Fund Reform (Adopting Release)  (75 FR 10060  4 
March 2010). CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. 
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 See generally MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER, et al., The Fundamental Principles of Financial 
Regulation  (Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11  2009) at Ch. 1. The report provides an overview 
of shortcomings of financial regulations leading to unintended consequences. For example, creation of 
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Importantly, this should be done thoughtfully without taking away benefits of the successful 
financial product including its stability, liquidity and tax efficiency.37  
With these objectives in mind, I formulate my research question as follows: how should 
money market funds be regulated? A decision of how to regulate postulates a plausible answer to 
the question of why to regulate, which, in turns, rests on an assumption that there is a defined set 
of socially desirable ends money market fund regulation is expected to achieve. In relation to the 
why to regulate, two overarching regulatory goals in this sector, namely investor protection and 
systemic stability, are identified in the next section 1.1.3, the theoretical framework. These goals 
are further elaborated in section 1.2 presenting a review of the traditional justifications for 
financial regulation and their relevance to money market funds. In effect, the analysis presented 
in section 1.2 discusses whether the contemporary approach to financial market regulation rooted 
in the neoclassical economic theory remains an appropriate foundation for the new regulatory 
architecture.38  
By asking how to regulate I intend to formulate normative proposals. The proposals 
recognise the practical and cultural diversity of money market funds on both sides of the Atlantic 
and therefore recommend preserving the unique features of the local markets as a means to 
promote systemic stability through encouraging product diversification. Thus, the proposals 
notably distance from the calls for further harmonisation of money market funds, which are very 
prevalent today, particularly in Europe.                
                                                                                                                                                             
‘national champions’ in banking industry comes contrary to one of the stated regulatory goals of 
maintaining efficient and competitive markets.   
37
 See, e.g., KARRIE MCMILLAN, Clouds Overhead: Financial Regulation After the Crisis - 
General Counsel’s Address Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference / Investment 
Company Institute at http://www.ici.org/policy/current_issues/12_km_mfim_conf. The speaker refers to 
those regulatory proposals aimed at reducing money market funds’ liquidity and tax efficiency as 
“outrageous”.  
38
 See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, The Preconceptions of Economic Science, Part III, 14 The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (1900). Thorstein Veblen introduced the term “neoclassical economics”, which is 
now used to encompass approaches to economics focusing on the determination of prices, outputs, and 
income distributions in markets through supply and demand. Normally, in these approaches income-
constrained individuals act to maximise utility of the product or cost-constrained firms act to maximise 
profits employing available information. 
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1.1.3 Theoretical framework 
As explained in section 1.1.1, due to their seemingly low risk profile, until very recently 
money market funds have remained an obscure, under-researched corner of the capital markets. 
Pre-crisis money market fund-related scholarship was very mainly limited to financial studies 
and did not subscribe to any of the established economic or legal theories.39 Numerous academic 
papers published post-crisis are based on the assumption that the banking regulatory model is 
superior to the regulation traditionally covering money market funds.40 Therefore, these papers 
mainly advocated bank-like regulation for money market funds.41 As shown later in this thesis, 
targeted money market fund regulation on both sides of the Atlantic has adopted a rule-based 
approach and does not assume any particular theoretical grounds, but rather rests on a 
combination of views advanced by neoclassical and behavioural economists.42  
From the standpoint of the neoclassical economics the effectiveness of regulatory 
intervention is judged according to welfare-economics principles, which postulate that “society 
fares best when markets are competitive”.43 The recent financial crisis, however, has profoundly 
shaken the main premise of the welfare-economics. Global regulators are strongly focused on 
creating a system that controls activities of financial actors, shields consumers against financial 
abuses and protects taxpayers; thus the invisible hand of the market has been replaced by a 
visible hand, the hand of the government. In light of these sentiments, the traditional 
justifications for financial regulation are critically reviewed in section 1.2 from the standpoint of 
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 Section 1.3 infra provides a brief review of related literature.  
40
 Section 1.3.3 infra. 
41
 For an alternative view of the massive failure of banking regulation during the financial crisis 
and numerous bank failures see JOHN D. HAWKE JR., File No. 4-619; Release No. IC-29497 President's 
Working Group Report on Money Market Fund Reform; Supplemental Comment of Federated Investors, 
Inc. in Response to Comment of Mr. Paul A. Volcker (US Securities and Exchange Commission  15 
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Regulating Money Creation after the Crisis, 1 Harvard Business Law Review 75,  (2011) and MORGAN 
RICKS, Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation  (Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 
370  2010). See also GARY B. GORTON & ANDREW METRICK, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 261,  (2010). The authors call for insurance of money market 
funds to guarantee their investors’ payment and eliminate incentives to run.  
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 Section 1.2 infra. See also chapters 3 and 4 infra for an analysis of money market fund 
regulation in the US and the EU, respectively. 
43
 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, Economics: Principles and Policy   (10th 
ed. 2007).  
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their applicability to money market funds. It is advanced here as a theoretical framework that the 
objectives of the post-crisis regulation should shift from the efficient allocation of society 
resources to building a robust financial system focused on investor protection and systemic 
stability, resilient to the future shocks.44 
To be clear, the investor protection-based argument has consistently been featured 
amongst the main components of most financial regulatory schemes.45 Indeed, the financial crisis 
once again highlighted the damaging economic consequences of the loss of investor confidence 
in the aftermath of market failures, which was especially evident in the behaviour of money 
market funds investors.46 As shown later in this thesis, investor confidence does matter for the 
money market fund industry.47 There is also an abundance of empirical evidence suggesting the 
existence of a strong causal link between investor protection rules and financial market.48 
Therefore my normative proposals are designed to heed to investor protection. 
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 See, e.g., ELISSE B. WALTER, Remarks at the 2012 Mutual Funds and Investment Management 
Conference US Securities and Exchange Commission at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch031912ebw.htm. The US SEC Commissioner stated in her 
speech that “...we need to remember that we must anticipate the future. Money market funds today 
present important questions implicating critical policy goals, related to not only investor protection but 
also...to systemic risk.”  
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 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC 
Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation.  (2008), at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. See also Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation  
(International Organization of Securities Commissions  May 2003) [IOSCO Objectives]. 
46
 See, e.g., LAURA BRUCE, Is your money market fund safe? Bankrate.com at 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/money-market/is-your-money-market-fund-safe--1.aspx. The article 
states that the Reserve Primary Fund, which sustained losses due to holding of $785 million of defaulted 
commercial paper issued by Lehman Brothers, had approximately $62 billion in assets until panicked 
investors withdrew more than $27 billion within two days after the news of the Lehman Brother’s default 
broke. An attempt by the Reserve Primary Fund to liquidate its multi-billion portfolio to meet mounting 
redemption requests led to a widespread freeze in the secondary market activities. See FCIC Report supra 
note 27 at 356 – 360.    
47
 For example, the US money market fund industry that is covered by the most comprehensive 
regulatory framework analysed in-depth in chapter 3 infra, is also the largest segments of the global assets 
under management of these funds. See exhibit 2 infra. 
48 See, e.g., RAFAEL LA PORTA, et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52(3) Journal of 
Finance 1131,  (1997). The study showed that countries with weaker investor protection rules “have 
smaller and narrower capital markets”. See also RAFAEL LA PORTA, et al., Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance, 58 Jnl of Financial Economics 3,  (2000). The empirical study of capital markets 
in different countries vis-à-vis investor protection found correlation between strong laws protecting 
investors and “valuable and broad financial markets”.  
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Notwithstanding the highlighted widespread acceptance of investor protection as a 
worthy regulatory goal, national arrangements and implementation details of specific policy 
measures may differ significantly.49 Currently, investor protection in money market funds is 
mainly understood in terms of developing a detailed set of investment standards that stirs the 
fund manager’s preferences towards those assets deemed appropriate for a conservative risk 
profile of money market funds.50 Another pillar of investor protection in money market funds is 
compulsory disclosure requirements albeit with a different degree of emphasis depending on 
whether the US or the EU funds are concerned.51 This thesis shall recommend good disclosure as 
the best regulatory measure with respect to both, investor protection and systemic stability. Good 
disclosure practices, which provide specific and practical disclosure, are distinguished from bad 
disclosure practices, such as boilerplate prospectus disclaimers. Indeed the view of this thesis is 
that investors are protected the best when they are empowered to make informed investment 
choices and when risk-taking abilities of fund managers are restricted by exposure to the public 
scrutiny.        
The two-pronged approach to investor protection in money market funds – objective 
investment standards and disclosure – in my view amalgamates micro-prudential measures that 
are aimed at containing the fund’s idiosyncratic risks with steps enabling a macro-prudential 
perspective through detailed transparency requirements. A clear macro view of the capital 
markets is important because stability of the global financial system has been cited after the 
crisis as one of the overarching objectives of financial regulation alongside investor protection.52 
The massive run on money market funds in the wake of the Reserve Primary Fund ‘breaking the 
buck’ in September 2008 has been widely cited as a poster example of an event leading to the 
financial system failure.53 A previously quiet corner of the financial markets has attracted 
significant public scrutiny from a standpoint of financial stability and as a result of just this one 
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 See chapter 5 infra for a comparative analysis of the money market fund regulatory models in 
the US and the EU.  
50
 See sections 3.3 and 4.3 infra for a detailed analysis of money market fund regulation in the US 
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 IOSCO Objectives  supra note 45 at i. 
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episode, money market funds have been widely cited as prone to producing destabilising 
effects.54  
Another very recent example of a systemic shock, reviewed later in this thesis, relates to 
the US money market fund investments in European banks, which rely on these funds for their 
US dollar funding.55 An increased integration and interdependence of the global capital markets 
contributed to a greater focus on money market funds as an apparent transmittal link of market 
instability.56 Thus, the contemporary regulatory debate is progressively shifting its focus from 
micro-prudential to macro-prudential issues, i.e., from regulating risk of individual fund to 
market interconnectedness and an ability of the money market fund industry to propagate 
systemic shocks.57 With regard to the objective of protecting the financial system against such 
shocks induced by homogenous investment practices – exhibited, specifically, by the US money 
market funds – this thesis maintains a view that product diversification shall be promoted whilst 
the widespread calls for harmonisation of investment standards shall be resisted.58  
It was telling in effect that the relatively small size of European money market funds and 
their diverse investment strategies have protected them from the accumulation of systemic risk 
and allowed these funds to fly under the regulatory systemic risk radar. Consistent with my 
theoretical view, this thesis argues that the diversity of European money market funds should be 
preserved precisely on the grounds of systemic stability concerns. Such diversified and relatively 
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 RENÉ M. STULZ, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government 
Sponsored  Enterprises United States House of Representatives on "Oversight of the Mutual Fund 
Industry: Ensuring Market Stability and Investor Confidence"  (24 June 2011) at 4. Available at 
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 Section 2.3.2.2 infra. See also NAOHIKO BABA, et al., US Dollar Money Market Funds and 
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 See PWG's Report supra note 7 at 5. The overarching goal of the report is to propose 
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 Section 2.4 infra.  
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low risk funds denominated in different currencies would simply lack significance in their 
respective markets to be too big to fail and warrant government intervention. My normative 
proposals in chapter 6 account for the noted distinction in systemic significance between money 
market funds operating in the US and the EU. 
In sum, the theoretical framework underlying my proposals for the new regulatory 
architecture covering money market funds on both sides of the Atlantic rests upon the dual 
regulatory goal of investor protection and systemic stability. The view expressed in this thesis is 
that these two goals fully capture considerations of micro and macro-prudential protections, 
which, in turn, lead to a regulatory architecture conducive to the market efficiency, economic 
progress as well as an improvement in societal welfare.59 This thesis maintains that the 
phenomenon of the market equilibrium achieved through good disclosure eliminates the need for 
a separate consideration of market efficiency even though market efficiency could be per se 
considered a worthy regulatory goal.60 Indeed the reduction in efficiency due to increased costs 
of regulation post-crisis has come into the focus of the industry debates61 given an effect of such 
costs on the productive sectors of the economy.62 Nonetheless, it will be shown later in this 
thesis, past developments in the financial industry prompted by the focus strictly on market 
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 See generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism 84 (3) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488 (August 1970). See section 1.2 infra 
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Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III  § 844(OECD Publishing / OECD Economics Department Working 
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efficiency and regulatory attempts to limit such developments are prone to various unintended 
consequences.  
For this reason I side-stepped the market efficiency consideration and formulate an 
original approach that does not make an economic argument. Instead, my normative proposals 
establish the principal conditions for the market creation that are fully aligned with my theory of 
the dual regulatory goals of investor protection and systemic stability.63 This approach crosses 
over the boundaries of the conventional theories traditionally used in the financial regulation 
design, which are critically reviewed in section 1.2 infra. As shown in section 1.2, none of the 
theories underlying the existing regulatory approach to money market funds in the US and the 
EU fully explains their current regulatory practices. Not surprisingly, inconsistencies of 
regulatory actions have resulted in patchwork regulation incapable of providing investor 
protection and systemic stability.  
This conclusion prompted my focus on the micro processes that underlie the market and 
economic development in addition to considerations of political and ethical dimensions in money 
market find regulation. To that end, based on examining investors’ historical preferences and 
cultural motivations for money market fund investments I envisage a new regulatory architecture 
that better protects investors through education and by preserving the natural diversity of 
investment options. Thus, my approach creates the conditions not only for market development, 
but also for market diversity and, while focusing on the dual regulatory goal – investor protection 
and systemic stability – could be applied consistently across the US and the EU.       
1.1.4 Methodology 
The methodology comprises: a broad examination of the literature concerning the subject 
of this thesis; an empirical study and comparative analysis of money market funds domiciled in 
the US and the EU; legal analysis of money market fund regulation; an elaboration of a theory 
underlying money market fund regulation; and normative recommendations. With regard to the 
literature concerning money market funds, I have researched financial and economic sources, 
industry studies and technical reports. Sources of such material have been books and articles in 
academic journals, databases of regulatory filings, public web-sites of fund management 
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companies, credit rating agencies, consulting organisations and financial media. This thesis has 
benefited greatly from the availability of large amounts of data regarding various types of asset 
flows collected by regulatory agencies and professional trade association, frequently updated, 
and offered in public domain. Information regarding portfolio holdings of the US money market 
funds has been collected from the funds’ public web-sites and the electronic filing database 
maintained by the US Securities and Exchange Commission. Other quantitative aspects of my 
thesis are developed from studies provided by economists, asset managers and risk management 
experts.  
In relation to the empirical research and comparative analysis, I start by uncovering the 
origin and development of money market funds in the US and the EU from the early 1970s 
through to the present. The comparative analysis of money market funds presented in this thesis 
is unique; to my knowledge there have been no detailed studies of micro-processes affecting the 
money markets. The history of money market funds is explained by country-specific patterns of 
investors’ investment objectives, taxation, legal, enforcement and accounting standards.     
Regulation is understood in this thesis as “organised attempts to influence behaviour, 
using any combination of rules, monitoring, incentives, and sanctions, which may or may not 
have legal status”.64 Therefore, despite a significant focus on the US securities law and 
applicable norms of the EU in the analysis of money market fund regulatory models, I 
nonetheless incorporate other standards that affect investment behaviour of fund managers. 
Examples of these standards include credit rating agency criteria and the best practices 
developed and voluntarily adopted by the money market funds themselves. Laws and other 
regulatory standards are stated as of December 2011 with pending developments noted.  
With respect to the theoretical enquiry, I have elaborated a theoretical framework which 
identifies two main goals for the regulation of money market funds: investor protection and 
systemic stability. The theory distils from traditional justifications for financial regulation 
(reviewed in section 1.2), and particularly from the neoclassical and behavioural economic 
theories, which somewhat clumsily underpin the current regulatory construct of money market 
fund regulation.  
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As noted earlier, my research is firmly rooted in my own extensive practical experience 
in money market fund analysis. I consider as empirical experience and another source of study 
the countless conferences, meetings, and debates that I have attended for over ten years during 
my employment as a rating agency analyst. These events bringing together money market fund 
managers, practicing attorneys, government officials and academics allowed me to build an 
extensive network of people who are the thought leaders in the sector. As an analyst covering 
money market funds, I have contributed to industry research and investor education activities by 
publishing innumerable rating actions commentaries and industry reports widely read and quoted 
by financial media.65  
Lastly, however ironic it may sound, I would like to point to the financial crisis in the US 
and the European sovereign crisis unfolding before our eyes as this thesis is being written is the 
single most important contributor of ideas and data. Prior to the financial crisis there has been 
very little academic attention to money market funds, which were then regarded as the quietest 
corner of the capital markets. The global liquidity squeeze induced by the failure of the third 
largest US money market fund placed these funds prominently in the centre of regulatory debate 
both in the US and Europe amidst calls for the wholesale change in the industry structure. Active 
political debates, rapid lawmaking developments, increased flow of data, and strong academic 
focus have offered invaluable input in development of my research.   
1.1.5 Contributions to knowledge 
My thesis aims to provide four major contributions to knowledge. The first contribution 
relates to cataloguing various types of money market funds, which are analysed from multiple 
angles including their essential functions, operational structures, investor base, and portfolio 
contents. As explained in section 2.3, money market funds are a major provider of short-term 
wholesale funding to financial institutions globally; thus my additional contribution relates to 
describing the role of these funds in the financial system and during the financial crisis. This 
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contribution is unique in the literature. My exploration of available academic sources presented 
in section 1.3 found few detailed studies related to money market fund types and functions in the 
US and the EU. Existing studies are mostly focused on the US money market funds and are 
largely limited to justifications of a particular regulatory scheme.  
The second contribution concerns the regulatory framework of money market funds and 
includes a descriptive enquiry of regulatory schemes applied to these funds on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Money market funds have been an under-researched corner of the capital market 
especially with respect to those funds operating outside the US. Indeed, as recently as October 
2011 the Financial Stability Board recommended the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions “to analyse the different categories, characteristics and systemic risks of MMFs in 
various jurisdictions as well as the particular regulatory arrangements which have influenced 
their role and risks”.66 Thus, delivering precisely on this request, my first and second 
contributions are expected to fill this research gap and inform policy actions.  
The third contribution consists of a comparative analysis of money market fund 
regulatory models in the US and the EU. The comparative part is structured to underscore any 
differences or similarity of the regulatory regimes vis-à-vis my theoretical framework of a dual 
regulatory goal – investor protection and systemic stability. This original approach brings out 
inter alia a fundamental flaw in regulation of European money market funds, which relates to 
lack of mandatory fund information transparency regime. The overarching drive for 
harmonisation of money market fund regulatory approaches globally reiterated by the Financial 
Stability Board is also critically analysed from the standpoint of the systemic stability 
argument.67                
The fourth contribution is the answer to the research questions: how should money market 
funds be regulated? I conclude this assessment of my contributions to knowledge by reiterating a 
strong interest of policymakers to details that are of practical use for an informed debate about 
the money market fund industry and its regulation in the US and the EU. Given the reach of 
money market funds far beyond these two markets, I also anticipate interest from international 
regulatory bodies and other investment communities not directly addressed within my thesis.     
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1.1.6 Outline  
This thesis comprises seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction and presents the 
research question, the subject of my research, the theoretical framework, the anticipated 
contributions to knowledge and the methodology for attaining them. Chapter 1 also examines the 
question “why should we regulate” in connection with money market funds. To that end, I 
review the conventional rationales for financial markets regulation and their applicability to the 
subject of my research. Chapter 1 concludes with a review of the sources essential for the 
development of my thesis – although from time to time I placed subject-specific fragments of the 
literature review directly in the respective chapters.  
Chapter 2 draws the profile of the money market fund industry covering both the US and 
European practices. The main aspects of the industry profile depicted in this chapter include the 
market share of money market funds in the global flow of capital, their relevance to the past, 
present and the future of the capital markets, and their role in the global financial crisis as well as 
their contribution in the European sovereign debt crisis. Given the money market funds’ socio-
economic beneficial objectives of being a safe haven for cash and global liquidity providers, the 
need to protect investors and systemic stability offers compelling arguments for the normative 
intervention. The role of money market funds in the financial crisis as transmitters of systemic 
shocks added more weight to those voices calling for the review of money market fund 
regulation on the grounds of systemic stability concerns.68  
Chapter 3 and 4 analyse money market fund definitions and regulation reviewing, 
respectively, the US securities law and the EU legal norms. They also analyse the ‘soft law’ 
produced by non-governmental actors. In particular, chapter 3 presents the past, present and 
possible future of the US money market funds against the backdrop of the industry’s regulatory 
arrangements and ongoing debates related to furthering the US money market fund reforms. 
Chapter 4 reports on European money market funds and investigates issues related to their 
treatment under the legal norms administered by the EU and national regulators. The descriptive 
enquiry undertaken in chapter 4 suggests that the structure of national capital markets and the 
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local investment culture have led to cross-jurisdictional disparities affecting European money 
market funds. Chapter 4 examines the ongoing regulatory changes in the EU and harmonisation 
initiatives as it relates to European money market funds. Chapter 4 offers a critical view of these 
initiatives on the grounds of their limited benefits to the local investment communities and 
concerns related to aggregation of systemic risk.  
Chapter 5 presents a comparison of the US and European money market fund regulatory 
models highlighting the lack of isomorphism on the international scale. The purpose of chapter 5 
is therefore to ascertain to what degree legal norms administered by the EU regulate money 
market funds ‘by default’ under the UCITS regime and to what degree the harmonised, money 
market fund-specific rules are necessary and desirable vis-à-vis the regulatory goals assumed 
under my theoretical framework. Chapter 6 offers normative proposals that are consistent with 
the theory of the dual regulatory goal presented in section 1.1.3. It also reconciles the appeal of a 
common regulatory approach against the need for diversity in investment product offerings by 
weighting in unintended consequences of harmonised regulation often leading to the aggregation 
of systemic risk and ‘too big to fail’ concerns. Chapter 6 concludes with a call for establishing a 
uniform transparency regime and for enhancing co-operation amongst national regulators in 
information-sharing and supervisory arrangements. Chapter 7 reports about the contributions to 
knowledge developed in this thesis.     
1.2 Traditional justifications for financial market regulation and their relevance to 
money market funds 
Recalling my research question – how should money market funds be regulated? – I next 
review some traditional justifications for the regulation of financial markets and in particular 
money market funds. These theories often insightful but cannot be taken at face value. Too often 
they underpin in an incoherent, superficial way the prevalent proposals for money market fund 
regulation. It is instead suggested that these insights should be critically and lucidly evaluated 
with a view to upholding investor protection and systemic stability. The examination of the 
regulatory environment for money market funds presented in this thesis has greatly benefited 
from the extensive ongoing debates on the goals and objectives of financial regulation in the 
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post-mortem of the financial crisis.69 Indeed, financial regulation is traditionally justified with 
reference to the instances of market failure and their high social costs.70 Moreover, the financial 
crisis stroke a severe blow to the theory of the self-correcting nature of the capital markets – 
which was until then a most widely accepted one – and reinforced the central argument for 
financial market regulation, which is to correct the market failures.71 Section 2.4 infra illustrates 
how the uncontrolled risks of money market fund activities contributed to the crisis and how the 
risks were transmitted amongst seemingly unrelated economic agents as well as geographically 
remote markets. 
While money market funds did not cause the financial crisis, their ability to expose 
borrowers to funding shocks has been cited as one of the chief concerns related to systemic 
stability.72 As explained in section 1.1.3 presenting my theoretical framework, it was not until 
recently that the systemic stability argument was placed on the top of a regulatory agenda in 
connection with collective investment schemes, where investor protection and market integrity 
have traditionally been in focus.73 All these objectives are critically reviewed later in this section 
as parts of traditional justifications for financial regulation and their relevance to money market 
funds.   
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With regard to the regulatory body, it is often assumed that the state is the chief engine 
promulgating regulation and maintaining enforcement mechanisms, although other regulatory 
schemes are conceivable. Baldwin et al. offers three definitions of regulation: (1) the 
promulgation of rules by the government supported by mechanisms for monitoring regulated 
entities and enforcement; (2) any form of direct state intervention in the economy; and (3) any 
mechanisms of social control affecting all aspects of behaviour from any source.74 Governmental 
agencies and academia are not particularly clear on developing and applying a common 
definition of regulation and users of regulations often assume the first one of three offered by 
Baldwin as true regulation.75 The analysis of the causes of the financial crisis has challenged this 
assumption pointing to a massive failure of state regulation and thereby prompted my 
investigation as to whether other types of regulation could be superior in achieving the dual 
regulatory goal of investor protection and systemic stability.  
The findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission place responsibility on 
regulatory agencies that were unable or unwilling to employ tools they already had.76 Thus, there 
could be a case for re-conceptualising regulation as a function exercised primarily by the state 
but best accompanied by a process of coordination amongst the industry actors that enables them 
to better organise themselves.77 A theory that de-centred approach could be superior to that of 
state intervention is based on the assumption that “government cannot know about the industry 
as the industry knows about itself”.78 To test this theory in application to money market funds, 
chapters 3 and 4 provide examples of credit rating agencies as of non-governmental actors 
developing quasi-regulatory standards and serving as sources of regulation for the money market 
industry in the US and the EU. Given considerations to both governmental and non-
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governmental bodies administering money market fund regulation, I interpret it as an organised 
attempt to influence funds investment behaviour, which may or may not have legal status.79 
I start my review of the conventional considerations for financial regulation with a 
discussion of the law and economics movement, which has been one of the most influential 
schools of thought in American jurisprudence for the last two decades.80 Indeed, securities law 
and regulation in the US are closely associated with the neoclassical economic theory.81 This 
theory assumes that rational individuals and firms make their economic choices, or transact in 
the markets, on the basis of their utility or profit maximization.82 A significant underlying 
assumption of this theory is that in order for economic agents to transact there should be an 
appropriate level of information available to enable the agents’ decision making. If sufficient 
information is unavailable, then the market failure is inevitable.83 Under this view, information 
symmetry, which is often referred as information transparency, is a precondition of a competitive 
market and the purpose of securities regulation.84  
George Akerlof, an American economist and a Nobel Prize winner, using an example of 
the market for used cars, established that when prospective purchasers are persistently lacking 
information about the car quality, or faced with information asymmetry disfavouring the buyers, 
the sellers and the buyers are unable to achieve the pricing point that would be accepted by both 
sides.85 This is because the buyers without knowledge of a particular car offered for sale assume 
the quality of any car to be average and are only willing to pay the price that reflects the average 
quality. Given that good quality is not rewarded by a better price, sellers of good cars withdraw 
from the market leaving only cars of below average quality available for sale. The buyers, in 
turn, would revise their quality expectations and the price they are willing to pay downward. 
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Eventually, fewer good quality cars are offered and demand for cars diminishes as the quality of 
the cars declines. At the end of this process, no cars are offered at the price the buyers still 
willing to pay making the market for cars illiquid.86  
If the information asymmetry is reversed and the buyers are better informed of the cars’ 
quality, the price equilibrium that satisfies both the buyers and the sellers could always be 
achieved.87 This finding of the Akerlof’s model justifies the popular idiom of an informed 
consumer being a better customer. Consistent with this theory, the US securities regulation, 
which governs money market funds, has developed a comprehensive disclosure regime aimed at 
facilitating information flow between investors and fund managers.88 My theory of a dual 
regulatory goal expressed in section 1.1.3 draws on the Akerlof model in its postulate that 
functioning of money market funds could be improved through reversing information asymmetry 
in favour of fund investors. Thus, a part of my normative answer to, in particular, European 
money market fund regulation reflects the market need for information symmetry and calls for a 
new type of disclosure regime, which I refer to as good disclosure.        
It is recognised, however, that emphasis on information symmetry does not necessarily 
assure the rationality of investors’ response to the market events. As evidenced by the financial 
crisis, the money market fund investors’ judgment was irrational.89 While asset-level information 
was available to the public, investors’ rapid withdrawals from money market funds amounted to 
a full-blown panic.90 Confused by perceived riskiness and complexity of money market fund 
operations, investors triggered a flight to quality, which is a shift in investment behaviour when 
investors sell assets perceived to be risky and purchase assets perceived to be safe.91 Flight to 
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quality episodes illustrate the limits of risk disclosures. Details of complex financial transactions 
and the contingency effect in case of a transaction failure through market interconnectedness, 
both horizontal and vertical, are often beyond the reach of even the most sophisticated 
institutional investors and securities analysts.92      
To adequately protect fund investors, considerations must be given to the effects of 
cognitive and emotional factors on investment decisions.93 This leaves room for other theoretical 
influences in the current regulatory construct such as behavioural economics, which rests on 
findings that investors often respond to risks irrationally and entails factoring these psychological 
aspects into economic models of rational behaviour.94 Under the US securities law, mutual funds 
that are normally sold to retail investors operate under an array of prescriptive rules and are 
subjected to extensive disclosure requirements, while investment vehicles geared towards 
institutional investors and high net worth individuals are free to employ a greater array of 
investment strategies and avoid majority of reporting and disclosure requirements. This generally 
leads to permitting sophisticated investors95 to choose from a broader array of investments while 
limiting investment choices of retail investors to safe, less complex alternatives.96  
                                                                                                                                                             
Management in a Flight to Quality Episode, 63(5) Journal of Finance 2195,  (2008) at 2196. ADITYA 
KAUL & BLAKE PHILLIPS, Economic Conditions, Flight to Quality and Mutual Fund Flows  (21st 
Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, Sydney, Australia  2008) at 19. The authors studied 
Canadian mutual fund cash flow during the collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund 
and found that investors move $1,850 million into money market funds and $627 million out of equity 
funds.   
92
 See, e.g., STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of 
Complexity, 1 U. Ill. L. Rev.,  (2004) The article examines the problems of complexity of financial 
instruments vis-à-vis disclosures usefulness to investors. 
93
 See generally JEFF SCHWARTZ, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 521,  (2009). The article describes a two-tier approach to investment management 
regulation in the US. Specifically, the current regulatory framework implies that investors with limited 
resources such as retail clients are often unable to properly analyse their investment options and bounded 
to make poor choices based on available heuristics.  
94
 See generally AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases 185/4157 Science 1124,  (1974). See also JILL E. FISCH, Regulatory Responses to 
Investor Irrationality: the Case of the Research Analyst 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 57,  (2006). The article 
questions validity of the assumption that greater disclosures improve investor decision making and 
caution against costs imposed by additional disclosures that provides only marginal usefulness. 
95
 17 CFR §230.501 Definitions and Terms Used in Regulation D  Sophisticated investors in the 
US federal securities laws are defined by the term “accredited investors”. See also Accredited Investors, 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (17 October 2011), at http://www.sec.gov/answers/accred.htm. 
96
 SCHWARTZ,  supra note 93 at 532 – 536. 
44 
 
The US and European money market funds are sold to both retail and institutional 
investors although, as shown in this thesis, the breakdown of retail and institutional ownership 
may vary depending on a particular market infrastructure.97 Money market funds, and especially 
those domiciled in the US, have evolved into a commoditised product sourcing investments 
through distribution channels that generally remove retail investors from the decision-making. 
The majority of retail assets are invested in money market funds through other commingled 
investment vehicles such as omnibus accounts of banks’ personal trust departments or pension 
plans administered by an employer.98 The boundaries between retail and institutional investors in 
money market funds are blurred suggesting that simplistic regulatory approach based on level of 
investor sophistication may not yield desired benefits. Furthermore, the recent court cases have 
exposed institutional investors as lacking sophistication and necessary knowledge of financial 
markets and as failing to conduct proper due diligence despite their fiduciary role and available 
resources.99  
Nonetheless, despite this critique, the continuing success of money market funds could be 
explained by the findings of behavioural economists such as investors’ aversion to loss.100 The 
investor preference for avoiding losses over acquiring gain is supported by numerous empirical 
observations including a flight to quality. In application to money market funds, the loss aversion 
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theory explains a positive relationship of money market funds’ assets under management and 
market volatility, i.e., money market funds tend to gain assets during the periods of increased 
market volatility, or when probability of market losses is the highest.101 The most apparent 
normative implications of this theory call for establishing detailed risk-limiting rules, sometimes 
referred to as prudential standards, to stir the fund managers towards the most conservative 
practices.102  
The prudential approach is the most prominent in banking regulation103 and is also 
notable in the securities law in relation to money market funds.104 From the standpoint of 
implementation and maintenance prudential measure are practical and, as such, are beneficial for 
the supervised entities. However, the pitfalls are plentiful and are often rooted in the fallibility of 
regulation itself.105 Furthermore, being the least flexible, the prudential approach attracts the 
major criticism as constraining financial innovation, on the one hand, and falling behind market 
developments, on the other.106 Therefore, this thesis undertakes a substantial study enquiring 
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whether harmonised micro-prudential standards applied to individual money market funds cross-
border are conducive to realising the goals of investor protection and systemic stability.107  
The analysis of money market funds established in different jurisdiction explores both the 
prevalent quest for financial product homogeneity and the benefits of cultural diversity. The 
evolution of money market fund industry can be viewed as a reflection of globalisation, as a 
process of “de-territorialisation of socio-economic and political space”.108 Money market funds 
traverse national borders providing the flow of capital to those markets and institutions that offer 
the most attractive financial terms at any given movement. Recalling the earlier discussion, from 
the point of view of the neoclassical economics, the efficiency in deployment of capital per se 
constitutes a worthy regulatory goal.109 However, it can be retorted that fluidity of capital 
provided by money market funds may also inflict severe shortage of capital and become a major 
destabilizing force should investment preferences of these funds change.110 Furthermore, there 
are also legal traditions and financial systems that do not subscribe to the efficiency narrative so 
prevailing in the Western economic culture.111 While financial developments outside the Western 
capital markets are beyond the scope of my thesis, I bring this point to highlight once again the 
limited scope of the post-crisis regulatory debate surrounding cross-border issues of money 
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market regulation, which zeros in predominantly on harmonisation of investment standards 
utilised in the US and the EU.  
As pointed out earlier in section 1.1.3, the controversy of the prevailing drive for 
harmonisation becomes apparent when the existing regulatory model is critically analysed vis-à-
vis my theory of the dual regulatory goal – investor protection and systemic stability. For 
example, an introduction of the CESR’s Guidelines on a common definition of European money 
market funds in May 2010 was presented by regulators as a step to a greater investor protection 
understood as ensuring “a level playing in Europe” for various collective investment schemes 
marketing themselves as money market funds.112 Therein investor protection is sought to be 
achieved through the conversion of diverse investment strategies pursued by money market 
funds in various European countries into two regulatory delineated options.113 I argue in section 
6.2.1 infra that an attempt to protect money market fund investors by a means of a reduction in a 
number of their options does not necessarily lead to a greater protection. On the contrary, such a 
regulation-induced coordination of investment strategies may, in fact, have unintended 
consequences of an increase in systemic risk.114 
An essential step in rationalising money market fund regulation is to agree on what are 
socially-desirable ends of the fund investment behaviour. My theory of the dual regulatory goal 
for money market funds regulation expressed in section 1.1.3 has sought this end. However, 
oversupply of regulation is a danger of its own as, on its extreme, it may negate the basic 
economic rationale for money market funds to exist.115 Under the economic efficiency doctrine 
only those regulatory measures are justified that could help to achieve the efficiency 
                                                 
112
 See Feedback Statement: CESR’s guidelines on a common definition of European money 
market funds (Committee of European Securities Regulators  19 May 2010) [Feedback Statement] at 2.  
113
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. 
114
 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment  
(Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 414  2010) at 16. 
115
 DAVID T. LLEWELLYN, The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation  (FSA Occasional 
Paper 1  April 1999) at 6. Points to “an evident danger of regulation being over-demanded by consumers 
and over-supplied by regulators”. See also VICTORIA MCGRANE, GAO: Implementing Dodd-Frank Could 
Cost $2.9 Billion, WSJ 28 March 2011. The US Government Accountability Office estimates that he first 
year of the Dodd-Frank Act implementation will cost the 11 US government agencies a total of about 
$974 million; using this annual estimate, the Dodd-Franks Act implementation will cost about $2.9 billion 
over five years. 
48 
 
improvement.116 Yet, because the social cost of the crisis is enormous, the post-crisis 
governmental production of new regulatory and supervisory services amidst calls for tougher, 
more restrictive regulation seems to obtain a blank check for its activities. In money market fund 
regulation costs should be carefully controlled.117 Every new rule would take away a few basis 
points of return from investors in already low yield/low risk investment alternative.118 It is 
money market fund investors who pay for fund regulation and this should be kept in focus of 
those involved into production of regulation. As Justice Brandeis warned back in 1933, 
“Remember, the inevitable ineffectiveness of regulation”.119 This warning underscores a 
discussion of a dual regulatory goal – investor protection and systemic stability – earlier in this 
chapter that stresses a lack of an economic argument. Indeed, as shown earlier, good disclosure 
that promotes risk-limiting behaviour of asset managers and fosters the public scrutiny is the 
most cost-effective mechanism for building an active market.      
1.3 Literature review 
As mentioned in section 1.1.3, prior to the financial crisis there was surprisingly little 
systematic research on money market funds. No established schools or research traditions existed 
on the subject. Instead, there were a relatively small number of unrelated empirical studies 
conducted by finance scholars and professionals with an almost exclusive focus on the US 
market. The main objective of these studies was to test market efficiency and the rational 
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 The outcome is deemed to be ‘Pareto optimal’ if there is no other resource allocation that 
makes everyone at least as well off and at least one party better off. See generally RONALD H. COASE, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal  of  Law  and  Economics 1,  (1960) and RICHARD A. POSNER, 
Economic Analysis of Law   (7th ed. 2007). 
117
 See, e.g., Money Market Fund Reform. Remarks by: Senator Pat Toomey (R-PA)  (US 
Chamber of Commerce  8 February 2012). The member of the US Senate urged to carefully consider the 
cost of additional money market fund reforms and whether these costs justify potential benefits.   
Available at http://www.preservemoneymarketfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Toomey_Remarks 
_2_8_12_13291521511.pdf.  
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 SCOTT C.  GOEBEL, Comment Letter to Money Market Fund Reform File Number S7-11-09, 
Release No. IC-28807  (Fidelity Investments  24 August 2009) at 21. Fidelity Investments estimated that 
the cost of money market fund reform as is was proposed by the US Securities in Exchange Commissions 
in 2009 would range from 19 to 42 basis points of annual return for institutional investors and from 14 to 
31 basis points for retail investors. The money market fund reform has been implemented making is less 
attractive for investors to invest in money market funds and more costly for investment managers to run 
the money market business.   
119
 MATTHEW P. FINK, How Regulators Failed to Prevent the Financial Crisis, Money 
Management Executive 10 January 2011. 
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expectations hypothesis as it applied to money markets. In addition, there were several 
descriptive articles on legislative debates and money market regulation produced by practicing 
attorney and ex-regulators. All this did not amount to any established legal theory or hypotheses 
that would have been tested by different methods and in different markets. Nevertheless, these 
fragmentary sources rationalized the money market fund industry and served as a good overview 
of its structure.   
Post-crisis financial and econometric studies identified money market funds as a part of 
the ‘shadow banking’ system, established the money market funds’ role in its operations, and 
called for tighter regulation of these funds on the basis of prudential approach adopted by 
banks.120 My review of this literature captures the divergence of opinions regarding the true 
nature of money market fund operations and their social benefits. I also noted the lack of 
consistency regarding money market funds amongst various national regulatory bodies. 
Nonetheless some material is valuable and chapter 2 draws from these sources while profiling 
money market funds as global liquidity providers and cash management vehicles outside the 
traditional banking system. I conclude reiterating that although the volume of research in money 
market funds is constantly growing, there has not been a systematic approach to money market 
funds through the prism of a coherent theory. It is my hope that this thesis would fill this gap.   
1.3.1 Money market funds in financial studies 
Earlier literature on money market funds was mainly produced by financial scholars 
concerned with various aspects of portfolio management and corporate governance.121 These 
studies have proven to be valuable to my thesis as background research explaining the 
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 The term shadow banking system is attributed to Paul McCulley, Managing Director of a 
global investment management firm PIMCO, who coined it at the 2007 conference of the Kansas City 
Federal Reserve Bank. He defined it as “the whole alphabet soup of levered up non-bank investment 
conduits, vehicles, and structures”. See PAUL MCCULLEY, Teton Reflections  (PIMCO Global Central 
Bank Focus  2007). See also section 1.3.4 infra for literature review related to ‘shadow banking’. 
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 See, e.g., ANDREW B. LYON, Money Market Funds and Shareholder Dilution, 39 Journal of 
Finance 1011, 1020,  (1984). The paper analyses the effects of amortised cost valuation on institutional 
money market funds and found the possibility of arbitrage between securities priced at market value and 
amortised cost, which resulted in dilution of value for money market fund investors.         
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commoditisation of money market funds.122 I also present studies arguing that while 
homogeneity tendencies in money market fund management are not contested, there is still room 
to add value to investors, but mostly via ancillary services. Academic studies found no strong 
correlation between the ability of the manager in forecasting interest rates and the economic 
success of the fund – which means that money market fund managers add little extra return, if 
any, through their portfolio management strategies.123  
Similarly, an analysis of changes in money market fund duration vis-à-vis changes in the 
general level of interest rates concluded that fund duration is a lagging, not a leading indicator of 
future interest rate changes.124 Thus fund managers have limited ability to add value through 
active duration management. In addition, it was inferred that the benefits of active money market 
fund portfolio management are not detectable in the fund return data.125 Managers of these funds 
are generally unable to add value by adjusting the duration of a fund portfolio in order to 
capitalize on anticipated changes in interest rates.  
Over the years, a small army of finance scholars was engaged in finding a Holy Grail of 
excess return in mutual funds. Domian et al. found, on a representative sample of money market 
funds operating in 1990 through 1994, that return of these funds is highly correlated with fees 
they charge on investors.126 It was found that money market funds in the sample produced 
similar gross returns.127 The differences in net returns were largely driven by differences in 
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 Commoditisation is normally understood as a lack of product differentiation. See, e.g., JOHN 
QUELCH, When Your Product Becomes a Commodity Harvard Business School at 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5830.html. 
123
 ALEX KANE & YOUNGKI  LEE, The Forecasting Ability of Money Market Fund Managers and 
its Economic Value (1983) NBER Working Paper Series available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=321298. 
The study of relationship between the interest rate forecasting ability of a portfolio management team and 
the economic success of money market funds found little correlation. 
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 DALE L.  DOMIAN, Money Market Mutual Fund Maturity and Interest Rates 24 (4) Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking,  (1992) at 9.  
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 RAMON P. DEGENNARO & DALE L. DOMIAN, Market Efficiency and Money Market Fund 
Portfolio Managers: Beliefs Versus Reality, 31 The Financial Review 453, 474,  (1996) at 19. 
126
 DALE L. DOMIAN & WILLIAM REICHENSTEIN, Performance and Persistence in Money Market 
Fund Returns, 6(3) Financial Services Review,  (1998) at 182. 
127
 Gross return refers to the aggregate performance of the holdings of a portfolio. See Concept 
Release: Request for Comments on Measures to Improve Disclosure of Mutual Fund Transaction Costs 
[Release Nos. 33-8349; 34-48952; IC-26313; File No. S7-29-03] RIN 3235-AI94 US Securities and 
Exchange Commission at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/33-8349.htm#P222_60222 at footnote 53.  
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charged fees128 and the funds’ objective to investment in risky securities such as commercial 
paper.129 The study divided money market funds in two groups: those funds investing exclusively 
in government securities, called ‘government funds,’ and those funds investing in other assets, 
called ‘prime funds.’130 Within both groups money market funds had a limited ability to 
differentiate themselves amongst their peers. Over time, lack of individual fund differentiation 
leads to a high degree of concentration currently evidenced in the money market fund 
industry.131 
The findings of the four studies by Lyon, Kane & Lee, Domian and Domian et al.  
explain the money market fund tendency for commoditisation, or inability to offer value through 
unique fund-specific attributes as there are almost none.132 In light of these findings it is worth 
examining a study conducted by Christoffersen et al. that explains how money market funds 
compete with each other in the efficient market.133 The study researched why investors do not 
sell those share classes carrying larger expense charges in favour of lower expense share 
classes.134 The authors concluded that as long as the fund adds value through ancillary services 
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 Operations of a mutual fund incur certain costs. These are regular fund operating costs, such as 
investment advisory fees, marketing and distribution expenses, brokerage, custodial, transfer agency, 
legal, and accountants’ fees. In addition, costs might be incurred in connection with particular investor 
transactions, such as investor purchases, exchanges, and redemptions. Total sum of those costs paid by a 
fund investor is referred to as “fund’s expenses’ or ‘fund’s expense ratio”. Explanation of mutual fund 
expenses is available on the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s web-site at 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mffees.htm#management. Net return refers to gross return net of mutual 
fund’s costs. See Id. 
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 The glossary of statistical terms maintained by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development contains the following definition of commercial paper: commercial paper is an unsecured 
promise to pay a certain amount on a stated maturity date, issued in bearer form. Commercial paper 
enables corporations to raise short-term funds directly from end investors through their own in-house 
commercial paper sales team or via arranged placing through bank dealers. Available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6054.  
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 DOMIAN & REICHENSTEIN, (1998) supra note 126 at 169. See also section 2.2 infra for a 
detailed classification of money market funds. 
131
 According to the Investment Company Institute, as of 30 September 2009, the US money 
market mutual funds had $3.4 billion in total assets under management. See www.ici.org. CraneData’s 
‘Money Fund Intelligence’ reported in its October 2009 issue that approximately 95 per cent of those 
assets was managed by only 25 mutual fund advisors. See http://www.cranedata.us/products/money-fund-
intelligence/. 
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 Supra notes 121, 123, 124 and 126. 
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 See generally SUSAN E.K. CHRISTOFFERSEN & DAVID K. MUSTO, Demand Curves and the 
Pricing of Money Management, 15 Review of Financial Studies 1499, 1524,  (2002). 
134
 The US Securities and Exchange Commission web-site contains the following explanation of 
mutual fund share classes: 
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such as individual customer care, there could be investors less sensitive to expense charges.135 
Therefore, fund managers were able to charge higher expenses without losing all existing 
investors.136 In another study, Christoffersen noted that about half of money market fund 
managers “voluntarily waive fees they have a contractual right to claim”.137 The author found 
that the variation in fee waivers is a significant and differentiating factor in funds’ relative 
performance. Fund managers use fee waivers to strategically adjust net performance, which 
promotes cash inflow and facilitates growth of assets under management.   
Lastly, I note that the studies discussed in this section were all based on a sample of the 
US money market funds. To sum up the findings, money market fund industry’s concentration in 
the US and a high level of fund commoditisation are explained by the fund managers’ inability to 
add value through active portfolio management and interest rate forecasting. The net return to 
investors is highly dependent on the level of fund fees and expenses. However, notwithstanding 
these findings, there could be other factors, mainly a high level of customer service, promoting 
investors’ loyalty regardless of the charged fees.   
1.3.2 Rationale for money market fund development 
As explained in chapter 3, the origin of the US money market fund industry in early 
1970s was inspired by restrictive banking regulation prohibiting bank from paying market rates 
on savings account.138 Thus, despite the restrictions on rates being lifted over 30 years ago, 
academic sources still often rationalize money market funds through the prism of their 
                                                                                                                                                             
Known as ‘multi-class funds,’ some mutual funds offer investors different types of shares, known 
as ‘classes’. Each class will invest in the same ‘pool’ (or investment portfolio) of securities and 
will have the same investment objectives and policies. But each class will have different 
shareholder services and/or distribution arrangements with different fees and expenses and, 
therefore, different performance results. 
Available at: http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfclass.htm.  
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 SUSAN E.K. CHRISTOFFERSEN, Why Do Money Fund Managers Voluntarily Waive Their 
Fees?, 56 Journal of Finance 1117, 1140,  (2001) at 2. 
138
 Chapter 3 infra offers an extensive historical narrative in the origin and development of the US 
money market industry including consideration of their competitive position vis-à-vis banks. 
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competitive position vis-à-vis banks.139 In 1983 Rosen et al. was amongst the first researchers to 
advance a hypothesis explaining the money market funds’ popularity by the rational consumer 
response to the inability of regulated financial institutions to offer the market rate of return on 
retail deposits.140 The theory predicted that “full deregulation of financial institutions will, in all 
likelihood, in turn, lead to the end of the money market mutual fund experiment in ad hoc 
deregulation.”141 The current size of the US money market fund industry has proved this theory 
wrong.142  
The real drivers behind commercial success of the US money market funds could be 
attributed to unique elements of money market fund operations as documented by industry 
insiders and finance journalists.143 For example, Nocera attributes the emergence of the US 
money market funds and their early popularity to the existence of Regulation Q,144 which 
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 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 5 Wis. L. Rev. 
1155,  (2010) at 1193. The author attempts to explain the growth of assets under management in the US 
money market funds by arbitrage between banking and securities regulations. While banks have to carry 
costs of deposit insurance and capital reserves, money market funds, free of such costs, are able to offer 
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hazard and promotes unsound business practices thus increasing a likelihood of systemic failure. The 
regulatory proposals offered in the article call for one of two solutions: (1) prohibiting money market 
funds from offering an investment product resembling bank deposits, or (2) subjecting money market 
funds to bank-like regulation including deposit insurance. 
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 KENNETH T. ROSEN & LARRY KATZ, Money Market Mutual Funds: An Experiment in Ad Hoc 
Deregulation: A Note, 38 (6) Journal of Finance,  (1983) at 1015.  
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 Id. at 1017. The portfolio theory model leads to a conclusion that the household's allocation of 
net worth is based on risk-return considerations, subject to a wealth constraint, i.e., consumer flows will 
leave low-yielding bank deposits for comparably low risk MMF shares.   
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 The success of the US money market funds after the ceiling on deposits’ interest rates was 
finally lifted in 1986 is illustrated by the growth of assets under management in these funds from $292 
billion at the end of 1986 to the all-times high of $3.8 billion at the end of 2009, according to the ICI data. 
This constitutes approximately 12.5 per cent annual asset growth rate over the 23-year period.  
143
 See, e.g., Joseph Nocera, A Piece of the Action: How the Middle Class Joined the Money 
Class   (Simon & Schuster. 1994). at 74. The author describes the fundamental market conditions such as 
a sharp increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in late 1960s and early 1970s and interest rate ceiling 
restrictions placed on banks’ savings account knows as Regulation Q that led to emergence of the US 
money market funds. See also Matthew P. Fink, The Rise of Mutual Funds: An Insider's View   (Oxford 
University Press. 2008). at 80. The author explains that higher-yielding financial instruments such as 
Treasury bills and jumbo certificates of deposit in excess of $100,000 were largely unavailable to an 
average American. Money market funds pooled assets of small investors to offer them a higher rate of 
return that was previously only available to institutional investors.  
144
 Section 11 of the Banking Act of 1933 (12 USC. 371a), which is implemented by Regulation 
Q (12 CFR part 217), regulates interest paid to bank depositors. The ceilings on savings accounts were for 
the most part lifted by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (12 
USC. 226 note). 
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limited, among other requirements, interest that US banks were allowed to pay on savings 
accounts.145 However, he also noted that by the time the restrictions of Regulation Q were fully 
phased out in 1986, money market funds gained momentum offering both the yield and the 
convenience of a checking account to retail investors. 146  
In the economic review issued by the Federal Bank for Richmond in 1979, Cook et al. 
sought to determine whether money market funds are a lasting financial innovation or merely a 
reaction to restrictive banking regulation. Two explanations for the explosive growth of money 
market funds in the US were offered: higher yield relative to banks’ savings accounts and service 
in managing short-term assets and liabilities.147 The latter interpretation has illustrated a 
permanent change in the way many market participants managed their liquid assets. Thus, money 
market funds’ continuing strong position is explained by their important role in the global 
liquidity markets.148  
My analysis of the US money market fund growth in chapter 3 offers an additional 
critique of the regulatory arbitrage-based hypothesis.  Restrictive banking regulation that limited 
interest paid on savings accounts was fully phased out by 1986 eliminating money market fund 
yield advantage introduced by regulatory arbitrage.149 Yet, the US money market funds’ assets 
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 See, e.g., JOHN F. MCDONALD & DANIEL P. MCMILLEN, Urban Economics and Real Estate: 
Theory and Policy   (Blackwell Publishing. 2007). at 255. The authors note that when nominal interest 
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 See TIMOTHY Q. COOK & JEREMY G. DUFFIELD, Money Market Mutual Funds: a Reaction to 
Government Regulations or a Lasting Financial Innovation? , 65 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond: 
Economic Review,  (1979) at 17. The authors noted that the yield differential between interest rates paid 
on banks’ savings accounts and banks’ three-month certificates of deposits offered in $100,000 
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 Id. at 18.  
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 VIKTORIA BAKLANOVA, Money Market Funds: An Introduction to the Literature  (2010) at 8. 
R. ALTON GILBERT, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It Passed Away  (Federal Reserve 
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under management continued to grow over years reaching their all time high in January 2009.150 
Furthermore, these funds have retained the relatively stable asset level through a prolonged 
period of ultra-low interest rates in 2007 through the present.151 The post-crisis analysis of 
money market funds’ cash flows illustrates that investors are willing to pay a high price for the 
safety of their money.152 For example, Fidelity Investments, the largest US manager of money 
market funds, confirmed through surveying its money market fund investors that both retail and 
institutional client value safety and daily access to funds the most, while the level of return is 
regarded as being the distant third investment objective.153     
Pozsar explained the institutional preference for managing cash pools outside the 
traditional banking systems largely by the poor track record of bank management, which became 
evident in the post-crisis environment.154 Only in the US there were 388 instances of bank 
failures since 2000 with 336 banks failed in three years from 2008 through 2011.155 These 
statistics look rather alarming especially against the backdrop of the track record of the US 
money market funds that have only passed losses onto investors twice since their origin in the 
early 1970s.156 The limited bank deposit coverage up to a legally established amount is one of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bank of St. Louis February 1986) at 31. The article offers the rationale behind Regulation Q, analyses its 
effectives and provides a schedules of phase-out steps.   
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 Investment Company Fact Book: A Review of Trends and Activities in the Investment 
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Banking System (International Monetary Fund  August 2011). 
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sustained principal losses due to a large exposure to government adjustable rate securities. As interest 
rates increased, these floating rate securities lost value. The fund was liquidated paying investors 96 cents 
per share. This was the first failure in the then 23 year history of money funds and there were no further 
failures for 14 years.  
On 16 September 2008 The Reserve Primary Fund, which was at the time the third largest US 
MMF with roughly $63 billion in assets under management, found itself holding defaulted Lehman 
56 
 
the two basic reasons explaining why money market funds continue to be a safe haven for cash 
even in the ultra-low yield environment. 157  
The second reason relates to the money market fund function as providers of a low cost 
outsourcing solution for a highly resource intense area of corporate liquidity management.158 
Lastly, the popularity of US and European money market funds could be explained by their role 
as funding sources for various economic actors from consumers to corporations to state and local 
governments.159 So far academic researchers largely seem to miss these evidences of investor 
preferences perhaps due to lack of publicly available data on money market fund shareholder 
base. This thesis inter alia seeks to close this gap.         
1.3.3 Legal issues pertaining to money market funds 
Being direct competitors to bank deposits and resembling bank accounts in terms of 
check writing capabilities, money market funds have presented unique issues under banking 
laws.  Money market funds compete with banks for the same money. This business competition 
propagated never ending regulatory debates of security markets and banking authorities over the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Brothers’ commercial paper in the total amount of $785 million. The Reserve’s Board of Directors made 
a decision to write the value of these holdings down to zero, which caused the fund’s net asset value to 
decline below $1.00 to $0.97. The event of the fund’s NAV decline below $1.00 is known in the industry 
as ‘breaking the buck’. See also SEC Rel. No. IC–28807 Money Market Fund Reform (Proposing 
Release)  (74 FR 32688  8 July 2009) at nn.30, 44, 45, and accompanying text. See also HENRY 
SHILLING, Sponsor Support Key to Money Market Funds  (Moody's Investors Service  August 2010) 
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 The maximum deposit size covered under the federal deposit insurance has been $100,000 per 
an account per a financial institution since 1970s until 2008, when the insured account cap was raised to 
$250,000. See also JONATHAN R. MACEY, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual 
Funds as Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits  (Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 
422  2011) at 38. 
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 See, e.g., Comment Letter on the President’s Working Group Report on Money Market Fund 
Reform (Release No. IC-29497; File No. 4-619) signed by Agilent Technologies, Inc. and fifteen other 
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current form would make short-term financing for American businesses far more costly. See also The 
contribution of IMMFA funds to the Money Markets  (PricewaterhouseCoopers  2011) [PwC Report] at 
5. 
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 See, e.g., ICI Report supra note 21 at 1. The report lists economic actors relying on money 
market funds as sources of funding. See also PwC Report supra note 158 at 4. The report lists European 
money market fund contributions in various economic regions and financial markets. 
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fate of the money market fund industry.160 Kalogeras observed that the growth of assets under 
management of money market funds coincides with the periods of high interest rates.161 Asset 
decline would normally coincide with the periods of low interest rates when investors re-allocate 
their cash from safe, but low-yielding money market funds to riskier investment options.   
Consumer preference for investing in money market funds instead of bank deposits 
during the periods of high interest rates has always been a subject of lobbying efforts by the 
banking industry. Greenberg analysed advantages and disadvantages of money market fund 
investments alongside an insightful review of their risk-return trade off.162 By the early 1980s, 
the money market fund benefits to consumers were so well publicized that the Fed had to side 
with the mutual funds industry and against banks. The main social benefit of money market 
funds was found in enabling small investors to access higher yielding financial products earlier 
only available to institutional investors and larger businesses.   
In his statements to Congress, J. Charles Partee, a member of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, noted:  
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 On January 24, 1980 in his statement before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, J. Charles Partee, a member of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System noted the substitutability of money market fund shares for 
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 G. KALOGERAS, Examining the Money Market Funds, 164 Banker's Magazine,  (1981) 
162
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4 (1) Journal of Financial Planning,  (1983) at 43:  
Some of the advantages of investing in a money market mutual fund as opposed to a savings 
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Corporation [up to a certain amount]. 
The author also compared the return of Capital Preservation Fund, Inc. invested exclusively in 
government securities with maturities of one year or less with return one would have received by 
investing in 3-month US Treasury bills. Direct purchases of the US Treasury bills would have 
outperformed the fund’s return in a period of rising interest rates and underperformed in a period of 
falling interest rates. 
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To limit yields on money market funds not only would be anticonsumer--and inconsistent 
with the nation's need to encourage saving--but would also fail to recognize the inherent 
distinctions between deposits and money market fund shares.'163 
Nonetheless, despite the compelling arguments against bank-like regulation of money 
market fund, the idea of imposing capital reserve requirements on these funds has surfaced 
periodically several times over the next three decades and still continue being debated.  
Dwyer et al. investigated the issue of money market fund monetary liabilities and found 
that initially money market funds were not legally required to redeem their liabilities at the initial 
value of investments.164 However, the US securities regulators and money market funds 
themselves made substantial efforts to avoid fund share price deviations from its par value of a 
dollar.165 Thus, money market funds are perceived as a medium of exchange characterized by 
promised redemption at par value on demand.166 This assumption made money market fund 
shares seem equal to the banks’ demand deposits in the minds of some investors adding weight 
to those proponents of bank-like capital reserve requirements for money market funds.167  
The demand for safe, high quality financial instruments fuelled growth on the US money 
market funds amongst other high quality assets.168 The legal structure of these funds and 
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 See, e.g., BEN S. BERNANKE, International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the 
United States, 15 Banque de France Financial Stability Review (2011). 
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oversight by the US Securities and Exchange Commission provided a rationale for these funds to 
function outside banking regulation.169 The most recent academic studies, conducted after the 
post-crisis amendments to the US money market fund regulation were implemented in May 
2010, concluded that further money market fund reforms involving a wholesale change of the 
structure of these funds may place broader capital markets in “substantial and unnecessary 
danger”.170 Furthermore, the industry research pointed to a danger that dismantling the 
convenient and efficient structure of money market funds may chase cash management and 
related risks in other unregulated financial products.171 Chapter 3 analyses possible future 
options for the US money market fund industry arising from these debates. 
1.3.4 ‘Shadow banks’ and systemic risk 
The post-mortem of the recent credit crisis has produced a vast literature on financial 
innovations collectively referred to as a ‘shadow banking’ system.172 In these sources money 
market funds are described as major funding venues for ‘shadow banks’ that exert a high level of 
influence on credit availability for both financial institutions and real economy. The credit crisis 
has exposed a high level of interconnectedness of the modern capital market through financial 
innovations and placed its actors, including money market funds, squarely in the centre of 
regulatory debate.  
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maturity and liquidity transformation. See also RICKS, Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation  supra 
note 41. The author proposed functional criteria for policy interventions in activities of ‘shadow banks’. 
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These debates are mainly concerned with the emergence and propagation of systemic 
risks that the current regulatory architecture is ill suited to capture. Schwarcz argued that with the 
growth of intermediation greater regulatory focus should be placed on relationship between 
markets and institutions.173 He defined risks to financial system arising from lack of sufficient 
incentives for an individual institution to internalize its costs of failure as systemic risk and 
ascribed law a role in reducing systemic risk.174 I draw on these sources in section 1.2 that 
analyses the traditional justifications for financial regulation and their applicability to money 
market funds.   
My review of relevant literature is concluded with studies that analyse market failures 
due to complexity and financial contagion. For example, Schwarcz purports that “complexity not 
only makes it impossible to predict how future financial crises will arise but also makes it more 
likely that regulation can lead to unintended, and often adverse, consequences”.175 Establishing a 
stand-by market liquidity facility that would support investments in the failing market was 
suggested as a solution averting irrationality of the market panic.176 Another strand of academic 
literature, however, maintains that during times of severe stress “the price of the assets may fall 
below their fundamental value and be determined by the available liquidity in the market”.177 
Therefore, because private market actors are unable to maintain an optimal level of liquidity, 
such a liquidity provider of the last resort must inevitably come from public sources.178 Indeed, 
one of the proposed solutions to a potential liquidity squeeze in the money markets in a form of a 
private liquidity facility was rejected on these grounds as explained in section 3.5 infra.     
The noted lack of secondary market liquidity for complex financial instruments was 
researched by Brunnermeier et al. who noted a challenge in developing a workable definition of 
complexity in financial markets. The authors offered three different ways we can cope with 
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complexity.179 One of them, standardisation and commoditisation of financial products, is 
currently embraced by money market fund regulators. I argue in section 4.5 that a quest for 
standardisation of investment parameters in money market funds is likely to result in unintended 
consequences of industry concentration which, in turn, leads to increase, rather than decrease, of 
systemic risk.180 This is because harmonised regulation is likely to create incentives for regulated 
organisations to engage homogenous business practices thus heightening the risk of contagion 
and a coordinated failure should such regulation err.181 I draw on these finding in chapter 6 
presenting my normative proposals.  
1.3.5 Conclusion 
The body of literature on various aspects of money market funds has been growing 
rapidly post-crisis fuelled by an increased public and regulatory scrutiny of the money market 
sector. My overview of financial studies, historical essays, legal and regulatory documents 
provides just the first glimpse into my research subject. The discussion of the most recent 
academic research with its vastly divergent policy recommendations reflects the complexity of 
the issues surrounding money market funds and the high societal impact of any regulatory 
changes.182 While regulators call for sweeping changes in the structure of the money markets, 
practitioners argue that any more changes are likely to be counterproductive chasing cash 
management into less transparent corners of the market.183  
The obvious conclusion drawn from the literature reviewed here is that in 3.5 years after 
the dramatic failure of Lehman Brothers, that inflicted a severe stress on the money market fund 
industry, academic sources have failed to offer an acceptable solution to the public policy debate 
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related to money market funds.184 Given the divergent perspectives expressed in the literature, 
the ultimate contribution of this thesis is to offer a normative view on money market fund 
regulations that supports and promotes two overarching regulatory objectives – investor 
protection and systemic stability – on the international level. The following chapter 2 analyses 
wide social benefits of money market funds and discussed the risks these funds can introduce to 
the global capital markets. The discussion underscores the need for internationally coordinated 
financial regulation of the money market fund industry.   
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CHAPTER 2: MONEY MARKET FUND INDUSTRY PROFILE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the essential characteristics of money market funds in the US and 
the EU (the current regulation of money market funds in the US and the EU will be subject to 
legal analysis in chapters 3 and 4). It also discusses their benefits to the global capital markets 
and their weaknesses as exposed by the financial crisis. To begin with, section 2.2 provides the 
historical background and the classification of the money market fund industry. Section 2.3 
outlines the essential function of these funds as financial intermediaries and a major provider of 
short-term capital to various economic actors, while section 2.4 specifies their role in the 
financial crisis.  
To be noted, an essential challenge to an account of the money market fund industry 
profile is that money market funds are not uniformly defined at national levels. In effect, the 
available academic sources often do not provide differentiation of fund types, but rather focus on 
the US prime money market funds by default. The basis for painting all money market funds 
with the same brush is the size of the assets under management of the US prime money market 
funds, which is the biggest segment of the industry.185 All other types of money market funds in 
the US and EU are assumed to be sufficiently homogeneous with respect to their investment 
policies, structure, domicile, and investor base.186 In fact this assumption does not hold true. 
Money market funds domiciled in the EU may have vastly different characteristics – although 
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some of them may have a strong resemblance with those funds in the US.187 However, a 
significant number of European money market funds have little in common with their US peers. 
A detailed classification of money market funds is especially important in light of the on-
going regulatory discussions that portrait money market fund industry as a whole as a major 
propagator of systemic shocks.188 Recalling the research question – how should money market 
funds be regulated? – I would like to start with a detailed analysis of what kinds of money 
market funds exist today, why and where. This chapter lays a foundation on the normative 
proposals in chapter 6 by, first, determining whether greater risks are harboured by any particular 
types of money market funds, which, therefore, may entail specifically targeted policy actions. 
Second, it demonstrates a wide range of societal benefits that money market funds provide to 
various economic actors underscoring contributions of these funds to economic progress, societal 
welfare and promotion of individual capabilities thus reiterating the need for an effective 
regulation focused on investor protection and systemic stability. Lastly, this chapter uncovers 
money market funds’ vulnerability to systemic events that manifested themselves during the 
financial crises and reviews policy actions taken by various regulators to contain risk of a run on 
these funds.                       
2.2 Classification of money market funds 
To my knowledge, no widely accepted classification of money market funds domiciled in 
the US and EU has been compiled; as such this classification system is original. A necessity for 
developing a classification system encompassing money market funds arises from two sources. 
First, different types of fund entail varying degrees of risk and tend to offer different levels of 
return as shown later in this section. Thus, an effective normative proposal ought to incorporate 
considerations of money market fund types in order to better achieve its goals. Second, this 
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section is aimed to inform the on-going regulatory efforts to take an inventory of money market 
funds as requested by the Financial Stability Board.189 This task is currently undertaken by the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions and it is my hope that this thesis could 
contribute to the Organisation’s effort.     
I start my review of fund types with a diagram in exhibit 3 that lays out a classification 
system for money market funds alongside their respective assets under management as of 
autumn 2011.190 The size of the assets under management helps to gauge investor acceptance and 
a relative importance of each type for the capital markets.  
Exhibit 2: Classification of money market funds 
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Prime Money Market Funds
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Government Money Market Funds
$63 bil/€18 bil/£3 bil (2%)





Money market funds are a relatively recent development for the global capital markets. 
The very first money market fund was established in 1968 in Brazil. John Oswin Schroy, the 
founder of a large Brazilian broker-dealer firm S-N Investimentos S.A., created Conta Garantia 
a collective investment vehicle that served one specific purpose: it pooled small investments into 
a large portfolio order to facilitate sales of letras de cambio, Brazilian low denomination 
commercial paper certificates.191 This fund had all essential attributes of a contemporary money 
market fund, namely invested in a portfolio of short-term high quality fixed income obligations 
with a goal of providing safety of principal and on-demand liquidity.192 Indeed, Conta 
Garantia’s portfolio was invested in short-term commercial paper and Brazilian treasury bills; 
and it issued and repurchased its own shares continually at a stable unit price.193  
The US money market funds can be traced to the autumn of 1972, when the Reserve 
Fund, the very first US money market fund was opened to investors.194 While today there are 
hundreds of money market funds in Brazil, they could not rival the size of the US money market 
fund industry. European money market funds arrived in late 1980s mainly in France and have 
quickly become a popular low risk investment option for retail investors and pension schemes.195 
Other European countries developed their own localised version of money market funds, but 
could never reach the size of either the US or French money market fund industries. Ireland and 
Luxembourg, the major European fund administration centres, played a pivotal role in the 
facilitating the growth of the European money market fund industry. Funds domiciled in these 
countries were mainly distributed cross-border to institutional investors and grew rapidly due to 
increasing demand for professional liquidity management from multi-national corporations 
expanding their business globally. 
Exhibit 2 depicts the current size of assets under management of money market funds by 
countries. 
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Exhibit 3: Assets under Management of Money Market Funds196 
 
This thesis focuses exclusively on the US and European money market funds and, 
therefore, money market funds domiciled elsewhere in the world are omitted from any further 
discussions. In this thesis European money market funds mean mainly those funds domiciled in 
the EU countries also distinctions are blurred between money market funds in the EU and those 
funds domiciled in other developed European countries. As explained in chapter 3 infra, the US 
money market funds are defined under the federal securities law and it is unlawful in the US for 
other investment funds to market themselves as money market funds unless they meet regulatory 
rules governing these funds.197  
European money market funds are defined by the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators’ (‘CESR’) Guidelines on a common definition of European money market funds that 
came into effect in May 2011 and are currently administered by the European Securities and 
Markets Authorities.198 These funds, domiciled in the different EU countries, are governed by 
national laws of the respective country of domicile, whose interpretation of the common 
definition guidelines could vary. Furthermore, national regulators may introduce additional 
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money market fund-targeted laws, if warranted. Thus, European money market funds have 
historically had varying risk characteristics, which in turn, resulted in lack of cross-border 
comparability.  
Being a collective investment scheme, European money market funds may choose to be 
authorised under the Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities (‘UCITS 
Directive’).199 Such UCITS authorised money market funds must follow risk-spreading rules laid 
out in the UCITS Directive as transposed into the respective national laws. Finally, European 
money market funds are subject to other relevant notices and guidelines, which provide 
recommendations with respect to operational, accounting and risk management issues.200  
2.2.2 Portfolio currency 
Second, money market funds can be differentiated on the basis of portfolio currency. The 
US money market funds only invest in securities denominated in US dollars and are not allowed 
by regulation to incur currency risk.201 European money market funds may operate in different 
currencies and can also invest in securities denominated in other than portfolio-base currency 
provided that exposure to foreign currency is fully hedged. Thus, investors in European money 
market funds deemed to be protected from any significant exposure to currency risk.202 To 
provide investment opportunities in various portfolio currencies, European money market funds 
are often organised in a form of umbrella funds with multiple sub-funds being managed in 
different currencies.203 For example, an umbrella fund may comprise sub-funds managed in US 
dollars, pounds sterling, euro and other currencies. 204            
                                                 
199
 Directive 2009/65, [2009] OJ L302/32  
200
 See chapter 4 infra for a detailed analysis of the regulatory framework applied to European 
money market funds. 
201
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (c)(3)(i) 
202
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at Box 2, paragraph 11 and Box 3, paragraph 1. 
203
 CATHERINE TURNER, International funds: a practical guide to their establishment and 
operation   (Elsevier Finance 2004). at 50. An umbrella fund is not a legal form, but rather a form of a 
capital structure of a open-ended collective investment scheme, which may, in most jurisdictions, be 
adopted any legal forms that open-ended schemes are allowed to adopt. An umbrella structure is usually 
implemented to lower the fund’s overheads.   
204
 See, e.g., DWS (CH) – Money Market Umbrella Fund Simplified Prospectus  (DWS 
Investments, Deutsche Bank Group  September 2011). This umbrella fund comprises two sub-funds, 
69 
 
2.2.3 Shareholder base 
Third, I analyse money market funds from the standpoint of their shareholder base. There 
are two types of money market funds shareholders: retail and institutional. In the US money 
market funds are held by approximately 65 per cent of households, which indicates a high level 
of acceptance of these funds by retail investors.205 Institutional investors employ money market 
funds as a cost-effective cash management service with approximately 85 per cent of the US 
companies utilising money market funds for this purpose.206 On aggregate, institutional investors 
account for two-thirds of total assets under management in the US money market funds.207  
Institutional ownership of money market funds is even more pronounced in the EU with 
multinational corporations, financial institutions, wholesale distributors of financial products and 
asset managers themselves are counted amongst the largest investors.208 While the exact amount 
of institutional ownership across all European money market funds is not reported by available 
sources, I estimate it at approximately 70 per cent of the total asset under management.209 A 
consideration of the shareholder type holds a great deal of significance in money market fund 
portfolio management mainly due to differences in shareholder behaviour.210 Academic studies 
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have found that retail and institutional shareholders subject money market funds to vastly 
different degrees of liquidity risk.211 Retail shareholders are presumed as being passive investors, 
who tend to react slow to changing risk characteristics of the fund portfolios as opposed to 
institutional investors, who normally posses greater resources and sophistication to monitor 
portfolio risks and redeem shares pre-emptively.    
Furthermore, the differences in shareholder base expose money market funds to varying 
degrees of concentration risk. Institutional investor-oriented money market funds typically have 
a larger percentage of their assets owned by fewer large shareholders. These shareholders are 
sophisticated investors who tend to act in a coordinated fashion in response to the same market 
development.212 To protect itself from a possible coordinated run by institutional shareholders, a 
money market fund would have to maintain a high level of available liquidity.213 Coordinated 
cash outflows could be incurred for various reasons, not necessarily in response to challenging 
market events. For example, cash outflows are generally higher around corporate tax dates or 
other important dates on the calendar of institutional investors. ‘Yield hunting’ institutional 
investors tend to move cash out of underperforming funds quickly.214 On the other hand, money 
market funds targeted at retail investors generally experience less disruptive cash fluctuation.215 
Thus, institutional investors-oriented money market funds are considered as carrying a greater 
risk of investor run and, therefore, inspire greater systemic stability concerns.216  
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2.2.4 Asset type 
Fourth, money market funds could be classified on the basis of their portfolio 
investments.  The portfolios of these funds typically comprise short-term securities issued by a 
wide range of issuers from state and local governments to governmental and supranational 
agencies to financial institutions and non-financial corporations. Money market funds can also 
invest in short-term asset backed securities and a range of privately negotiated transactions. The 
key requirements for securities to be eligible for money market funds are credit quality and 
maturity. Normally, eligible securities must be of high credit quality and short maturities, 
although specific objective standards concerning credit quality and maturity do vary depending 
on the jurisdiction.217 Market data offer extensive evidence of money market funds being a 
significant source of funding for issuers of short-term securities.218     
Money market funds hold a significant share of the commercial paper market that 
provides short-term funding for corporate borrowers and a large portion of state and local 
government debt markets.219 The US Treasury and government housing agencies also 
substantially rely on money market fund investments.220 Money market funds, especially those 
managed in US dollars, have been one of the major providers of US dollar funding for European 
banks through investments in certificate of deposits and commercial paper issued by these banks. 
For example, the Bank of International Settlements estimated that in 2008 European banks relied 
on the US dollar money market funds for about one eighth of their $8 trillion in US dollar 
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funding.221 This brief description of typical asset types purchased by money market funds 
provides a basis for further classification of funds based in their investment policies. 
Money market funds investing in securities issued or guaranteed by sovereign state 
governments or substantially similar securities are known as government money market funds.222 
These money market funds are not subject to credit risk associated with corporate borrowers due 
to their investment focus exclusively on government securities and, therefore, serve as investors’ 
safe haven in times of market turmoil.223 Money market funds that invest in securities issued by 
corporate entities are referred to as prime money market funds.224 Prime money market funds 
typically invest in high quality commercial paper, including asset-backed commercial paper 
programmes, short-term corporate notes, banks’ certificates of deposit, time deposits and 
repurchase agreements.225 With respect to geographical distribution, prime and government 
money market funds can be found in both the US and Europe although European money market 
fund landscape is dominated by prime money market funds mostly due to lack of significant 
supply of short-term high quality government securities issued by European governments.226 
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 For more details on each type of money market securities see generally MARCIA STIGUM & 
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The last category tax-exempt money market funds can only be found in the US. These 
funds invest mainly in securities issued by the US local governments and municipal entities that 
distribute income generally exempt from the federal income tax. A sub-set of this category, 
single-state tax-exempt money market funds, invests mainly in securities issued by local 
governments and municipalities located in the same state. The ultimate goal of such a narrow 
investment mandate is to provide investors with income generally exempt from federal and local 
income taxes. This type of funds is mainly targeted to retail investors seeking a tax shelter for 
their income and represents the smallest money market fund category in terms of asset under 
management.227       
2.2.5 Asset valuation methodology 
Fifth, money market funds are differentiated on the basis of their asset valuation 
practices. Based on the valuation aspect, two types of money market funds are distinguished: 
constant (or stable) net asset value money market funds and variable net asset value money 
market funds, sometimes also referred to as fluctuating net asset value money market funds.228 
The US money market funds are managed as constant net asset value money market funds.229 
The constant net asset value per share is achieved through the use of amortised cost accounting 
in valuation of portfolio securities and further round of resulting per share value to the nearest 
cent.230 European money market funds, however, could feature either constant or variable net 
asset value.231 A sub-set of European money market funds that mimics their US peers is 




 Constant net asset value money market funds are purchased and sold by investors at a constant 
share price, such as $1.00, £1.00, €1.00, depending on the portfolio base currency. Specific accounting 
practices are used to maintain the share price constant. See, e.g., OHLBAUM SWIRSKY. supra note 104 at 
16 – 19. Variable net asset value money market funds do not maintain a constant share price.  
229
 Although regulation of the US money market funds permits use of other methods, the absolute 
majority of the US money market funds managed to a constant net asset value per share. Chapter 3 infra 
provides exhaustive details of the US money market funds asset valuation practices. Historically, the 
majority of the US money market funds operate at the constant net asset value per share of $1.00 
although regulation allows a money market fund to set any value at which to stabilise its share price. See 
Id. at 16.  
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 Id. at 16 – 19. In addition to the amortised cost accounting and rounding, in the US the 
constant net asset value per share is maintained by accruing portfolio income separately from capital 
gain/loss. Portfolio income is accrued daily and paid out monthly.  
231
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at 5. The guidelines define variable net asset value money 
market funds as funds that do not offer constant net asset value per share. 
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managed as constant net asset value money market funds. These European funds are sometimes 
referred to as the US-style money market funds.232 Money market funds domiciled in Continental 
European countries mainly feature variable net asset value per share.233     
Chapter 3 and 4 infra provide generous historical details and discuss the national 
arrangements underlying the discussed particularities of the money market fund accounting 
practices. Ultimately a choice of an accounting method is largely driven by investor preferences 
and their risk tolerance level within the scope of a particular regulatory regime. The constant net 
asset value per share structure adopted by the US money market funds is overwhelmingly 
preferred by institutional investors who use these funds as a cost-effective way to manage daily 
liquidity needs.234 The same type of an investment vehicle offers retail investors an alternative to 
bank savings accounts.235 On the other hand, my study of the money market fund history in 
Europe found that retail investors may also view money market funds as a low risk investment 
alternative and could tolerate a limited level of share price fluctuation as long as it remains 
consistent with their perception of low risk.236 
This section showed that the current structure of the money market funds industry is 
geared towards meeting the needs of investors with different types of fund products designed 
according to their operational and tax requirements as well as risk and return preferences. 
Understandably, the industry structure that was so fine tuned to meet multiple investors’ 
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 Chapter 4 infra provides historical background explaining an adoption of a particular 
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 DONALD AIKEN, IMMFA Money Market Funds Have Come of Age (Institutional Money 
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response to the US Securities and Exchange Commission request for comments to PWG's Report  
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4-619.shtml,  e.g.,  Commet Letter Re: File No. 4-619, 
President’s Working Group Report on Money Market Fund Reform  (The Financial Services Roundtable  
30 June 2011) at 2 – 3. The letter states that many institutional investors are prohibited from investing in a 
variable net asset value fund by the virtue of corporate investment policies.    
235
 ICI Report supra note 21 at 25. The report explains that at the retail level, money market funds 
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market deposit accounts. 
236
 See, e.g., POIZOT, et al., (2006) supra note 209 at 5. The report explains that due to income 
accumulation by French money market funds and not paying it out regularly like the US money market 
funds do, investors perceive that the net asset value of French money market funds is steadily improving, 
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demands has led to a wide acceptance of money market funds internationally and in the US, in 
particular. Indeed, global assets under management of money market funds reached their all-time 
high in January 2009 at approximately $5.8 trillion with the US money market funds accounting 
for over two thirds of that amount.237 Although approximately $1.7 trillion have flown out of 
money market funds between 2009 and 2011, the size of assets that money market funds still 
manage evidence an importance of these funds for the global capital markets. The next section is 
focused on the benefits of money market funds for issuers and investors and explains relationship 
of these funds with various economic actors.       
2.3 Benefits to protect 
The emphasis of the public policy debate surrounding money market funds so far has 
mostly been placed on their perceived risks, whether in terms of consumer protection or financial 
stability, and on the ways in which these can be minimised.238 Largely missing from this debate 
are the wide socio-economic gains resulting from money market fund activities. This section 
examines the benefits of money market fund activities: the private ones accruing to money 
market fund investors through improvement in their personal wealth as well as the public 
benefits to the financial system accruing by the virtue of diversifying funding sources and 
improving liquidity.239 Risks and perceived fragilities of the money market fund industry are 
addressed in section 2.4 infra.      
2.3.1 Benefits to investors: creation of wealth and capital formation 
Money market funds are uniquely positioned as suppliers of credit and liquidity to the 
financial system. Given a high level of penetration of these funds into household finances and 
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 Assets under management of the US money market funds reached an all-time high of $3.9 
trillion in the week of 14 January 2009. There assets were managed by 784 funds. In Europe, assets under 
management amounted to $1.3 trillion and were invested in 1,600 funds. The rest of the world accounted 
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 See generally PWG's Report supra note 7. The report outlines seven public policy option 
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 See, e.g., ICI Submission to IOSCO supra note 171 at 4 – 6. It should be noted that private 
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educational institutions and other funds managed for public benefits.   
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corporate cash management, social gains of money market fund activities do not accrue solely to 
the industry participants, but benefit nearly all strata of the society. The most tangible and 
observable benefit is accrued to fund shareholders in a form of excess return earned by money 
market funds versus other comparable investment options such as an interest-bearing bank 
account. For example, an investment of $1000 in the average money market fund at the 
beginning of 1999 would have earned excess income of $200 over the average bank account by 
the end of 2008.240 Even though the absolute amount looks inconsequential in the context of the 
ten-year time frame, it translates into 20 per cent of relative investments benefit. Over the last 25 
years, due to the yield differential between bank deposits and the US money market funds, 
money market fund investors have increased their returns by over $450 billion.241   
Second, money market funds have earned reputation for safety. In the 40-year history of 
the US money market funds, only two money market funds have failed to return the full principal 
value.242 This is an exceptionally strong track record, which encourages investor participation 
especially at the time of stress.243  The US Treasury’s Temporary Guarantee that was established 
in September 2008 to support the US money market fund industry was terminated in 2009 
resulting in $1.2 billion in revenue for the federal government. No money market funds drew on 
this programme.244 European money market funds likewise serve as a safe investment alternative 
to equity and longer-dated fixed income investments especially at the time of stress.245      
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On the other side of the equation are the borrowers – governments, corporation and even 
consumers, albeit indirectly – relying on money market funds for funding options. An access to 
deep and liquid public markets provides significant cost benefits for the borrowers and 
diversifies their funding options.246 The next section describes money market fund relationship 
with various economic actors who rely on these funds for a short-term funding.    
2.3.2 Benefits to the capital markets: diversification of funding and cost saving 
Money market funds provide a valuable funding diversification option for debt issuers. A 
deep and liquid public market offers a choice to tap either long-term or short-term funding 
options while considering the optimal capital structure. While it is often preferable to issue 
longer duration securities to reduce the mismatch of the duration of assets and liabilities and 
avoid uncertainty related to the need for frequent refinancing, borrowers recognize that access to 
the money market as beneficial for lowering their costs of funding. Depending on their types of 
business and capital structures, they may choose from commercial paper, discount notes, variable 
or floating rate notes, certificate of deposits, repurchase agreements and others.247  
2.3.2.1 Benefits to non-financial corporations: access to capital markets and funding 
flexibility 
Non-financial corporations refer to brick and mortar businesses and other producers of 
goods and services in contrast to financial entities. These corporations typically access the 
money market to meet short-term liquidity needs such as timing mismatch between payroll 
payments and collection of revenues. Corporations also use the money market as a source of 
bridge financing for mergers or acquisitions or to borrow against forthcoming bond proceeds 
until they can arrange or complete longer-term funding.248  
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High quality non-financial corporations normally access the money markets by issuing 
commercial paper or medium-term notes.249 Commercial paper is issued to fund day-to-day 
operations at interest rates that typically less than bank loans.250 Funding in the commercial 
paper market is also more flexible. If corporate funding needs decrease, commercial paper 
quickly matures and is not re-issued as opposed to a bank loan facility for which a borrower 
would have to pay an additional non-usage fee.  
Interest rate data for seasoned industrial corporate bonds and commercial paper presented 
in Annex B demonstrate that cost saving of commercial paper issuance is significant. Annual 
yield differential between commercial paper and corporate bonds over the last five years 
averages to 3.4 per cent, i.e., a corporation borrowing $100 million in commercial paper would, 
on average, save $3.4 million a year in interest payments.251 A non-tangible benefit of the use of 
the commercial paper market related to diversification of corporate funding sources by accessing 
various types of short-term institutional investors, including money market funds.  
2.3.2.2 Benefits to bank: funding in foreign currencies and reduction of trade 
imbalance  
Notwithstanding a fierce competition for investors between banks and money market 
funds, money market funds serve as an important source of funding for banks and finance 
companies. Banks borrow in the money market to finance their short-term assets including credit 
card receivables, auto loans, or other consumer loans.252 In addition, US dollar-denominated 
money market funds serve as a major source of dollar funding needs for non-US banks and 
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European banks.253 The international trade imbalances have caused the transatlantic asymmetry 
of funding in which US dollar-denominated assets of European banks are currently almost ten 
times higher than assets of US banks denominated in various European currencies.254 The US 
dollar-denominated assets of European banks have grown rapidly over the past decade from 
approximately $2 trillion in 1999 to more than $8 trillion in 2008.255 This dynamic presents the 
major challenge for non-US banks in financing their US-dollar denominated assets and their US-
dollar operations.   
Commercial banks traditionally finance themselves by attracting retail deposits.256 While 
retail deposits are the most desirable and stable type of funding for banks, many banks have to 
turn to the wholesale funding to meet their funding in other currencies.257 US-dollar denominated 
money market funds have long been natural providers of short-term dollar financing for non-US 
banks in the wholesale funding market.258 US dollar denominated money market funds invest a 
large part of their assets in certificate of deposits, time deposits and commercial paper issued by 
non-US banks.259 Non-US banks also have an option to enter repurchase agreement transactions 
with money market funds and obtain short-term, normally overnight, US-dollar funding in 
exchange for collateral consisting of banks’ assets.260  
The funding relationship between money market funds and non-US banks is non-trivial 
resulting in non-US banks dwarfing US banks as money market funds’ counterparties: over 40 
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per cent of the US money market funds’ assets are invested in securities issued by European 
banks only.261 Canadian, Asian and Australian banks are also having substantial presence in the 
US money market.262 These statistics illustrate an importance of money market funds as 
providers of wholesale funding for banks internationally.     
2.3.2.3 Benefits to securities firms: inventory funding and market liquidity 
Money market funds are even more critical for the securities firms such as broker/dealers 
as investors in commercial paper, short-term notes and repurchase agreements issued by 
securities firms.263 For example, in the repo market, which is used by securities firms to finance 
their inventories and is estimated to be of approximately $1.7 trillion in the first quarter 2010, the 
US money market funds are responsible for nearly a quarter of all transactions.264  
It should be noted that a high level of money market fund participation in the repo market 
is a function of regulatory requirements.265 Under the US regulation and the Code of Practice 
adopted by a large number of European US-style money market funds, these funds have to 
allocate ten and five per cent of their assets, respectively, to daily liquid securities.266 Repo 
transactions fit the regulatory definition of a daily liquid asset making it a desirable investment 
option for these money market funds. Hence a symbiotic relationship between securities firms 
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and money market funds in which securities firms seek inexpensive and flexible ways of 
financing their trading books and money market funds seek liquid investments.267    
2.3.2.4 Benefits to local governments and municipalities: lowered borrowing cost 
Money market funds are the major investors in securities issued by local governments 
and municipalities.268 Public issuers turn to the money market to bridge the timing gap between 
expenditures and tax receipts by issuing short-term notes.269 Municipalities and other entities 
performing essential public services also come to the market to fund their projects such as 
building and maintaining roads, bridges, airports, water and sewage treatment facilities, 
hospitals, and low-income housing. Appetite for municipal securities from retail investors is 
quite significant due to tax-exempt nature of the US municipal debt. Because public issuers such 
as schools and hospitals normally borrow smaller amounts relative to banks or large 
corporations, the municipal market is more fragmented, less transparent and generally illiquid. 
Thus, the intermediating role of money market funds in this market is particularly important.270  
Moreover, public issuers have historically been issuing long-term bonds with tenors of 
ten to 30 years to match the bond payment schedule with the long life of public projects.271 With 
the emergence of money market funds as a source of short-term funding, municipalities accrue 
significant savings in interest payments. To meet money market fund demand for short-term 
securities municipalities’ debt of a long tenor is shortened by including a tender provision. The 
tender option enables the investor to sell back the long-dated municipal bond on a short notice, 
typically seven days.272 Such ‘shortened’ municipal securities are called variable rate demand 
obligations. Variable rate demand obligations enable local governments and public entities to 
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borrow long-term, yet paying lower interest rate.273 The market for variable rate demand 
obligations has developed in 1980s; by 2010 money market funds held over 56 per cent of all 
outstanding short-term US municipal debt.274         
2.3.2.5 Benefits to state governments: a major source of funding 
Securities issued by state governments, their agencies and supranational organisations 
account for a substantial part of money market fund portfolios. As explained in section 2.2, 
government money market funds are obligated by the terms of their offering documents to invest 
substantially all their assets in government securities. These assets under management of the US 
government money market funds spiked from $900 billion in August 2008 to almost $1.5 trillion 
in December 2008 after default of Lehman Brothers, when investors sought safety of the US 
government securities.275 The US money market funds currently hold close to 37 per cent of all 
outstanding short-term debt of the US government agencies including two major US housing 
agencies, the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation, often referred to as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.276 Money market funds hold 12 
per cent of all outstanding US Treasury securities.277 
Investors’ risk aversion, which increased post-crisis, also led a number of European asset 
managers to offer money market funds investing exclusively in securities issued by European 
sovereign governments.278 Even though the contribution of European money market funds in the 
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government securities market in Europe is currently relatively modest, these funds do have a role 
in offering an option to those investors seeking safety of government securities.279       
2.3.2.6 Benefits to structured finance issuers: source of capital and liquidity 
Starting in 1970s, in parallel with growth of money market funds, other new financial 
products rapidly developed. The general direction of this trend was to achieve an optimal 
employment of capital through managing some of the banks’ assets off-balance sheet and, thus, 
avoiding certain costs and capital reserve requirements.280 For example, as a result of this trend, 
by 2007 more credit card debt was financed outside the banking system through the issuance of 
asset-backed securities.281 Segregating banks’ assets into legally separated entities called special 
purpose vehicles allowed banks to finance their assets with securities issued in the public market 
instead of banks’ own liabilities.282 Such special purpose vehicles are often referred as shadow 
banks. Despite the negative connotation associated with the word shadow, there are tangible 
social benefits of such as alternative providers of credit and liquidity.283        
Asset-backed commercial paper programmes, one of such off-balance sheet vehicles, are 
particularly important in the context of the money market fund study.284 Since mid-1980s, asset-
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backed commercial paper programmes, which were generally established by major international 
banks, served as efficient funding vehicles for the large volumes of bank assets such as 
receivables, loans and securities.285 There were three major reasons for development of asset-
backed commercial paper programmes. The first and the most compelling factor was the cost-
effective, off-balance sheet nature of funding enabling low-cost flow of credit to banks’ 
customers.286 The second factor relates to risk dispersion when neither party of the transaction 
was directly exposed to each other, but through a diversified portfolio of assets.287 The third 
factor was funding flexibility as the size of borrowings could be reduced or increased quickly 
depending on the funding needs.288  
For all these key features – short maturities, liquidity support from a high quality bank 
and a backing of a diversified portfolio of assets – asset-backed commercial paper has been an 
attractive investment alternative for money market funds.289 The most recent changes to banking 
and accounting rules negated benefits of asset-backed commercial paper to sponsoring banks 
causing a steady decline in outstanding amounts. Specifically, an off-balance sheet treatment of 
asset-backed commercial paper conduits has largely been ended by changes to Basel III and 
requirements of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Annex C plots asset-backed 
commercial paper outstanding against the US money market funds’ assets under management 
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illustrating a strong positive correlation between the size of the asset-backed commercial paper 
markets and money market fund assets. 
To summarise, section 2.3 highlighted the socio-economic gains and multiple benefits of 
the money market funds to a variety of stakeholders, investors and issuers in the global capital 
markets. The size and structure of the money market affects availability of credit and 
diversification of funding sources for many other economic actors. All these benefits provide an 
obvious rationale to why money market funds should be protected by appropriate market 
regulation, which is outlined in my normative recommendations in Chapter 6. Notwithstanding 
these benefits, the next section turns to the dark side of money market funds, namely their ability 
to withdraw funding quickly and, therefore, to transmit liquidity shocks from one market 
participant to another, from country to country.  
2.4 Risks to control 
The character of money market funds as powerful investors and their ability to act in a 
coordinated manner can exacerbate the instability of fragile markets. This section examines the 
risk conveyed by money market funds as highlighted by the financial crisis and the European 
sovereign debt crisis. The cascade of events that led to the financial crisis started with the 
failures of a few asset backed commercial paper programmes in August 2007.290 Reliance on 
sub-prime mortgage-backed securities in structuring asset-backed commercial paper programmes 
by IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG caused this programme to fail on 7 August 2007.291 
However, because the bank had absorbed the loss, the event was largely overlooked by both the 
broad market and regulators.292 In October 2007, when this obscure market had started to freeze, 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the stock market index whose movement are associated with 
investors’ confidence and the level of economic activities, was still making new highs.293  
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In fact, some even welcomed the ‘creative destruction’ of Wall Street under the 
assumption that capitalism works the best when it ruins “the foolish levered momentum player, 
sending him to the poor house while his assets are sold at a deep discount to the less-levered (or 
even cash!) player”.294 Indeed, the initial stages of turmoil in the asset-backed commercial paper 
market exposed to sub-prime mortgages did not affect the non-financial sector. However, the 
cost of funding of corporate receivables for banks increased when money market funds ceased 
their investments in the asset-backed commercial paper.295 An instantaneous shortage of 
investors for various programmes had a direct negative effect on the cost of capital for 
corporations.  
Proactive actions of money market funds have been viewed as catalysts of looming 
funding problems and formed a view of money market funds as a leading indicator of credit 
risk.296 This view has inspired a regulatory conundrum with respect to money market funds: on 
the one hand, money market funds are under obligation to avoid unwarranted risks; on the other 
hand, ceasing investments in a particular issuer, money market funds may, and often do, 
exacerbate any emerging credit concerns. The short-term nature of money market funding does 
not afford much time to cure problems. The US Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee found that 
money market funds’ termination of funding to banks and securities firms would cause them to 
fail shortly thereafter due to lack of market access.297  
For example, Countrywide Bank, the largest US mortgage lender pre-crisis, not only 
relied heavily on the asset-backed commercial paper market, but also financed its mortgage 
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portfolio in the repo market. After money market funds cut their investments in mortgage-backed 
programmes sponsored by the Countrywide Bank and, among other counterparties, ceased 
trading repos with the bank, liquidity pressures led to the Countrywide’s insolvency.298 It has 
also been suggested that money market funds had caused a failure of Bear Stearns, one of the 
largest and oldest US broker/dealers, by curtailing investments in securities issued by Bear 
Sterns and not lending to it in the repo market.299         
Structured investment vehicles known as SIVs, another asset class that caused significant 
damage to the global financial market, had been highly popular with money market funds prior 
to August 2007.300 SIVs were highly leveraged entities that earned their profit from the interest 
rate arbitrage between their longer-dated assets and shorter-dated liabilities. SIVs assets 
generally consisted of highly rated asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities, while their 
liabilities comprised commercial paper and medium-term notes with duration much shorter than 
that of the assets. SIVs’ commercial paper and notes were mainly purchased by money market 
funds and other short-term investors. A market for SIVs came about in early 1980s and 
functioned smoothly until August 2007, when money market funds have grown increasingly 
concerned with SIVs’ exposures to mortgages even though SIVs generally invested in high 
quality mortgages and other assets.301  
Proliferation of SIVs themselves may, in part, be attributed to unintended consequences 
of regulation: holding of AAA-rated securities issued by SIVs had an advantageous capital 
charge structure under Basel II, which explains an active involvement of European banks in the 
SIV market.302 When in September 2007 money market funds stopped investing in SIVs, SIVs 
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were unable to raise cash from new investors and had to liquidate their underlying portfolios in 
order to repay the maturing securities.303 The market became quickly flooded with asset-backed 
and mortgage-backed securities up for the fire-sale liquidation. An excessive supply of securities 
triggered further price decline. Due to the domino effect – lower was the asset price, more assets 
had to be sold – SIVs’ losses were substantial.304 By 2010 all SIVs were either restructured or 
liquidated.305 However, even though a large number of money market funds incurred losses due 
to SIV investments, these losses were not transferred to money market fund shareholders, but 
were largely absorbed by the funds’ sponsors due to reputational considerations.306     
After the fall of the SIV market at the end of 2007, the financial crisis has continued to 
build up affecting the mortgage insurance industry, US government housing agencies, UK 
building societies and financial institutions in many countries. On 15 September 2008 the fourth 
largest US investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. declared bankruptcy in the largest in 
the US history bankruptcy filing.307 Three years later, government investigations in the Lehman 
Brothers’ practices leading to bankruptcy revealed, amongst the reason for its failure, excessive 
reliance on the money markets, including commercial paper and repo markets.308 Relevant to the 
subject of my study, one of the biggest lessons from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy was the 
lesson of market interconnectedness through money market funds.  
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. has been a large issuer of commercial paper, which was 
held by money market funds.309 When one of these funds, the Reserve Primary Fund, failed due 
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to losses caused by Lehman’s commercial paper, investors withdrew from money market funds, 
even those without investments in Lehman. Money market funds ceased investing as they needed 
cash to meet redemptions; thus other borrowers in the commercial paper market such as General 
Electric, “the mainstay of corporate America”, found no investors.310 This episode illustrates that 
money market funds represent a strong, but not always apparent and fully appreciated link 
between the productive sectors of economy and its financial sector.  
Harvey Miller, the bankruptcy attorney for the Lehman Brothers’ estate noted, “When the 
commercial paper market died, the biggest corporations in America thought they were 
finished”.311 The cost of commercial paper borrowing has increased dramatically in the week 
following the Lehman’s bankruptcy making it prohibitively expensive even for the largest 
international corporations to finance their payroll and daily operational needs.312 The panic 
threatened to disrupt global payment systems.313 A significant number of money market funds 
were under unprecedented redemption pressures as investors rushed out prime money market 
funds holding commercial paper and into government money market funds.314 Prime money 
market funds en masse turned to the secondary market in attempts to sell their assets and raise 
cash to meet redemption. The secondary market was instantly flooded with securities for sale, 
but only few buyers. Those funds unable to raise cash from sale of the securities had to seek 
financial support from their sponsors.315  
When sponsor support was not provided, funds restricted redemption or even got closed 
and subsequently liquidated notwithstanding quality holdings.316 Government money market 
funds, on the other hand, were flooded with new money, which instantly created substantial 
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demand for US government securities and pressured funds’ yields lower. The yield on four-week 
US Treasury securities fell to zero.317 To stop the run on prime money market funds, threatening 
to the viability of the money markets, the US Treasury department introduced a guarantee 
programme for money market fund shareholders.318 Even though participation in the Treasury 
guarantee programme was optional and entailed a fee, majority of funds chose to participate.319 
An unprecedented step of the US Treasury to provide a guarantee to private investment vehicles 
proved to be extremely effective in containing the panic and quelling shareholder redemptions.320 
By January 2009, assets under management of the US money market funds reached all time high 
of $3.9 trillion.321 
The guarantee programme was intelligently designed to address the risk of a future run on 
the fund by providing government guarantee to only those shareholders on record as of 19 
September 2008 and staying invested in the same money market fund.322 Thus shareholders were 
discouraged to redeem their shares because doing so they would have forfeited any future 
coverage under the guarantee programme. Furthermore, in contrast with the federal deposit 
insurance for bank accounts capped at $250,000 per account, the Treasury guarantee programme 
covered the entire invested amount regardless of the size.323        
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Immediately after restoring one of the fundamental functions of money market funds – 
safety – albeit through the US Treasury guarantee, the US government turned to the issue of 
market liquidity. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston announced it would provide loans to those 
banks purchasing high quality asset-backed commercial paper from money market funds.324 The 
programme enabled the US money market funds to liquefy their high quality holdings that were 
rendered essentially illiquid in the market panic followed the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. In 
the first ten days of the programme operations, money market funds sold over $150 billion of 
asset-backed commercial paper and its usage declined in the ensuing months.325 No asset-backed 
commercial paper purchased from money market funds under the programme defaulted or 
otherwise incurred any losses to the Federal Reserve.326  
The US government actions aimed at restoring viability of money market funds during 
the peak of liquidity crisis highlighted their importance for the financial system as a liquidity 
vehicle. Over the last 40 years money market funds have grown to represent a significant part of 
the funding markets. When the mortgage market collapsed and money market funds together 
with other short-term investors abandoned the commercial paper and repo lending markets to 
avoid the risky exposure, a number of institutions depending on these markets failed or had to be 
rescued. Even healthy companies unrelated to the financial sector experienced an unprecedented 
drop in the market access and resulted spike in borrowing cost due to lack of demand from 
money market funds. Thus money market funds served to propagate turmoil in the financial 
sector to other economic sectors. Yet, money market funds’ functions as providers of credit and 
liquidity were compelling reasons for the US government to step in.327  
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The crisis not only had devastating consequences for the US economy, but also produced 
a profound ripple effect on the rest of the world. The US Congress Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission tasked with the crisis tally found 26 million Americans without jobs, four million 
families losing their homes in foreclosures and $11 trillion in retirement and life savings 
vanishing.328 A number of European economies suffered similar hardships once the crisis 
reached their shores. Iceland, one of the first and hardest hit countries, had to nationalise its 
banking system after seeing the collapse of its three major banks in 2008. Its currency, the 
Icelandic króna had declined more than 35 per cent against the euro in the first nine months of 
2008 and inflation of consumer prices was running at 14 per cent per annum.329 Internal finance 
and banking systems of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, collectively dubbed as GIIPS, 
have been under unprecedented pressure during 2009 through the present time.330  
Austerity measures instituted by the governments of these countries to contain ballooning 
public debt, have caused national unrests.331 Unhealthy national finances of GIIPS contaminated 
banking system of the ‘core’ European countries through holdings of GIIPS’s sovereign debt by 
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the largest European banks.332 James Carville, the US President Bill Clinton’s campaign 
strategist was stunned at the power of the bond market over governments:  
I used to think if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the President or the 
Pope or a 0.400 baseball hitter. But now I want to come back as the bond market. You 
can intimidate everyone.333 
Mr. Carville’s famous quote captures the essence of our inquiry into the rationale for 
financial market regulation: because financial markets indirectly control our everyday life, they 
may cause national uprising or put governments out of power. The widespread market failures 
that began in the second part of 2007 in the asset-backed commercial paper sector and negatively 
affected virtually every economy in the developed world is currently threatening viability of the 
European Union. 
As the European sovereign debt crisis developed in the spring of 2011, the thread of the 
financial contagion from the cross-border capital flow were placed in the focus of the public 
policy debate.334 The US Federal Reserve has grown increasingly concerned regarding a 
potential disruptive effect of the European crisis on the US financial system via money market 
funds’ exposure to European banks.335 As discussed earlier in this section, money market funds, 
specifically those funds denominated in the US dollar, invest in highest quality companies with 
extensive global business franchises thus enabling non-US companies to finance their US 
operations.336 This latest example of debates surrounding money market funds highlights a high 
level of interconnectedness of the contemporary financial system vertically at many levels of 
participation and horizontally across national border.  
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In the space of forty years, from the early 1970s through the present, money market funds 
transformed into important market intermediaries serving crucial socio-economic goals of capital 
formation and market efficiency. Chapter 2 presented the essential characteristics of money 
market funds and provided their detailed categorisation illustrating the variability of the 
international money market funds landscape. It was established in this chapter that the 
geographic location of a fund is the key determinant of its operational and accounting practices 
as well as its investment preferences. I found that the nature of the funds’ shareholder base has a 
significant impact on the fund risk profile; thus money market funds offered to retail investors 
are shown to be less susceptible to a run.337  
Most importantly, an analysis of money market fund investments illustrated that money 
market funds incur in a different degree of risks depending on the type of assets. Prime money 
market funds investing in short-term securities issued by corporate entities deemed to be the 
riskiest amongst their peers, while funds investing in government or municipal securities are less 
likely to face credit-related losses. Finally, this chapter categorised money market funds on the 
basis of their asset valuation practices, distinguishing constant net asset value funds and variable 
net asset value funds, a characteristic important for institutional investors concerned with money 
market fund utility as a cash management tool.              
This chapter portrayed money market as important actors in the short-term capital 
markets, who expanded a choice of funding opportunities for various issuers. An important 
beneficial function of money market funds is to improve market efficiency by channelling cash 
flows directly from cash-rich households to cash-strapped businesses and governmental entities 
passing traditional intermediaries such as banks. The dark side, however, is the risk that if money 
market funds cease to function because of cash withdrawals by investors, the borrowers could be 
left without sources of funding. Thus, this chapter demonstrated the importance of the money 
market fund industry which is exercised through both vertical interconnectedness amongst other 
market participants, and horizontal interconnectedness, across national borders.  
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Given such importance, I retort that a normative intervention in money market fund 
activities is entirely justifiable. The following chapter 3 focuses on the US money market funds, 
their history of development and current regulation. In effect, chapter 3 sets the stage for an 
introduction of the new international regulatory architecture for money market funds by 





CHAPTER 3: US MONEY MARKET FUNDS 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 examined the profile of the money market fund industry with respect to its 
economic functions and its relationship with other economic actors. It also showed that money 
market funds served as a risk transmittal link in the financial crisis. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
money market funds established and operating in the US, which account for the largest share of 
assets under management of money market funds worldwide.338 The chapter opens with an 
analysis of the origin and early development of these money market funds. It illustrates how 
these funds were originally a product of an arbitrage created by restrictive banking regulation 
and how, subsequently, performing well over time and advocating sound investment practices, 
they won investors’ trust and became one of the most important liquidity management tools for 
retail and institutional investors. 
Next this chapter analyses the current regulatory structure of the US money market funds. 
It will be shown, in particular, that the US money market funds are already covered under a 
comprehensive framework of federal securities laws, the best industry practices and rules 
established by credit rating agencies. This chapter illustrates that the source of specific legal 
practices that are enshrined under the federal securities law in a form of government mandated 
prudential rules are the money market funds themselves. Furthermore, these practices can also 
influence foreign cases when similar questions related to money market fund regulation are to be 
resolved in other jurisdictions.339 Such a migration of the legal practices with respect to these 
funds is abundantly examined later in chapter 4 when addressing regulatory developments in the 
European money market fund industry.  
The method of this chapter is legal analysis. The study is nonetheless undertaken with a 
critical attitude, highlighting the uncertainty embedded in the contemporary regulatory 
landscape. With regard to the structure, this chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 
3.2 reviews the historical background of the US money market funds and profiles the 
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 Source: www.ici.org. In the first quarter of 2011, assets under management of the US money 
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 Chapters 4 and 5 infra. 
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contemporary state of the industry. Section 3.3 presents the legal framework governing 
investment and operational activities of the US money market funds. Section 3.4 introduces 
credit rating agencies and details credit rating considerations related to these funds. In specific 
connection to the research question – how should money market funds be regulated? – section 
3.5 discusses unresolved issues in the US money market fund regulations, explores the proposed 
solutions and analyses the possible consequences of their implementation. This section also 
reports on the advantages and limitations of the US money market fund regulation and its 
broader effect on the global capital markets. The achievements derive from the size and strengths 
the US money market funds and their multiple benefits to other economic actors both 
domestically and cross-border. With regard to the limitations it is pointed out, in particular, to the 
legal uncertainties surrounding the future of the US money market funds that are plaguing their 
development. A conclusion is finally provided in section 3.6.  
3.2 History and the current state of the US money market fund industry 
3.2.1 US money market funds from the 1970s to the early 1990s 
The origin of the US money market funds in the early 1970s is commonly attributed to 
the existence of Regulation Q which, among other requirements, limited the interest that US 
banks were allowed to pay on passbook saving accounts.340 In January 1970 banks were offering 
only 4.5 per cent interest on depositor’s passbook saving accounts, while 3-month US Treasury 
bills earned eight per cent and the yield on 3-month banks’ certificates of deposit was hovering 
close to nine per cent.341  The catch was that certificates of deposit were only sold in $100,000 
                                                 
340
 The Banking Act of 1933 Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162   at Section 11. Section 11 of the 
Banking Act of 1933 (12 USC § 371a), which is implemented by Regulation Q (12 CFR § 217), regulates 
interest paid to bank depositors. The ceilings on savings accounts were for the most part lifted by the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (12 USC § 226 note). See also 
MCDONALD & MCMILLEN. supra note 145 at 255. Explains that when the nominal interest rates in the 
US went up in the mid-1960s, the US Congress had responded by enacting the Interest Rate Control Act 
of 1966, which gave the Federal Reserve Board under the Regulation Q the authority to impose an interest 
rate ceiling on deposit accounts held at savings and loan associations, thrifts and banks; MARKHAM. 
supra note 145 at 4. The article points out that the passage of the Interest Rate Control Act of 1966 was 
aimed to curb the competition among thrifts for the same deposit dollars.   
341
 The Federal Reserve Board’s Statistics & Historical Data, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H.15 accessed on 4 March 2010. See also 
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denominations and, therefore, were largely unavailable to investors with smaller cash balances. 
Henry B.R. Brown and Bruce R. Bent – both are now credited as inventors of money market 
mutual funds – came up with the idea of how to help small investors to access the market rates 
only available to wealthier depositors.342 Brown and Bent decided to pool small cash balances 
into a larger portfolio, or a mutual fund, to achieve the required investment scale. A prospectus 
of the Reserve Fund, the first US money market fund, was approved by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the fall of 1972.343 The fund’s objectives were to offer a market rate of 
return and relative stability of principal. At the opening the fund had only $300,000 under 
management.344    
At the same time in California a stockbroker James Benham set up an investment vehicle 
that offered small investors an opportunity to share income benefits of the US Treasury bills.345 
The US Treasury bills, sold with denominations of $10,000, were also largely unavailable to 
small investors. 346 James Benham’s Capital Preservation Fund was launched in the fall of 1972 
and invested solely in the US Treasury bills.347 The Capital Preservation Fund had four major 
advantages for investors relative to purchases of bills directly from the US Treasury. First, the 
size: clients with any small balances could invest in the fund and, thus, in the US Treasury 
market, albeit indirectly. Second, liquidity: investors did not have to wait until US Treasury bills 
mature, but could withdraw their investments at any time and receive invested  principal and due 
interest. Third, investors could withdraw any fraction of their invested balances and did not have 
to cash out the entire amount. Fourth, investors could rollover their investments and accrued 
interest continuously without having to reinvest the proceeds and interest from maturing bills.   
In the 1970s and the early 1980s due to obvious yield advantage, the US money market 
funds gained popularity with multiple types of investors. To appeal to a greater number of 
                                                                                                                                                             
FINK, (2008) supra note 143 at 80. Banks’ passbook saving accounts interest rate was later increased to 
5.25 per cent. 
342
 See, e.g., NOCERA. supra note 143 at 76.  
343
 Id. at 81. 
344 VIKTORIA BAKLANOVA, A Common Definition of European Money Market Funds: More 
Clarity or More Confusion?  (eSSRN  10 March 2010) at 3. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568393.  
345
 NOCERA. supra note 143 at 79. 
346 Id. at 80. The US Department of Treasury facing hundreds of people lining up to buy Treasury 
bills during its weekly auctions increased the minimum purchase from $1,000 to $10,000. 
347
 Id. at 81. 
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investors various cash management features were added to money market funds. It was Fidelity 
Daily Income Trust that first explored assets’ “redeemability through check writing” in 1974.348 
In 1978 Merrill Lynch, a large US financial services company, currently defunct, unveiled a 
comprehensive cash management vehicle that combined check writing, credit or debit cards and 
paid money market rate of return on the balance.349 Federated Investors, another large US asset 
management company, introduced money market funds to bank trustees and personal wealth 
managers. By the time the restrictions of Regulation Q were fully phased out in 1986, money 
market funds have gained popularity offering both the market yield and cash management 
services.350 At the end of 1986, money market funds had $292 billion in assets under 
management compared to $4 billion at the end of 1976 showing an exuberant average annual 
growth rate of 53.6 per cent.351 
Banks’ trust departments played a pivotal role in development of the US money market 
funds. In their early days, money market fund shares were priced at $10 at the issuance, but 
fluctuated thereafter around the initial price of $10 reflecting market conditions.352 However, 
there were many shareholders who wanted to invest in a fund whose share price would not 
change.353 For example, bank trust departments were precluded by their charters from investing 
in mutual funds with changing net asset value.354 In 1978 the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission held a hearing at which institutional investors explained their objections for placing 
cash in funds with fluctuating net asset value.355 Ease of use, accounting and tax considerations 
                                                 
348 FINK, (2008) supra note 143 at 81.  
349 NOCERA. supra note 143 at 155-160. 
350
 Paragraph 11 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 provided for an orderly 
phase-out and ultimate elimination of interest rate in 6 years. The title expired on March 31, 1986. 
351
 I would like to thank Peter Crane, the founder and the principal of CraneData 
(www.cranedata.us)  for providing historical series of data related to the US money market funds’ assets 
under management. The annual growth calculations are my own.  
352
 A share price of a contemporary US money market fund is pinned at $1.00 and does not 
change over the life of the funds. Accrued interest reflects changing market conditions.   
353
 Federated Investors, one of the largest US asset management firms, working with bank trust 
departments that invested their clients’ money in US Treasury bills, recognised the demand for money 
market funds with stable net asset value. 
354
 See Federated presentation slides for the meeting with the SEC on January 20, 2010 available 
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-09/s71109-169.pdf accessed on March 3, 2010. 
355
 LYON,  supra note 121 at 1013, n. 6.  
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were generally cited as the main attraction of a constant net asset value fund for institutional 
investors.356  
These investors often operate under specific operational rules that require capital gains 
and losses to be separated from interest payments for accounting and tax purposes.357 
Furthermore, investors in money market funds are extremely risk-averse and are primarily 
focused on safety of their capital and availability of cash on daily basis rather than an 
incremental return. Consistent with the findings of behavioural economists discussed in Chapter 
1, investors in money market funds exhibited a stronger preference for avoiding losses rather 
than acquiring gain.358 This type of behaviour with respect to money market fund investments is 
explained by a rational choice theory given an asymmetry between expected reward and 
probable losses.359 To meet investor demand for safety and structural simplicity the great 
majority of the US money market funds have their shares priced at $1.00 although other types of 
the US mutual funds are usually priced at $10.00. A price of $1.00 has caused some parties 
including scholars to view money market funds as a cash equivalent.360  
In order to prevent share price fluctuation following daily changes in the fund portfolio 
market value, the US money market funds were permitted to use special accounting 
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 FINK, (2008)  supra note 143 at 84.  
357
 A large number of institutional investors represented to the US regulators that a constant net 
asset value is one of the most important features of money market funds. See generally, President's 
Working Group Report on Money Market Fund Reform (Request for Comment) [Release No. IC-29497; 
File No. 4-619], US Securities and Exchange Commission.  (3 Novermber 2010), at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4-619.shtml. See e.g., Comment Letter Re: Money Market Fund 
Reform Options (File No. 4-619)  (Treasury Strategies, Inc. 10 January 2011) at 4. The letter stated that 
the accounting simplicity is highly valued by corporate treasurers as it reduces potential for accounting 
errors and improves overall operational efficiency. Available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
619/4619-44.pdf accessed on 12 March 2011; ROBERT L. MORAN, Comment Letter in Re: Request for 
Comment on the President's Working Group Report on Money Market Fund Reform [File #4-619] 
(American Association of State Colleges and Universities  21 January 2010). The letter stated that 
removal of a stable net asset value feature “would have significant [negative] ramifications on a funding 
mechanism used by institutions of higher education as a stable, low-risk investment tool”.  
358
 See also MEIR STATMAN & KENNETH L. FISHER, Mental Liquidity  (eSSRN  May 2006) at 8.  
359
 In the modern portfolio theory, risk aversion is measured as the additional marginal reward an 
investor requires to accept additional risk. Recalling that money market fund investments are conservative 
low yielding alternatives, any incremental increase in risk corresponds to asymmetric increase in volatility 
jeopardising stability of invested principal. 
360 BIRDTHISTLE,   supra note 139 at 1160 – 61. The author maintains that the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission “has collaborated in the creation of an appearance that these investments are as 
safe as bank deposits”. 
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techniques.361 In addition, to prevent share prices from moving up and down following dividend 
distribution, these funds declare dividends daily and accrue and pay out dividends monthly.362 
Typically, money market funds compute their share price using the amortised cost method, but 
also round the share price to the nearest cent.363 The overarching rationale behind introduction of 
these share price computation techniques was the historical observation that the daily market 
price volatility of typical money market securities is low. This means that high quality short 
maturity securities comprising money market fund portfolio do not change much in value on 
day-to-day basis. Therefore, if a money market fund is invested in such low volatility securities, 
its share price calculated with help of these methods is likely to be very close to that calculated 
using the securities’ market prices. Persuaded by this analysis, in 1977 the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission approved use of both an amortised cost method and a penny-rounding 
method for a few funds.364 Within two years, the Commission allowed these two accounting 
methods for use in money market funds on a permanent basis.365  
The US money market fund industry has significantly contributed to the development of 
the law governing these funds. Certainly, as highlighted in the literature reviewed in section 
1.3.2, the grounds for the origin of the US money market funds can be traced in the response of 
the investment industry to the restrictive banking regulation. However, asset managers had a 
proactive role as they not only created an investment product – money market funds – that would 
best meet their clients’ needs; they also developed the pertinent fund management practices. 
Furthermore, the investment industry successfully petitioned to its regulator for legalising these 
practices. Historically, the US money market fund industry and the Investment Company 
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 See generally SEC Rel. No. IC-13380 Valuation of Debt Instruments and Computation of 
Current Price Per Share by Certan Open-End Investment CompanIes (48 F.R. 32555  18 July 1983). The 
US Securities and Exchange release that permitted money market funds to move utilize amortised cost 
accounting method (straight line) and penny-rounding technique to keep share price at a stable value.  See 
generally, FINK, (2008)  supra note 143 at 84. See also LYON,  supra note 121 at 1012. Under the 
amortised cost method the principal value of a security increases or decreases daily, depending on 
whether the security was initially purchased at a discount or premium to its par value, or at a fixed rate 
and is unaffected by changes in market interest rates. 
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 OHLBAUM SWIRSKY. supra note 104 at 18, n. 15 and accompanying text. 
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 Id. at 18. 
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 SEC Rel. No. IC-10027  (28 November 1977). The release approved use of an amortised cost 
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Institute, its lobbying organisation have been closely involved with regulators on both federal 
and state levels educating, proposing, commenting and, at the end, achieving the end workable 
for all industry constituencies.366  
An introduction of a specific version of money market funds, those featuring constant net 
asset value that later became a prevailing global model and the only type of money market funds 
operating in the US, is fully attributable to the investment management lobby activities. Thus, 
the US mutual fund industry not only found an innovative way to employ its investment 
potential, but also facilitated the rulemaking process codifying its management practices into 
law. To note, the money market fund industry was not unanimous with respect to the advantages 
of the amortised cost accounting enabling constant net asset value. On the other side of the 
barricades for the valuation battle were those asset managers who foresaw a possibility of 
gaming constant net asset value funds.367  
An arbitrageur could, in theory, move into a money market fund when the fund’s yield 
exceeded available market yield and then rapidly withdraw her cash when the fund’s yield 
lagged the market yield. An arbitrageur would incur no capital loss because money market fund 
shares were always priced at $1.00, but would receive above the market yield. Furthermore, cash 
flows moving in and out of a money market fund would have diluted return for those core 
shareholders committed to the fund. This yield arbitrage theory prompted some of the industry 
participants to voice their concerns that the amortised cost ‘presents the illusion of higher returns 
in times of declining rate and makes money market funds appear to have overcome the risk’ of 
fluctuating interest rates.368 It was indeed a valid concern that without the discipline of having to 
mark-to-market, money market funds could be incentivised to acquire a significant amount of 
longer term obligations.369 This concern was addressed in money market fund regulation by 
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 See, e.g., FINK, (2008) supra note 143 at 80 – 98. The author describes the Investment 
Company Institute’s heavy lobbing process to protect the money market fund industry from imposing 
damaging bank regulation in early 1980s. 
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limiting final maturities of eligible securities and restricting the overall weighted-average 
maturity of the fund.370  
As discussed in section 3.3 concerning the federal securities law framework applicable to 
the US mutual funds generally, legitimising the amortised cost accounting contradicted the basic 
premise of mutual fund investing set forth in the Investment Company Act of 1940.371 By law, 
mutual funds arrive at their net asset values by marking the fund’s assets to market and dividing 
the total value by the number of shares outstanding after taking into account the fund’s other 
assets and liabilities.372 Nevertheless, persuaded by the argument of generally low volatility of 
short-term securities, the US Securities and Exchange Commission allowed money market funds 
to price their assets differently from other mutual funds, provided they adhere to specified risk 
limiting provisions.373  
To limit the risk of mispricing, money market funds were obligated to keep the deviation 
of the fund's amortised cost value from its true market value within the range of 0.5 per cent. If 
the deviation exceeded 0.5 per cent, a money market fund had to take steps to reduce the 
deviation, or adopt the market-based pricing.374 These arguments formed the basis for Rule 2a-7 
under the Investment Company Act governing operations of the US money market funds adopted 
in 1983. Thus, in 11 years after registering the first US money market fund prospectus, the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission codified their investment management and operational 
practices. The announcement of the adoption of Rule 2a-7 stated that money market funds are 
permitted, subject to certain risk-limiting conditions, to use an amortised cost method and/or a 
penny-rounding method for valuing portfolio assets when compute their current share price.375   
By the end of 1979, the Consumer Price Index in the US reached 13.3 per cent and 
interest rates approached 12 per cent.376 With interest rates on saving accounts remaining under 
the ceiling of Regulation Q, by the early 1980s, assets under management of money market 
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funds exceeded $200 billion. The speed with which these funds were gathering assets had long 
alarmed the banking community. Being direct competitors to bank deposits and resembling bank 
accounts in terms of cheque writing abilities, money market funds presented unique issues under 
banking laws leading to regulatory debates with federal banking authorities.377 Section 1.3.4 of 
this thesis sampled academic sources investigating legal issues pertaining to money market funds 
and reflecting the regulatory conundrum of early 1980s related to these funds. Appealing to the 
US Congress, bankers claimed that money market funds are under-regulated and excessively 
risky. However, instead of restricting money market funds, the Congress focused on improving 
bank competition by getting rid of interest rate limits on saving accounts imposed by Regulation 
Q.    
In 1981 another line of attack on money market funds developed at the state 
administration level. Regional banks and savings and loans (S&L) in a number of US states 
made attempts to lobby the respective state legislatures prohibiting sale of money market funds 
or, at least, limiting the interest paid by these funds to investors. The proposed regulations had 
good chances of being adopted because of coordinated actions of local banking communities. 
Usually, local bankers were members of states’ lawmaking bodies. By contrast, mutual fund 
firms managing money market funds had only limited presence in the states. The Investment 
Company Institute represented interests of the funds in more than 20 states when matters 
regarding money market funds were debated and won in every instance.378 The successful repeal 
of banker’s efforts to outlaw money market funds on the state levels argues for the high utility of 
money market funds for their shareholders who were also state voters.   
The utility of the US money market funds for retail investors was further enhanced by 
development of tax-exempt money market funds. In their original form the US money market 
funds invested solely in US government securities and securities issued by corporate entities. In 
early 1980 money market funds started looking into obligations issued by US states and 
municipalities that pay income generally exempt from federal income tax.379 Therefore, money 
market funds investing exclusively in securities issued by states and municipalities were 
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classified as tax-exempt.380 Annex D illustrates the high level of interest rates in the US in late 
1970s – early 1980s, which made an income tax exemption an appealing feature and added to the 
money market fund utility particularly for the high net worth investors.  
A serious testing moment for money market funds came in September 1994, when the 
Colorado-based Community Bankers US Government Money Market Fund incurred substantial 
losses as a result of a drop in value in certain floating rate securities.381 The fund promptly 
announced that it would liquidate and distribute the assets to its shareholders. Upon liquidation, 
investors received $0.961 per share losing approximately 4 per cent of their investments in the 
fund. The fund losses were caused by improper use of floating rate securities issued by the US 
housing agencies such as Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Farm Credit Bank, Federal National 
Mortgage Association, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and Student Loan Marketing 
Association.382  
These entities were of high credit quality and enjoyed status of the US government 
agencies with implicit guarantee from the US Treasury. However, some of the securities carry an 
adjustable interest rate and were structured as collateralised mortgage obligation benchmarked to 
an index that generally lagged the movement of interest rate.383 When in 1994 the Federal 
Reserve rapidly increased interest rates as shown in Annex D, adjustable rate securities lagged 
the rate hike and lost value. Investors did not fully appreciate that even high quality, virtually 
credit risk-free securities could still lose value due to risk of interest rate change and following 
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price decline. Government securities would have been paid in full if held to maturity. However, 
an interim decline in price caused fund losses.384 
The Community Bankers US Government Money Market Fund was not the only money 
market fund holding adjustable rate securities that lagged the interest rate moves. Asset managers 
of 42 money market funds faced the same scenario, but chose to purchase the depreciated 
adjustable rate securities from their funds.385 Since the problem was so widespread among 
money market funds, questions were raised by both the investment public and regulators whether 
such volatile securities are appropriate for funds designed to maintain a constant net asset value 
per share.386 Ironically, shares in the Community Bankers US Government Money Market Fund 
were principally sold to small community banks as an option for an overnight investment.387 The 
fund offered a rate that was higher than the rate a bank could obtain depositing its free cash 
overnight at the Federal Reserve and thus attracted small banks seeking return maximisation.  
The Community Bankers was a relatively small fund with approximately $150 million of 
assets under management at its peak fund thus the losses and the fund closure did not have any 
significant effect on other market participants beyond those directly involved with the fund.388 
Nonetheless, the Community Bankers fund losses prompted bank regulators once again to call 
for examining the risks in money market funds.389 In the same year, the default of the Orange 
county in California affected the US tax-exempt money market funds investing in the Orange 
county’s bonds. The Orange county itself sustained losses from investments in adjustable rate 
government securities and was unable to pay its bondholders. Once again, no investors sustained 
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losses in money market funds because asset managers of tax-exempt money market funds with 
exposure to the Orange county bonds had purchased defaulted bonds from their funds.390  
Given a series of negative developments in the US money market fund industry caused 
by a sharp increase in interest rates in 1994, one would envision an investor exodus from these 
funds. Yet, this did not happen. The US money market funds ended the year with more assets 
under management than when they began.391 Based on the painful experience of 1994, the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission took steps to rein in money market fund risks. These steps 
and other subsequent developments in money market fund regulations are reviewed in section 
3.3.2.            
3.2.2 US money market fund industry from the 1990s to today 
From later 1990s through 2007, the dawn of the financial crisis, the US money market 
funds established themselves as a significant market player and an important funding source for 
the borrowers in all major economic sectors.392 Exhibit 4 illustrates the structure of the US 
money market fund industry and its assets under management today. 
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Exhibit 4: Classification of the US money market funds393 
 
Given the size of the assets under management in money market funds, by 2007 these 
funds became victims of their own success. While money market funds served as a source of 
liquidity for other sectors, when the secondary market dried up in the fall of 2008 no other 
buyers were able to purchase all the securities that money market funds tried to sell. The 
dislocation in asset-backed commercial paper market in 2007 and bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers discussed in chapter 2 revealed the unstable nature of the short-term markets and money 
market funds’ vulnerability to a complete shutdown.394 Those US money market funds affiliated 
with banks had an advantage of obtaining liquidity through their parent bank even though this 
type of support could cause negative accounting consequences to banks themselves.395 Finally, 
those asset managers unaffiliated with banks had nowhere to turn to in search for liquidity.  
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The US government interventions played a crucial role in stabilising the money market 
fund industry during the crisis. The US monetary authorities established five support 
programmes directly targeting money market funds and their investors.396 Annex E lists the 
various programmes implemented by US monetary authorities in the fall of 2008. The need for 
the government interventions during the crisis challenged the main assumptions underlying the 
money market fund investment activities – a belief in highly liquid nature of the short-term 
market. Historically, these funds relied on the vibrant secondary market densely populated with 
willing buyers to raise cash when needed. This assumption was shuttered when the market 
liquidity evaporated. Simultaneously, corporations that had relied on the US money market funds 
as a funding source suddenly found themselves unable to refinance maturing securities as these 
funds were no longer investing.397  
Once again, on the heels of another crisis, money market fund regulation was reviewed to 
establish the new rules that would remedy those vulnerabilities exposure during the liquidity 
squeeze. At the heart of these new rules were new liquidity requirements directing the funds to 
maintain a pre-specified level of assets maturing daily and weekly.398 Other US regulatory 
agencies have also reviewed their assumptions post-crisis and drafted new rules seeking to 
address both firm-specific and systemic risks in the financial system. For example, the US 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation changed the way the bank insurance premium is 
calculated making it more expensive for the large US banks to seek funding in the short-term 
markets.399 New capital ratio and liquidity requirements under Basel III have also affected the 
                                                                                                                                                             
banks raises a number of policy issues. In particular, concerns were raised that the availability of 
discretionary support during the crisis may have contributed into destabilising behaviour of fund 
shareholders.    
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 SEC Rel. No. IC-29132 See also section 3.3 infra for the detailed discussion of these rules. 
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 Changes are mandated under the Dodd-Frank Act. See The Dodd-Frank Act Pub.L. 111-203, 
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international funding markets.400 Under the new regime banks should be better capitalised and be 
less reliant on the short-term funding.  
Nonetheless, unintended consequences of achieving these policy goals have resulted in a 
dramatic reduction in short-term issuance due to more expensive access to the short-term market 
for banks. While bank regulators encourage the longer-term borrowing, the US money market 
funds are obliged to maintain shorter duration and invest more assets in securities maturing daily 
and weekly. Given the divergent actions of bank and securities market regulators, the 
contemporary landscape of the US money market fund industry is shaped by a regulatory 
conundrum illustrated by exhibit 5.     
Exhibit 5: Impact of regulatory reforms on the short-term markets401 
 
In light of the regulatory conundrum, bank liquidity facilities and credit lines are 
expected to become more expensive going forward. The commercial paper market is likely to be 
negatively impacted by the punitive cost of the back-up liquidity arrangements, a must have for 
the commercial paper issuance.402 Many corporate issuers have already replaced short-term debt 
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with long-term borrowings making it more challenging for the US money market funds to find 
high quality investments and diversification opportunities.403 A strong demand for money market 
fund-eligible assets keeps yields earned by these funds at depressed levels.404 The global 
liquidity standards are still developing and this process is expected to take a few years, while 
market experience and data are accumulated.405 
For the US money market fund manager, the new regulatory regime has already resulted 
in scarcity of eligible investment options and disequilibrium of supply and demand.406 Too many 
assets under management of the US money market funds are chasing too few investment options. 
The US money market fund average yield is at its historically lowest level prompting investors to 
seek alternative ways to manage their cash.407 The US money market fund industry today, in the 
post-crisis environment, has found itself in the centre of the regulatory storm and nearly torn 
apart by divergent regulatory actions. The next section scrutinises the US money market fund 
regulation in light of the most current amendments against the backdrop of the US federal 
securities law governing mutual fund activities.                      
3.3 US regulatory framework for money market funds   
It is an important point in scholarship to reflect on the existing regulatory framework. As 
shown in section 3.3.1 that outlines a comprehensive regulatory scheme under the US federal 
securities law governing activities of the US investment companies and asset managers, money 
market funds are simply not a case of “unregulated banks” as some academic stated.408 Section 
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3.3.2 focuses on Rule 2a-7, which provides a legal definition of the US money market funds and 
sets forth investment and operational standards governing these funds. Section 3.3.3 relates the 
effect of the post-crisis changes to the financial regulation on the US money market fund 
industry.    
3.3.1 US money market funds under the federal securities laws 
As an illustration of an argument advanced in section 1.3.3, the US money market funds 
are already tightly regulated under the overarching legal framework of the federal securities laws 
that comprise four principal statutes: the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Investment Company Act of 1940.409 The US 
mutual funds, including money market funds are furthermore subject to most of the requirements 
that apply to corporate issuers under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.410 These laws are 
administered by the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the primary regulator of the US 
money market funds. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and the Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 – although this does not specifically target mutual funds – could also affect the US money 
market funds in a significant way.411 Section 3.3.2 relies upon the current versions of the US 
money market funds regulation, which still contains reference to credit rating agency ratings. 
Section 3.3.3 includes a discussion of the possible implications of the Dodd-Frank Act for the 
US money market funds. 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates the structure and operations of 
investment companies and, therefore, is essential to the US money market funds.412 The 
Investment Company Act addresses their capital structure, investment activities, operational 
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 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.   Securities Exchange Act of 1934 amend. 15 USC §§ 78a-78kk 
;Investment Advisers Act of 1940 amend. 15 USC §§ 80b-1 - 80b-21  15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq.     
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practices and the duties of fund boards. The Securities Act of 1933, often referred to as the Truth 
in Securities Act, regulates public offerings of securities. Mutual funds, which are open-ended 
investment companies, continuously issue their shares and, therefore, are subject to disclosure 
requirement set forth by the Securities Act. Specifically related to the US money market funds 
and other mutual funds, the Securities Act provides that fund investors should be furnished 
financial and other material information such as fund prospectuses. It also prohibits 
dissemination of deceptive information, misrepresentation and other fraud in the sale of 
securities.413 The Securities Exchange Act regulates trading, purchase and sale of securities, 
including money market fund shares.414 It also governs corporate reporting and disclosure in 
proxy materials.415 The Investment Advisers Act, among its other aims, requires asset managers 
of the US money market funds to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission.416  
The US money market funds must be registered with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission by filing a form that spells out the fund’s investment objectives, policies and 
pertinent risks.417 The US money market funds are organised under individual US state law 
either as a corporation or a business trust with a specified minimum level of capital.418 The fund 
shares cannot be publicly offered unless minimum capital requirements are satisfied.419 In 
addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act seeks to improve investor protection by assuring accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures.420  
As one can see from the panoply of rules covering practically every practical aspect of 
investment, operations and even terminology, money market funds are already abundantly 
                                                 
413
 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.  Sections 10 and 12. See also, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
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regulated. The following six sections offer an in-depth discussion of six core principles that 
provide a strong foundation of the regulatory framework for the US money market funds. These 
principles are fund governance, disclosure requirements, protection of funds’ assets, restriction 
of leverage, prohibition of affiliated transactions and asset valuation.  
3.3.1.1 Governance: board oversight and manager accountability 
The US money market funds are subject to a system of oversight from both internal and 
external sources. Internal oversight includes boards of directors or trustees, depending on the 
fund organisational structure, and a compulsory compliance programme. External checks are 
provided by the US Securities and Exchange Commission with periodic examinations of asset 
managers, the Financial Industry Regulatory Association, an independent regulator of the US 
securities firms, state securities regulators and independent public accounting firms.421 The great 
majority of the oversight measures are a part of a broad framework encompassing the US money 
market funds together with types of investment companies.422 However, boards’ duties with 
respect to money market funds specifically entail certain additional responsibilities.423 
The first layer of a mutual fund internal oversight is a high level of fund board 
independence. As opposed to boards of operating companies, at least 40 per cent of members on 
a mutual fund board must be independent, or not have any significant business relationship with 
the fund asset manager or its underwriter.424 As a matter of the best practice, the majority mutual 
funds currently have a much higher level of independence.425 This structure with an emphasis on 
independence empowers fund boards to achieve their core objectives of mitigating the conflict of 
interest between the fund asset manager and shareholders. The Investment Company Act 
imposes additional responsibilities on independent directors, which include approving fund fees, 
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overseeing fund performance and its compliance programme.426 Written policies and procedures 
aimed at preventing violations of the federal securities laws encompass the second layer of an 
internal oversight.  
A mutual fund is required to designate a chief compliance officer in charge for designing 
and administering these policies. Compliance policies must be reviewed by the fund board at 
least annually for their adequacy and effectiveness.427 The chief compliance officer reports 
directly to the board.428 External oversight checks include periodic examinations and 
enforcement actions as warranted and administered by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission as a primary regulator and inspections of the state securities regulators.429  Bank-
affiliated funds could be subject to banking regulators. An additional external check comes from 
an independent public accounting firm auditing fund’s annual financial statements.430 Fund 
officers must certify accuracy of financial statements as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.431 
 3.3.1.2 Disclosure 
Section 1.2 highlighted a close association of the US securities law and regulation with 
the neoclassical economic theory emphasising sufficiency of information as a prerequisite of the 
market activities, i.e., information asymmetry constrains market activities.432 Consistent with this 
theory, the US mutual funds are subject to extensive information disclosure requirements. The 
overarching goal of the disclosure regime is to afford a mutual fund investor a fair opportunity to 
determine the expected risk of her investments. Therefore, a fund prospectus, the main disclosure 
document, is required to be delivered to each fund shareholder upon the sale of the fund 
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Mutual Fund Directors, Investment Company Institute.  (2011), at 
http://www.ici.org/idc/policy/governance/faq_fund_gov_idc.  
427
 ROBERTSON,    supra note 418 at 9-81. 
428
 17 CFR § 270.38a-1 Compliance Procedures and Practices of Certain Investment Companies  
(2003). 
429
 ICI Report supra note 21 at 32. 
430
 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq.  Section 30(g). 
431
 15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.   
432
 AKERLOF,  supra note 59.  
116 
 
shares.433 According to the industry survey, US mutual fund investors consider, on average, nine 
discrete pieces of information about a fund before investing.434 Information related to fund 
charges is known to be on the forefront of investors’ inquiries.435  
The US mutual funds, including money market funds, maintain their prospectuses current 
by re-filing them annually.436 An annual update includes inter alia any changes to fund’s 
investment goals and objectives, fees, discounts, portfolio turnover rate, principal investment 
strategies, risks and performance data.437 To facilitate investor focus on key investment 
parameters, mutual funds may provide investors with a “summary prospectus”, while making 
other pertinent information available on the Internet or by post upon request and without charge. 
Moreover, mutual fund investors benefit from the centralised electronic data gathering system 
administered by the US Securities and Exchange Commission.438 Fund registration statements, 
prospectuses, updated statements of additional information, audited annual financial statements 
and many more information are available to investors through this data system free of charge.439   
In effect, the US money market funds are subject to even more extensive disclosure 
regime than any other mutual fund. The 2010 amendments to the rules governing money market 
fund activities included requirements for monthly reporting of holdings on fund websites and for 
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monthly reporting to the US Securities and Exchange Commission.440 Such disclosure regime 
goes a long way in enhancing investor protection by not only empowering individual investors to 
make better investment decisions, but only enabling public scrutiny of investment behaviour of 
fund managers. It can therefore be considered as good disclosure (as mentioned in section 1.2; 
see also infra sections 5.2 and 6.2).                
3.3.1.3 Safekeeping of fund assets 
The US mutual funds maintain their assets in custody segregated from assets of their 
management firms. Rules on asset segregation and reconciliation play a vital role in protecting 
mutual fund investors and comprise a mechanism aimed at prevention of fraud-based losses. The 
US Securities and Exchange Commission regularly prosecute Ponzi schemes and other frauds 
involving misappropriation of clients’ assets in less regulated investment products.441 The US 
money market funds, subject to the strict custody rules, normally keep their assets with a US 
bank custodian.442 Today the US largest custodians are full-service banks and provide a full 
range of services from safekeeping of fund assets to tax withholding and transfer agency support 
to securities lending. 443 Custodians settle fund transactions, price assets, calculate the fund’s net 
asset value, receive dividends and pay fund expenses. The US money market fund boards are 
charged with oversight responsibilities for approving and monitoring custodial arrangements.444   
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3.3.1.4 Restriction of leverage 
The basic tenet of the Investment Company Act is to foster simplicity of a fund structure, 
which could be easily understood by its investors. The US mutual funds are prohibited from 
issuing senior securities that take a priority over the fund’s common stock.445 Thus the US 
money market funds incur no leverage and maintain a straightforward capital structure – their 
securities are owned pro rata by investors. Simple and transparent capital structure helped the 
US money market funds to weather a storm of financial de-leveraging that started in 2007, when 
certain types of investment vehicles incurred catastrophic losses due to leverage.446 Money 
market funds may, however, borrow from a bank provided that the amount of borrowings does 
not exceed one-third of the fund’s total assets.447  
Nevertheless, many US money market funds voluntarily go beyond the regulatory limits 
on borrowings by adopting policies that further restrict their ability to use borrowed capital. For 
example, funds often adopt a policy that they will borrow only as a temporary measure for 
extraordinary or emergency purposes and not for investment in securities.448 Once a fund has 
adopted these policies, they cannot be changed without the approval of fund shareholders.449  By 
virtue of these regulatory limitations and adopting voluntary measures the US money market 
funds maintain a simple all-equity capital structure with no permanent leverage.  
3.3.1.5 Prohibition of affiliated transactions 
Enacted on the heels of the stock market crash of 1929, the Investment Company Act 
contains a number of provisions prohibiting transactions between a mutual fund and fund 
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insiders or affiliated organisations. 450 The US Securities and Exchange Commission’s study of 
the investment management industry, conducted in 1939, uncovered various ‘abuses and 
deficiencies’ in the fund business.451 The shape of investment management regulation was 
largely formed by the finding of that study. For example, provisions related to affiliated 
transaction are designed to eliminate the ‘securities dumping’ problem and other abuses of the 
1920s, which eventually led to the stock market collapse.452       
In a contrast to the general thrust of the Investment Company Act, the 2010 amendments 
to the rules governing money market fund activities introduced an exemption for affiliates.453 
Sponsors of the US money market funds are permitted, under specific conditions, purchase 
securities from their affiliated funds.454 This provision serves to facilitate financial support of the 
US money market funds by their strategically motivated sponsors if the stability of the fund net 
asset value is threatened.455  
3.3.1.6 Daily valuation and liquidity 
Mutual fund regulatory regime assigns a particular importance to portfolio asset pricing 
and portfolio valuation.456 Shareholders expect mutual funds to provide liquidity and an 
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objective valuation based on the current market price of the fund assets. As required by 
regulation, mutual funds mark their asset to market and calculate net assets value of frequent 
basis, most often daily.457 The daily pricing process is a critically important aspect of fund 
operation as it ensures fair and equitable treatment of fund shareholders and enables them to 
purchase, redeem or exchange fund shares on daily basis. Moreover, fund shareholders are 
expected to be paid promptly upon redemption – mutual funds may not suspend redemptions or 
delay payments for more than seven days.458 To ensure that the requirement of timely 
redemption is met, the US Securities and Exchange Commission guides mutual funds to have at 
least 85 per cent of their assets in liquid securities.459     
Notwithstanding this general framework, the US money market funds are set apart from 
other mutual funds with respect to both asset valuation and liquidity requirements. Rule 2a-7 
under the Investment Company Act permits a money market fund to maintain a stable price per 
share using other accounting methods besides pricing portfolio assets according to market 
prices.460 Liquidity requirements applied to the US money market funds are significantly more 
stringent relative to other mutual funds.461 Section 3.3.2 below delves into specific regulated 
elements of money market fund investment and operational practices set forth by Rule 2a-7.    
The six pillars of collective investments regulation discussed in this section are often 
cited as its major success factor promoting investor protection, market integrity and financial 
innovation: 
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The securities laws seek to protect investors, not fund managers. Thus, the securities laws 
are centred on full and fair disclosure, prohibitions on conflicts of interest and public 
enforcement proceedings in the case of violations. The securities laws do not seek to limit 
entry into the fund business, or to protect fund managers from competition, or failure. 462  
 Even though the scope of the quote referring to the US securities law is broader than my 
research subject, the overarching legal framework governing money market funds reflects the 
strength of the regulatory regime through a causal link to the wide acceptance of these funds by 
investors and the size of the assets under management.463 The next section examines the specific 
details of the US money market fund regulation.            
3.3.2 Legislative history of Rule 2a-7 
Rule 2a-7 was adopted in 1983 and served to codify the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s previous orders permitting certain funds to deviate from the rule of daily asset 
pricing provided certain conditions are met.464 Thus the main purpose of Rule 2a-7 is to establish 
investment and operational parameters for the US money market funds under which they may 
use two alternative pricing methods in lieu of pricing their assets according to market prices.465 
An earlier discussion of the origin and development of the US money market funds in section 
3.2.1 has presented these two valuation methods used by the US money market funds – 
amortised cost and penny-rounding methods.466 Importantly, any fund that markets itself as a 
money market fund in the US must comply with the provisions of Rule 2a-7.467  
The hallmark of Rule 2a-7 is its risk-limiting provisions that are designed to restrict fund 
exposures to various investment risks by establishing specific objective and subjective criteria 
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with respect to quality, diversification, maturity and liquidity of the fund assets.468 The risk-
limiting provisions seek to minimise the likelihood of a money market fund failing to maintain a 
stable price per share. Although since its adoption in 1983 Rule 2a-7 had been meaningfully 
amended four times, the broad risk-limiting provisions and the oversight by the Board of 
Directors or Trustees have always been its hallmarks.469    
The majority of revisions to Rule 2a-7 were prompted by market events that from time to 
time exposed shortcomings and weaknesses in the US money market fund regulation. Some 
other amendments were needed to accommodate financial innovations affecting money market 
fund portfolio management. The rule was first amended in 1986 to permit money market fund 
investments in long-term adjustable rate securities with structured features limiting their interest 
rate risk.470 Structural features included a put option or a demand feature that would allow a 
money market fund to tender the security back to the issue at a short notice.471 This change 
somewhat liberalised the original restriction of money market fund portfolio investments to only 
those securities maturing within one year and fostered the development of the short-term 
municipal market.472   
The US credit market in the mid-to-late 1980s saw a number of negative credit 
developments for commercial paper issuers.473 The US money market funds found themselves 
                                                 
468
 OHLBAUM SWIRSKY. supra note 104 at 48 – 49. Rule 2a-7 establishes two types of criteria 
with respect to its risk-limiting provisions – and objective minimum standards and a principle-based 
standard, which is subjective in nature. This approach ensures that the rule does not allow a portfolio 
manager to hide behind the minimum acceptable criteria, but requires a determination whether a more 
stringent self-imposed standard is more appropriate given a particular portfolio.  
469
 Id. at 198 – 200. See also MAJORIE S. RIEGEL, Special Duties of Money Market Fund 
Directors, in Fund Governance: Legal Duties of Investment Company Directors, (Robert A. Roberson 
ed., 2005). at 11-4. 
470
 SEC Rel. No. IC-14983  (12 March 1986). 
471
 LUO,   supra note 272. The most typical notice period is seven day, but could be as short as 
one day or as long as one year. Money market funds treat a demand feature or a put option like any other 
portfolio security for their credit quality and diversification tests. 
472
 See section 2.3.2.4 supra for a discussion of money market fund benefits to local government 
and municipal borrowers. 
473
 SHILLING, MMF Support Report supra note 156 at 4, Figure 2. Commercial paper issuers 
including Integrated Resources, Inc., Mortgage Realty Trust and Drexel Burnham defaulted on its 
financial obligations. The MNC Financial Corp. faced credit deteriorations. 
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holding securities issued by those borrowers whose credit quality was significantly impaired.474 
These events prompted the US Securities and Exchange Commission to revise Rule 2a-7 
imposing an objective minimum credit quality and diversification standards for money market 
funds.475 The US money market funds now could only invest in securities that were rated in one 
of the highest two short-term rating categories by Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating 
Organisations, normally referred to as credit rating agencies.476 Those funds investing in 
commercial paper were also required to diversify their investments allocating no more than five 
per cent of portfolio assets in securities of any one issuer except for securities issued by the US 
government.477  
Even more stringent diversification requirements were established with respect to second 
tier securities, or those securities rated in the second short-term rating category by credit rating 
agencies.478 From this point on, the US money market funds regulator adopted credit ratings 
seeking to provide an objective criterion of minimum credit standard for these funds. The next 
Section 3.3.3 will discuss currently proposed amendments to Rule 2a-7 required under Section 
939A of the Dodd-Frank Act that seek to remove references to and reliance on credit rating in 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s rules and regulations.479 In addition to credit and 
diversification standards, amendments introduced in 1991 codified the use of the term money 
market fund making it “unlawful for any investment company to hold itself out as a money 
market fund unless it meets the risk-limiting conditions of the rule”.480 This amendment 
                                                 
474
 Id. at 4, Figure 2. A number of money market fund sponsors bailed out their funds holding 
commercial paper issued by those entities whose credit quality significantly deteriorated. No money 
market fund shareholders suffered losses due to these adverse credit developments. 
475
 SEC Rel. No. IC-18005  (20 February 1991). 
476
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 at (a)(12). The rule generally defines an eligible security as a rated security 
with a remaining maturity of 397 days or less that has received a rating from certain nationally recognised 
statistical rating organisations in one of the two highest short-term rating categories. 
477
 Id. at (c)(4)(i)(A) and (B). The section provides detailed portfolio diversification criteria for 
various types of money market funds. Generally, money market funds are allowed to hold up to five per 
cent of their assets in securities issued by an individual first tier issuer.  
478
 Id. at (c)(4)(i)(C). Money market funds can hold no more than one half of one per cent in 
securities issued by an individual second tier issuer. 
479
 SEC Reliance on Credit Ratings Study supra note 411. Section 939A under the Dodd-Frank 
Act directed the US Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulatory agencies to reduce 
reliance on credit ratings in its rules and regulations.   
480
 SEC Rel. No. IC-18005  
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restricting the use of the money market fund designation established a legal definition of these 
funds in the US. 
In 1996 the US Securities and Exchange Commission modified Rule 2a-7 to address 
weaknesses in money market fund operations that became apparent upon the Orange County 
bankruptcy.481 Securities issued by Orange County were mostly held by tax-exempt money 
market funds. Thus, the 1996 Rule 2a-7 revisions are focused primarily on the risk-limiting 
provisions applicable this type of funds.482 There was also a new rule adopted that facilitated 
purchases of impaired securities out of money market fund portfolios by their affiliates.483 
Changes to Rule 2a-7 adopted in 1996 turned out to be so confusing for industry participants that 
the Commission had to suspend the compliance date while developing technical corrections.484 
During the following ten years until 2008, Rule 2a-7 has remained largely unchanged 
with only few technical amendments related to specific definitions.485 It was a period of steady 
growth for the US money market funds as investors better recognised their utility. Then in 2008 
the floodgates opened. Section 2.4 described the circumstances that culminated in a run on the 
US money market funds in September 2008. In the wake of the turmoil, regulators have called 
for a broad reform of the US money market fund industry. The reform was envisioned as a two-
step process that included improvements to prudential rules administered by the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission and, potentially, a wholesale change to the structure of the money 
market fund industry.  
 3.3.3 Post-crisis US money market fund reform 
This section reports on the changes to Rule 2a-7 implemented in May 2010, which 
comprised the immediate policy response to the market turmoil. This response was mainly 
focused on enhancing the existing risk limiting conditions and fund oversight with no changes to 
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 See ICI Report supra note 21 at E-161. 
482
 SEC Rel. No. IC-21837  (21 March 1996) 
483
 17 CFR § 270.17a-9 Purchase of Certain Securities From a Money Market Fund by an 
Affiliate, or an Affiliate of an Affiliate   
484
 SEC Rel. No. IC-22921  (2 December 1997). The US Securities and Exchange Commission 
adopted technical amendments to Rule 2a-7 mostly related to the treatment of structured and synthetic 
securities. It also clarified how money market funds calculate and present short-term total return in their 
marketing materials. 
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 OHLBAUM SWIRSKY. supra note 104 at 199 – 200. 
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the industry structure. The Investment Company Institute led the industry response with its 
Report of the Money Market Working Group issued on 17 March 2009.486 The report 
recommended tightening existing investment standards including maturity requirements and 
credit quality criteria. It also recommended new standards for managing portfolio liquidity, stress 
testing and disclosure. The ICI Report recommended that money market fund boards were given 
an authority to suspend redemption temporarily to prevent fire-sale of fund assets and ensure 
equal treatment of shareholders.  
In June 2009 the President Obama administration released its “A New Foundation” 
blueprint for rebuilding financial supervision and regulation. The blueprint directed the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission to “move forward with its plans to strengthen the 
regulatory framework around money market funds”.487 The first step in this plan was “to reduce 
the credit and liquidity risk profile of individual money market funds”.488 The blueprint also 
advised the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets to prepare a “report assessing 
whether more fundamental changes are necessary to further reduce the money market fund 
industry’s susceptibility to runs”, such as eliminating the ability of money market funds to use a 
constant net asset value or requiring these funds “to obtain access to reliable emergency liquidity 
facilities from private sources”.489  
The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets released its report outlining 
options for fundamental reforms of the US money market funds industry in October 2010. At the 
time of writing, no radical changes to the industry structure have taken place. However, any of 
the proposed options would undoubtedly change the way money market funds have been 
operating for the last 40 years. Section 3.4 discusses the future of the industry in light of the 
currently debated regulatory proposals outlined in the President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets.     
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 See generally ICI Report supra note 21. 
487
 "A New Foundation" Report supra note 2 at 12. 
488
 Id. at 12. 
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 Id. at 12. 
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3.3.3.1 Portfolio management: quality, diversification, maturity and liquidity 
The money market fund industry response to the market turmoil presented in the 
Investment Company Institute’s report served as a starting point for the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s amendments to Rule 2a-7. The 2010 amendments were “designed to 
make money market funds more resilient to certain short-term market risks, and to provide 
greater protections for investors”.490 These policy goals were achieved through a number of 
enhancements discussed in this section. First, Rule 2a-7 imposed risk-limiting standards on 
money market fund management practices. These standards presented in Exhibit 6 relate to 
quality, diversification, maturity and liquidity and include both subjective and objective 
criteria.491  
Exhibit 6: Risk-limiting provisions of the US money market funds492 
Elements Provisions 
Quality Subjective standard:  
Limits investments to securities that present minimal credit risks493  
Objective standard: 
At the time of acquisition, each security must be an eligible security494   
                                                 
490
 SEC Rel. No. IC-29132  75 FR 10060 at 10060. 
491
 SEC Rel. No. IC-14607  (1 July 1985) at n. 25. “There are basically two types of risk which 
cause fluctuations in the value of money market fund portfolio instruments: market risk, which primarily 
results from fluctuations in the prevailing interest rate, and credit risk. In general, instruments with shorter 
periods remaining until maturity have reduced market risk...Similarly, instruments which are of higher 
credit quality have lower credit risks and tend to fluctuate less in value over time than instruments which 
are of lower quality”. See also supra note 468 for an explanation of the objective and subjective criteria in 
Rule 2a-7. 
492
 Adopted from OHLBAUM SWIRSKY. supra note 104 at 48 – 49.   
493
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 at (c)(3)(i). Although Rule 2a-7 does not provide an exact definition of 
minimal credit risk, money market funds are required to invest only in those securities presenting minimal 
credit risk. See also OHLBAUM SWIRSKY. supra note 104 at 50 – 53. In 1989 and 1990 the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission provided guidance related to factors that could be taken into account in 
making a minimum credit risk determination.  
494
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 at (a)(12). An eligible security is determined by a reference to its maturity 
and credit quality. Money market funds must invest at least 97 per cent of their assets in first tier 
securities. A first tier security is a security that is rated by a credit rating agency in the highest short-term 
rating category for debt obligations or unrated security that is of comparable quality.  Up to 3 per cent of 
fund’s assets could be invested in second tier securities. A second tier security is a security that is rated 
by a credit rating agency in the second highest short-term rating category for debt obligations. 
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Maturity Subjective standard:  
Maintain portfolio maturity consistent with a stable net asset value 
Objective standard: 
Each first tier security must mature within 397 days; each second tier 
security must mature within 45 days495  
Weighted average maturity may not exceed 60 days496  
Weighted average life may not exceed 120 days497 
Liquidity Subjective standard:  
Sufficiently liquid assets to meet reasonable foreseeable redemptions 
Objective standard: 
Invest no more than 5 per cent of total assets in illiquid securities498  
Invest at least 10 per cent of total assets in daily liquid assets499  
Invest at least 30 per cent of total assets in weekly liquid assets500  
 
As shown in exhibit 6, the objective standard of the credit quality criteria relies on a 
determination of eligibility which, in turn, rests on credit ratings assigned by rating agencies. 
Establishing this process, the US Securities and Exchange Commission sought to use credit 
ratings as an objective benchmark of credit quality. This approach is expected to be reformed in 
the near future to meet the requirement of the Dodd-Frank Act to “remove any reference to or 
                                                 
495
 Id. at (c)(2)(i) and (3)(ii). US government adjustable rate securities may have longer maturities 
as long as the variable rate of interest is readjusted at least every 397 days. See 17 CFR § 270.2a-7  at 
(d)(1).  
496
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 at (c)(2)(ii). A money market fund’s weighted average portfolio maturity is 
calculated by multiplying a number of days to maturity of each holding, or a number of days to the next 
reset date for floating rate securities, by dollar weights of each holding. Exceptions are made for certain 
adjustable rate securities.  
497
 Id. at (c)(2)(iii). A money market fund’s weighted average portfolio life is calculated by 
multiplying a number of days to maturity of each holding by dollar weights of each holding. 
498
 Id. at (c)(5)(i). 
499
 Id. at (c)(5)(ii). Daily liquid assets include cash, direct obligations of the US government and 
securities that will mature or are subject to a call within one business day. See 17 CFR § 270.2a-7  at 
(a)(8).  
500
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (c)(5)(iii). Weekly liquid assets include cash, direct obligations of the US 
government, securities issued by US government agencies if issued at discount and have a remaining 
maturity within 60 days and securities that will mature or are subject to a call within five business day. 
See 17 CFR § 270.2a-7  at (a)(32). 
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requirement of reliance on credit ratings”.501 Credit ratings are expected to be substituted for an 
alternative standard of credit-worthiness that is yet to be determined.502 In addition to the main 
subjective and objective criteria with respect to money market funds’ asset credit quality, Rule 
2a-7 contains a number of special provisions related to securities’ call features or guarantees.503 
Rule 2a-7 also restricts money market funds to investments in US dollar-denominated securities 
only thus eliminating foreign currency risk.504       
Rule 2a-7 seeks to minimise credit risk of a money market fund portfolio as a whole by 
imposing strict diversification standards. Funds are generally limited to five per cent of total 
assets invested in a single issuer.505 However, investments in second tier issuers are limited to 
0.5 per cent of total assets in a single issuer.506 With these two major diversification tests, Rule 
2a-7 affords a number of exceptions to special types of securities including US government 
securities, shares of other US money market funds, repurchase agreements, asset-backed 
securities and securities whose credit quality is enhanced by a third party obligor.507 In practice, 
money market fund portfolios are generally well diversified across a number of individual 
issuers yet highly concentrated in the financial sector.508 It is the nature of the short-term market 
dominated by financial issuers that caused a high level of sector concentration for money market 
funds.  
For example, non-financial issuers comprised only 14.5 per cent of all outstanding 
commercial paper in July 2011, according to statistics collected by the Federal Reserve.509 The 
other 85.5 per cent was issued by financial entities and asset-backed programmes.510 
Furthermore, money market funds invest in banks’ certificate of deposits and enter repurchase 
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 The Dodd-Frank Act Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173 Section 939A. 
502
 SEC Reliance on Credit Ratings Study supra note 411. 
503
 OHLBAUM SWIRSKY. supra note 104 at 31 – 32.  
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 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 at (c)(3)(i). 
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 Id. at (c)(4)(i)(A) and (B). 
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agreements with securities firms thus taking more exposures to entities in the financial sector.511 
While Rule 2a-7 does not limit concentration of money market fund concentration in any 
particular industry sector, overexposure to financials could be interpreted as a significant risk 
factor. This risk is difficult to mitigate due to limited availability of money market fund eligible 
securities issued by non-financial entities as evidenced by the Federal Reserve data.512         
The US money market funds manage their exposure to interest rate and market risk by 
limiting portfolio maturity. Exhibit 6 points to four tests related to maturity. The subjective test 
of asset “maturity consistent with a stable net asset value” is intended to provide a principle-
based guidance on the market risk management. Generally, during periods of higher market 
volatility maturity of fund assets and the overall average portfolio maturity should be shorter. 
Moreover, because lower quality securities tend to be more volatile, it is generally appropriate to 
further limit maturities of second tier securities. Hence, the first objective standard limits 
maturities of individual securities based on securities credit worthiness. The US money market 
funds may acquire a first tier security with a remaining maturity up to 397 days and a second tier 
security with a remaining maturity up to 45 days.  
The other two objective standards for money market portfolio maturity are designed to 
limit interest rate, spread and liquidity risks.513 Money market funds must limit their dollar-
weighted average portfolio maturity to 60 days.514 This metric encompasses the portfolio 
exposure to interest rate risk. For example, if interest rates move up one per cent, a money 
market fund portfolio would sustain a loss of 0.16 per cent all else being equal.515 Lastly, money 
market funds must limit dollar-weighted average life of portfolio securities to 120 days.516 This 
metric is intended to capture any spread widening on portfolio securities “due to changing 
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 Sections 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.2.3 supra. 
512
 Supra note 509. 
513
 Interest rate risk refers to fluctuations in the value of a debt security resulting from changes in 
the general level of interest rates. Credit spread risk refers to fluctuations in the value of a debt security 
resulting from changes in credit spread. Liquidity risk refers to risk that a security cannot be traded 
quickly enough in the market to prevent a loss.       
514
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (c)(2)(ii). 
515
 Money market funds are generally managed to withstand share price volatility within 0.5 per 
cent. Money market fund boards are required to consider taking actions if the deviation between the fund 
portfolio amortised cost and its market value exceeds 0.5 per cent. See Id. at (c)(8)(ii)(B). 
516
 Id. at (c)(2)(iii). 
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market perceptions of credit risk and liquidity”.517 In addition to the main subjective and 
objective criteria with respect to maturities, Rule 2a-7 contains a number of special provisions 
related to variable and floating rate securities and securities with call features.518 
Liquidity provisions were added to Rule 2a-7 in 2010 for the first time.519 Although the 
Investment Company Act requires that any investment company pays out the redemption 
proceeds within 7 days, most money market funds operate under a more restrictive self-imposed 
liquidity mandate and generally promise investors to redeem their shares on the same day. Prior 
to the 2010 amendments to Rule 2a-7 money market funds generally relied on the secondary 
market to raise cash to meet unexpected redemptions. However, as explained in section 2.4, 
during the market turmoil of September 2008, buyers fled the market and money market funds 
were unable to raise cash through securities sale.  
The newly established liquidity provisions sought “to enhance investor confidence by 
assuring that money market funds stand ready to meet significant redemptions without incurring 
losses [that could arise from selling securities in the secondary market]”.520 These liquidity 
standards include a subjective determination whether portfolio securities are sufficiently liquid to 
meet reasonably foreseeable redemptions and three objective criteria, which may also vary 
depending on the type of the fund.521 First, money market funds can not invest more than five per 
cent of their assets in illiquid securities.522 Second, the taxable money market funds are required 
to hold at least ten per cent of their assets in daily liquid securities.523 Third, money market funds 
must also invest at least 30 per cent of their total assets in weekly liquid securities.524    
To summarise, the essential function of Rule 2a-7 is to provide objective risk-limiting 
standards for the US money market funds that are, in the view of regulators, consistent with the 
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 SEC Rel. No. IC-29132 at 10072, n. 156.  
518
 OHLBAUM SWIRSKY. supra note 104 at 105 – 113. 
519
 SEC Rel. No. IC-29132 at 10076. 
520
 ICI Report supra note 21 at 74. 
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 17 CFR § 270.38a-1 Compliance Procedures and Practices of Certain Investment Companies   
Money market funds are required to develop so-called know your customer procedures to identify 
investors whose redemptions could cause unforeseen liquidity needs for the fund. See also OHLBAUM 
SWIRSKY. supra note 104 at 115 – 123. 
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 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (c)(5)(i). 
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 Id. at (c)(5)(ii). 
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low risk profile of these funds. Importantly, the rule is designed to be a sufficiently flexible to 
address idiosyncratic risks of individual funds through imposing subjective standards alongside 
the specific quantitative criteria. I contend that these subjective standards described in Exhibit 6 
are essential for a successful implementation of the money market fund objective to be a safe and 
liquid cash management tool. As shown in section 2.2, different types of money market fund 
entail various degrees of riskiness; besides, as history suggests, fluidity of the capital market and 
its changing nature cannot be captured at the onset. A degree of asset manager discretion to tailor 
its investment strategy to specific circumstances above and beyond the minimum objective 
criteria, implemented under the board’s oversight, has contributed to the overall success of Rule 
2a-7 as a regulatory tool.525      
3.3.3.2 Stress testing 
To add to the ability of the fund manager to address emerging investment risks to the 
fund portfolio on the forward-looking basis, the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
incorporated a stress testing requirement in its post-crisis amendments to Rule 2a-7.526 Stress 
testing is expected to provide “some context within which to evaluate the assessment of the 
magnitude of each hypothetical event that would cause the fund to break the buck”.527 Examples 
of such events would include “a change in short-term interest rates, an increase in shareholder 
redemptions, a downgrade of or a default on portfolio securities”.528 Comment letters submitted 
to the US Securities and Exchange Commission in response to the stress testing proposal 
welcomed this introduction.529 It was noted that stress testing had been a part of robust risk 
management practices voluntarily adopted by the largest asset management companies long 
                                                 
525
 Statement of ICI Executive Committee on Money Market Fund Regulation, Investment 
Company Institute (14 March 2012), at http://www.ici.org/pressroom/news/12_new_mmf_ec. The 
statement highlighted that provisions of Rule 2a-7 “were in keeping with the SEC’s long record of 
crafting ever-stronger rules for money market funds.” 
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 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (c)(10)(v)(A). 
527
 SEC Rel. No. IC-29132 at n. 268. 
528
 Supra note 526. 
529
 See, e.g., Comment Letter to Money Market Fund Reform (File No. S7-11-09) (JP Morgan 
Asset Management  8 September 2009) at 2 – 6. JP Morgan Asset Management, one of the largest US 
asset managers, strongly supported the stress testing proposal as a cost-effective tool evaluating potential 
risks in money market fund portfolios and addressing such risks. 
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before it became compulsory.530 A non-binding Institutional Money Market Fund Association’s 
guidance on generic stress testing for European money market funds was also cited as an 
example of good regulation.531  
Guided by the need for customisation in establishing risk management practices, Rule 2a-
7 does not provide stress test-related objective compliance standards, but offers considerable 
flexibility for the fund boards to determine a framework that is “appropriate and reasonable in 
light of current market conditions”.532 For example, the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission advised money market fund managers do adopt contingent stress testing policies 
that would cause them to conduct tests on a more frequent basis should the fund net asset value 
decline below a predetermine threshold.533 In sum, the stress testing framework seeks to facilitate 
the fund directors’ understanding of what it takes for a money market fund to break the buck and 
take timely risk-mitigating steps, if warranted.  
3.3.3.3 Maintenance of a stable net asset value 
This section analyses two of the most important micro-control features in money market 
fund operations – maintenance of a stable net asset value per share and an ability of the fund 
boards to suspend redemptions. The study of micro-process like this one is expected to enrich 
legal scholarship with respect to the influence of a particular legal rule on the efficiency of the 
                                                 
530
 ICI Report supra note 21 at 75. The Investment Company Institute’s report recommended 
codifying the industry’s best practices in risk management as a legal standard. In practice, asset managers 
normally develop a stress testing process as a part of a broader in-house risk management framework not 
limited exclusively to money market funds. Risk management processes, among their other functions, 
limit exposures to a single entity or to a family of interrelated entities across different type of funds 
depending on in-house view of credit spreads, but also incorporate various historical and hypothetical 
stresses. Asset managers usually dial down exposure limits to a particular issuer should credit concerns 
arise although risk management practices, in general, depend on the firm’s risk appetite, investment 
expertise and various other aspects. 
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 Id. at 75 and 185. Specifically, Ireland-domiciled money market funds are expected to conduct 
monthly portfolio stress tests under various market scenarios. These scenarios should be designed to 
evaluate the magnitude of portfolio losses at certain levels of credit risk, interest rate risk and market risk 
exposure as well as increase in redemptions. The results of the stress tests must be made available to the 
Irish Financial Regulator upon request) 
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 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (c)(10)(v).  
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 SEC Rel. No. IC-29132 at n.262. In addition, the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
staff provided further clarifications and guidance related to stress test implementation. See Staff 
Responses to Questions About Money Market Fund Reform, US Securities and Exchange Commission.  
(25 May 2010), at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/mmfreform-imqa.htm.  
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market and the behaviour of market participants.534 As we shall see, the effect of the legal 
mechanisms that supports stable net asset value per share in money market funds is essential for 
the product in its current form; it is also essential for providing benefits to various industry 
stakeholders as illustrated by section 2.3. Notwithstanding its benefits, however, the very same 
mechanism has come under the regulatory scrutiny for its perceived contribution to money 
market fund susceptibility to a run.535 I address this concern in my normative proposals in 
chapter 6 in a manner that is consistent with my theory of the dual regulatory goal through a 
regulatory requirement of asset price transparency irrespective of an underlying valuation control 
mechanism. 
The 2010 updates to Rule 2a-7 did not affect the valuation methodology historically 
applied to the US money market funds – a combination of amortised cost and penny-rounding 
methods as explained in section 3.2. These two methods allow money market fund to smooth 
daily fluctuations of asset values and operate at a constant share price. Rule 2a-7 also requires a 
periodic comparison of the stabilised value of a share to the market-based value of a share, which 
is known as the shadow pricing process.536 The shadow pricing process refers to a mark-to-
market valuation of all securities in money market fund portfolios in addition to valuing each 
security at an amortised cost.537 The goal of the shadow pricing process is to ensure that fund 
shareholders are treated fairly and equally when they purchase and redeem fund shares and that 
no shareholder is disadvantaged due to asset mispricing.  
In the event that a money market fund’s stable price per share deviates from its marked-
to-market value more than half per cent, the rule requires the fund board to determine whether 
any action is necessary to reduce such deviation.538 A money market fund board of directors has 
special duties to “determine, in good faith, that it is in the best interest of shareholders to 
maintain a constant net asset value per share” and to establish written procedures by which such 
stable value is computed.539 If the board believes that the fund’s constant net asset value per 
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 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (c)(8)(ii)(B). 
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 Id. at (c)(1) and (c)(8)(i). 
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share no longer reflects its market value and may cause unfair treatment of the fund shareholders, 
it may suspend redemptions and liquidate the fund.540  
The second control feature – an ability of a fund board to suspend redemptions – is a new 
proviso to the US money market fund regulatory framework introduced after the tumultuous 
events of September 2008. Prior to the 2010 money market fund reform, a fund was required to 
obtain an order from the US Securities and Exchange Commission to suspend the 
redemptions.541 An experience of managing money market funds during the crisis has shown that 
a run on a fund can develop rather quickly. Thus, a fund board may not have sufficient time to go 
through the legal steps of requesting such permission. Rule 22e-3 introduced in March 2010 
empowered money market fund boards to suspend redemptions if the fund is facing a run.542 It 
was intended “to reduce the vulnerability of investors to the harmful effects of a run on the fund, 
and minimize the potential for disruption to the securities markets”.543 Thus, the regulatory goal 
of protecting systemic stability was indeed achieved with an introduction of the discussed rule. 
 As discussed in section 3.3.1, the federal securities law framework makes it generally 
illegal for the US mutual funds not to honour redemptions or delay payments for redeemed 
shares for more than seven days. When introducing Rule 22e-3, the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission noted that the rule is designed only to facilitate the permanent termination of a fund 
in an orderly manner, but should not be used for suspending redemptions temporarily.544 Other 
actions that a money market fund sponsor could undertake in order to stabilise its net asset value 
involve various forms of financial support. Specifically, Rule 17a-9 permits money market fund 
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 17 CFR § 270.22e-3 Exemption for Liquidation of Money Market Funds  (75 FR 10117, 4 
March 2010). 
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 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22   
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 17 CFR § 270.22e-3  To invoke the rule, certain conditions must be satisfied: (1) the fund’s 
board, including a majority of directors who are not interested persons of the fund, determines that the 
extent of the deviation between the fund’s amortized cost price per share and its current marked-to-market 
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liquidation of the fund; and (3) The fund, prior to suspending redemptions, notifies the Commission of its 
decision to liquidate and suspend redemptions. 
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 SEC Rel. No. IC-29132 at 10088. The US Securities and Exchange Commission also noted 
that “because the suspension of redemptions may impose hardships on investors who rely on their ability 
to redeem shares, the conditions of the rule limit the fund’s ability to suspend redemptions to 
circumstances that present a significant risk of a run on the fund and potential harm to shareholders”. 
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affiliates to purchase an impaired security from a money market fund portfolio.545 To avoid a 
financial loss to the fund shareholders, the purchase price must be equal or greater than the 
amortised cost of the security or its market price.546  
Positive from the standpoint of my theory of the dual regulatory goal and, specifically, 
from the standpoint of investor protection, the rule operationalises the fund sponsor’s willingness 
to absorb the loss voluntarily. A capital contribution from a fund sponsor may also help to bring 
the fund’s net asset value closer to its stable value should a dangerous deviation of the fund’s 
share price from its stable value occurs. Other affiliated funds or the fund sponsor could lend 
cash to a money market fund in case of emergency liquidity needs.547 Even though fund sponsors 
have no legal obligations to provide financial support, the history suggests that strategically 
motivated organisations tend to protect their fund shareholders to avoid negative implications for 
their asset management franchises.548  
3.3.3.4 Recordkeeping, reporting and public disclosure 
Rule 2a-7 imposes the whole panoply of requirements seeking to ensure that money 
market funds are run in a responsible manner and under a high level of oversight. First, as 
discussed earlier, money market fund boards must establish and periodically review written 
guidelines for determining whether securities present minimum credit risk. In practice, these 
guidelines are followed by the fund’s asset manager with the fund board not being involved in 
the day-to-day fund management.549 However, if credit quality of a portfolio security 
                                                 
545
 17 CFR § 270.17a-9 Purchase of Certain Securities From a Money Market Fund by an 
Affiliate, or an Affiliate of an Affiliate  Absent this rule, Section 17(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act 
prohibits any affiliated person from purchasing securities from the fund. 
546
 Id. at (a)(2). The rule also allows an affiliate to proactively purchase any other security from a 
money market fund provided that if the security is thereafter sold for a higher price, the fund must be 
promptly reimbursed for the difference.   
547
 OHLBAUM SWIRSKY. supra note 104 at 39 – 40. The US Securities and Exchange Commission 
exemptive relief would be needed for fund borrowings from affiliated entities.   
548
 See generally SHILLING, MMF Support Report supra note 156 at Fig. 2. The study notes that 
between 2007 and 2009, over 60 money market funds received financial support from their sponsors. 
Money market fund sponsors purchased impaired securities of failed asset-backed commercial paper 
programmes and structured investment vehicles. Sponsors also purchased defaulted securities issued by 
Lehman Brothers from their affiliated money market funds at prices that allowed the funds to maintain a 
stable net asset value. 
549
 OHLBAUM SWIRSKY. supra note 104 at 26 – 30. A number of the fund board’s functions can 
be delegated to the asset manager or the officers of the fund, provided certain conditions are satisfied. 
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deteriorates, the board must make a determination whether continuing holding of such security is 
in the best interests of shareholders.550 Second, money market fund boards require asset 
managers to provide periodic reports that facilitate the boards fulfilling their oversight duties.551 
Examples of required reports would include comparisons of the amortised cost price and market-
based values per share, the shadow price methodology and stress testing.552 Third, money market 
funds are required to keep written records of credit risk analysis performed for each portfolio 
security and the status of the security being determined as an eligible security, i.e., whether it is a 
first or second tier security.553 Written records of evaluations of various other security features 
are also required to be maintained and kept in an accessible place for a number of years.554   
Section 3.3.1.2 described a comprehensive disclosure regime applicable to all US mutual 
funds.555 Mutual fund reports are available at no charge to any investor through a public filing 
database, called the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) 
maintained by the US Securities and Exchange Commission.556 However, following amendments 
to Rule 2a-7 introduced in 2010, in addition to the general disclosure requirements, money 
market funds are held to a much higher level of transparency relative to other mutual funds and 
are required to place the list of portfolio holdings on public web-sites on a monthly basis.557 The 
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 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (c)(7). 
551
 Id. at (e). 
552
 Id. at (c)(8)(ii)(A)(2) for shadow price calculations and (c)(10)(v) for stress testing. A money 
market fund board may request from the fund manager additional reports that could be helpful including, 
for example, a list of portfolio maturities, a list of second tier and non-compliance securities and a report 
related to the fund shareholders. See also OHLBAUM SWIRSKY. supra note 104 at 135 – 136.  
553
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (c)(11)(iii). 
554
 Id. at (c)(11)(iv) – (viii). Security features subject to additional evaluations include adjustable 
rate securities, asset-backed securities and securities subject to calls. 
555
 17 CFR § 274.128 Form N-CSR, certified shareholder report  (68 FR 5368  3 February 2003). 
This form is used by registered management investment companies to file shareholder reports; 17 CFR § 
274.130 Form N-Q, quarterly schedule of portfolio holdings of registered management investment 
company  (69 FR 11271  9 March 2004). This form is used by registered management investment 
companies to file quarterly reports of portfolio holdings after the first and third quarters. Just like any 
other mutual fund, money market funds must provide a full schedule of their portfolio holdings in 
quarterly filings to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, within 60 days after the end of the 
quarter. 
556
 EDGAR supra note 438. 
557
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (c)(12). The US money market funds are mandated to disclose their 
portfolio holding information on their public websites on monthly basis within five business days after the 
end of each month, which is a more frequent and timely schedule than that required for other mutual 
funds. Other mutual funds furnish their portfolios to the US Securities and Exchange Commission on a 
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policy reason for frequent disclosure of portfolio holdings is to better educate investors regarding 
the current investment risks thereby strengthening their ability to exert influence on risk-taking 
by the fund managers.558 I reiterate that, as pointed out in section 1.1.3, only such good 
disclosure as opposed to bad disclosure would achieve the policy goal of investor protection by 
subjecting the fund managers to the on-going public scrutiny.559  
The ultimate goal of public filings of portfolio holdings is to accumulate a central 
database that could be used to enhance fund oversight, monitor market interconnectedness and 
enhance regulatory ability to respond to market events.560 Even though such detailed information 
could be viewed as overwhelming for individual investors, regulators anticipated that many 
institutional investors, academic researchers and economic research firms would make use of 
portfolio holding information to study money market fund holdings and evaluate their risk.561 
Urged by some market participants, the US Securities and Exchange Commission considered a 
competitive effect of frequent disclosures on funds or fund managers as some information could 
be viewed as proprietary, sensitive, or confidential in nature. Other concerns related to frequent 
disclosures of investment information included free riding and profitable arbitrage when 
sophisticated investors could take advantage of available portfolio holding information and trade 
ahead of money market funds locking in free profit.562  
The US Securities and Exchange Commission concluded, however, that the risks of 
trading ahead of money market funds are “severely curtailed, because of the short-term nature of 
                                                                                                                                                             
quarterly basis. See 69 FR 49805 Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered 
Management Investment Companies (12 August 2004).    
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 SEC Rel. No. IC-29132 at 10081. 
559
 17 CFR § 270.30b1-7  Rule 30b1-7 requires money market funds to file Form N-MFP within 
five business days after the end of each month. Form N-MFP must be filed electronically through the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR system in an eXtensible Markup Language (XML) 
tagged data format.  
560
 SCHAPIRO, (2010) supra note 88.  
561
 SEC Rel. No. IC-29132  at 10084. 
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 See, e.g., LYON,   supra note 121. A study related conducted in 1984 revealed the possible 
danger from arbitrage in money market fund shares. Money market fund shareholders could risk having 
their capital gains diluted by efficient arbitrageurs, who could increase their holdings of the MMF when it 
was undervalued and sell their shares when the MMF was overvalued. The research also showed that risk 
of dilution to an individual investor is immaterial. However, arbitrage could be more profitable for an 
arbitrageur or more damaging for money market fund shareholders during a prolonged period of rising or 
falling interest rates.  
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money market fund investments and the restricted universe of eligible portfolio securities”.563 
Also, because shares of money market funds are purchased and redeemed at $1.00, a profitable 
arbitrage strategy is difficult to implement in practice.564 Thus, an incremental competitive 
disadvantage and theoretical possibilities of free riding and arbitrage are counterbalanced by the 
disciplining effect that public disclosures have on portfolio management practices. In his 
interview given in July 2011, Andrew ‘Buddy’ Donohue, the former director of the Division of 
Investment Management of the US Securities and Exchange Commission noted:  
Money market funds have become the focus of attention in the press, particularly as 
money market fund exposures to the risks of potential downgrades or defaults in Europe 
from sovereign debt have been highlighted, and more recently with regard to our own 
[US] Government securities. As an aside, it is the high level of transparency around their 
portfolio holdings provided by money market funds on a monthly basis in regulatory 
filings and on their websites which enables this healthy discussion.565  
Opposite views with respect to benefits of public disclosure were voiced by a few money 
market industry actors during the commentary period preceding the May 2010 implementation of 
the money market fund reform. For example, the Dreyfus Corporation, one of the largest US 
asset management firms raised a concern related to the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s encouragement of third-party research firms to rely of such public disclosures for 
their commercial studies:       
Disclosure for the principal benefit of third-party research firms, and not individual 
investors, is excessive and beyond the appropriate scope of transparency. Also, the 
expectation that third-parties will draw fair and accurate characterizations from raw 
statistical data provided without any context or controls is no higher than it would be for 
individual investors. This could result in the dissemination of inaccurate and negative 
characterizations of fund market value changes, with detrimental effects to funds and 
their shareholders.566 
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In addition, asset management firms objected to the disclosure of the market-based 
values of portfolio securities and of fund net asset value per share.567 There were concerns that 
even a slight negative deviation of the market price from a stable value of $1.00 could result in 
an investor confusion and redemption requests that would exacerbate pricing deviations. Thus, 
transparency in market-based pricing could have an opposite effect and, instead of achieving 
information symmetry and improving fund manager discipline in operating their funds, lead to 
destabilising effects on the money markets.568 Notwithstanding these concerns, the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s fundamental position is that greater transparency forms the 
foundation of functional and efficient markets.569  
This assumption by the Commission is, in effect, fully consistent with the discussion of 
the Akerlof model of the efficient market offered in section 1.2 and also is supportive of my 
assertion that good disclosure would provide a strong basis for greater investor protection. The 
Commission believed that the most significant positive effect of the improved money market 
fund reporting was in “discouraging a fund’s portfolio manager from taking risks that might 
reduce the fund’s market-based net asset value”.570 Regulators anticipated that robust disclosures 
would lead to greater cash flows into those funds exhibiting less historical volatility in market-
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 See, e.g., Comment Letter to Money Market Fund Reform Proposals File No. S7-11-09; Rel. 
No. IC-28807  (State Street Global Advisors 8 September 2009) at 2. The comment letter maintained that 
public disclosure of money market fund portfolio market values should not be required “since such 
disclosure could cause investor confusion.” Available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-09/s71109-
108.pdf. 
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 SEC Rel. No. IC-29132 at 10084. 
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 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 Findings and Declaration of Policy  Section 1(b)(1) of the Investment 
Company Act states that “[N]ational public interest and the interests of investors are adversely affected ... 
when investors purchase, pay for, exchange, ... sell, or surrender securities issued by investment 
companies without adequate, accurate, and explicit information”. See also ELISSE B. WALTER, Speech by 
SEC Commissioner: Opening Statement at SEC Open Meeting on Money Market Fund Reform (Final 
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ensure that investors understand that money market funds, like all investments, involve risk and differ 
from ... insured bank products. And the information may help facilitate a productive dialog between a 
fund and its current and prospective investors concerning, among other things, investment decisions, 
corporate governance, and risk management”.  
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 SEC Rel. No. IC-29132 at 10085. 
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based share values thus encouraging a conservative approach to money market fund 
management.571  
To summarise, regulation of the US money market fund built upon the legal framework 
described in this section could be viewed as both successful and controversial. Its success is 
evident in the size of the assets under management and the broad benefits these funds provided to 
the various economic actors. Its controversial nature arises from a number of deviations in 
regulatory approach to the US money market funds from other mutual funds. The next section 
introduces an entire new dimension to the US money market fund analysis – credit rating 
considerations.   
3.4 Credit rating of the US money market funds 
Another dimension of my research question – how should money market fund be 
regulated? – is the service provided by credit rating agencies in the form of credit ratings for 
these funds. As we shall see from this section, the criteria of credit rating agencies have a 
material impact on the fund manager behaviour and as such credit rating agencies could be 
considered as having a regulatory effect. In order to establish whether credit rating agencies have 
a place in the regulatory architecture proposed in this thesis, their effect should be critically 
analysed vis-à-vis my theory of a dual regulatory goal – investor protection and systemic 
stability.       
As seen in section 3.2.1, the historical developments of money market funds and their 
exposure to risky assets led to a demand for an independent third party risk analysis in these 
funds. Credit rating agencies, whose core function is to analyse credit risk, found a role in this 
sector with Standard & Poor’s first offering a money market fund rating in 1984.572 In a few 
years, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings had also started publishing money market 
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 Id. The final version of the 2010 money market fund reform related to money market fund 
reporting contained a provision that delayed the public availability of portfolio information and market- 
based value per share for 60 days. The 60-day lag sought to alleviate concerns that the immediate investor 
reaction to unfamiliar data could result in redemption requests that exacerbate pricing deviations.  
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 A History of Standard & Poor's.  (2009), at http://www.standardandpoors.com/about-
sp/timeline/en/us/.   
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fund ratings.573 Today, only these three internationally recognised rating agencies offer rating 
opinions on the US and European money market funds.  
In the context of money market funds, credit rating agencies are focused on the ability of 
these funds to achieve their stated investment objectives of preserving principal and providing 
timely liquidity. Credit views of rating agencies are guided by their proprietary rating 
methodologies, which set forth an analytical framework for measuring money market fund risks. 
Credit ratings for money market funds are based on evaluation of several factors such as credit 
quality of portfolio assets, diversification and duration of individual securities, overall portfolio 
duration, liquidity management, operational practices, governance and oversight as well as the 
level of resources dedicated to the money market fund operations.574 Furthermore, a credit rating 
approach to the US money market funds assumes fund compliance with all applicable laws and 
regulations.  
Notwithstanding the credit rating agencies’ methodologies, the baseline limitations on 
investment and operational risks in money market funds are set by virtue of the existing 
regulatory framework. In addition to the regulatory risk-limiting standards, credit rating agencies 
strive to provide further differentiation among money market funds on the basis of their relative 
riskiness and ability to achieve their stated investment objectives. All three rating agencies use 
separate and distinct rating symbols and scales designed specifically for money market funds. 
Unique rating symbols, presented in Exhibit 7, seek to differentiate money market fund ratings 
from corporate issuer or issue credit ratings, which usually indicate a borrower’s ability to repay 
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 See Global Money Market Fund Rating Criteria  (Fitch Ratings  4 April 2011) Available at 
http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=614345. Moody's Revised 
Money Market Funds Rating Methodology and Symbols  (Moody's Investors Service  10 March 2011) 
Available at  http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_131303. Principal 
Stability Fund Ratings  (Standard & Poor's  8 June 2011) Available at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/prot/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetID=1245314271927. While there are 
ten organisations currently registered with the US Securities and Exchange Commission as ‘Nationally 
Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations,’ the status that makes ratings acceptable for regulatory 
purposes, only the largest three rating agencies issue ratings on the US money market funds. For the 
purposes of this research, references to credit rating agencies are limited to Fitch Ratings, Moody’s 
Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s. 
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principal and interest on a timely basis. Ratings on money market funds may not be comparable 
with corporate credit ratings on debt securities.575      
Exhibit 7: Money market find rating symbols and scales 
Rating Generic Definition576 Fitch Moody’s Standard & Poor’s 
AAAmmf Aaa-mf AAAm 
A money market fund has extremely strong 
ability to achieve its investment objectives of 
preserving principal and providing liquidity 
AAmmf Aa-mf AAm 
A money market fund has very strong ability to 
achieve its investment objectives of preserving 
principal and providing liquidity 
Ammf A-mf Am 
A money market fund has strong ability to 
achieve its investment objectives of preserving 
principal and providing liquidity 
BBBmmf Baa-mf BBBm 
A money market fund has adequate ability to 
achieve its investment objectives of preserving 
principal and providing liquidity 
BBmmf Ba-mf BBm 
A money market fund has marginal or uncertain 
ability to achieve its investment objectives of 
preserving principal and providing liquidity 
 B-mf  A money market failed to provide liquidity.  Its 
ability to preserve principal is uncertain.  
Bmmf C-mf Dm 
A money market fund failed to meet either 
objective of providing liquidity or preserving 
principal. 
           
Credit rating agencies evaluate credit quality of a money market fund by assessing 
individual holdings, counterparties and overall diversification.577 The analytical method pursued 
by all three rating agencies comprises a combination of a bottom-up quantitative approach to 
investment risks overlaid with top-down qualitative considerations related to operational 
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 See, e.g., Fitch MMF Rating Criteria  supra note 573 at 3. 
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 Specific language used by credit rating agencies in defining rating levels may vary. Generic 
definitions seek to capture a relative gradation of risks in lower rated money market funds.   
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 Normally, the credit quality assessment is driven by credit ratings already assigned to 
individual holdings and counterparties by the same rating agency. For the funds seeking the highest 
money market fund ratings, each holding must be rated in the highest short-term rating category. A highly 
rated money market fund should also be adequately diversified across individual issuers: generally no 
more than five per cent of total fund assets could be invested in securities of the same issuer although 
there might be allowances for special types of investments. See Credit rating agencies’ money market 
fund rating methodologies supra note 573.   
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practices and oversight. A quantitative approach to investment risk recognises its two-
dimensional nature – the risk of investing in high quality short maturity securities is lower than 
risk of investing in lower quality longer maturity instrument.578 The risk in money market funds 
could be managed dynamically by limiting an investment horizon for the lower quality securities 
and by extending duration in the higher quality assets.  
Credit rating agencies expect money market fund to adequately manage the interest rate 
risk exposure consistent with the funds’ objective of principal stability. Depending on the credit 
rating agency, specific quantitative criteria for AAAmmf/AAA-mf/AAAm rated money market 
funds generally mirror the US regulatory requirements set forth in Rule 2a-7, but may also be 
more stringent, less stringent or not include certain factors at all.579 In addition, highly rated 
money market funds are expected to conservatively manage their liquidity profiles vis-à-vis their 
portfolio composition and shareholder base.580         
Another important factor in the risk assessment of money market funds is the volatility of 
the fund’s market-based net asset value per share, which indicates how close the fund is to 
breaking the buck.581 The effect of this risk assessment is a change in the behaviour of the fund 
manager evidencing a quasi-regulatory status of credit rating agencies. Specifically, Standard & 
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 Both Fitch and Moody’s developed proprietary metrics intended to assess credit risk 
assessment in money market funds. These tools are Portfolio Credit Factor (Fitch) and a Moody’s Credit 
Matrix. Standard & Poor’s requires money market funds to maintain a specific ratio of the highest quality 
short-term securities. See Credit rating agencies’ money market fund rating methodologies supra note 
573.    
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 Credit rating agencies generally expect the highly rated US money market funds to limit their 
dollar-weighted average maturity to 60 days in line with Rule 2a-7 requirement. Other rating criteria vary. 
For example, Fitch expects the highest quality money market funds to maintain a dollar-weighted average 
life of no more than to 120 days. Standard and Poor’s would like to see this limit to be below 90 days. 
Moody’s rating approach does not include a weighted-average life factor. See supra note 573. 
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 Specific rating agency criteria vary with respect to liquidity management in money market 
funds. For example, Fitch provides specific guidelines related to portfolio allocations to daily and weekly 
liquid assets at different rating levels. See Fitch MMF Rating Criteria supra note 573 at 2 and 7. Neither 
Moody’s nor Standard & Poor’s offer portfolio allocation guidelines but rather expect highly-rated money 
market funds to maintain adequate portfolio liquidity relative to the fund size and its shareholder 
composition and limit investments in illiquid securities with no secondary market. See Moody's MMF 
Rating Methodology supra note 573 at 6 – 7. S&P MMF Rating Methodology supra note 573 at D. 
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 Breaking the buck refers to the discrepancy of 50 basis points or more between the fund’s 
amortised cost-based net asset value per share, or $1.00, and its market value-based net asset value per 
share. Supra note 156. Normally, the deviation of money market fund’s market value-based net asset 
value per share from $1.00 is well within 50 basis points. See Pricing of U.S. Money Market Funds  
(Investment Company Institute  January 2011) at 26. 
144 
 
Poor’s provides volatility limits for money market funds at each rating level.582 Moody’s requires 
to stress test the fund’s marker-based net asset value and incorporates the result of the stress test 
in its rating scoring system.583 Fitch offers no qualitative criteria related to this factor, but 
reviews market-based net asset values as a part of its regular rating surveillance.584           
Lastly, drawing from the history of financial support of money market funds by their 
sponsors, both Fitch and Moody’s included ability and willingness of the fund sponsors to back 
up their funds as a part of their rating analysis.585 According to a study conducted by Moody’s, 
even well-managed money market funds investing in high quality short-term securities may 
experience a material decline in their market-based values and shortage of liquidity.586 Thus, in 
Fitch and Moody’s view, the quantitative assessment of a money market fund profile could not in 
and of itself determine the fund rating, but it is a qualitative assessment of the fund sponsor 
ability to provide support that grants a money market fund rating its predictive ability.587 By 
contrast, Standard & Poor’s does not consider sponsor’s financial support in its rating analysis, 
but forms its opinion solely on “a fund’s independent ability to maintain principal stability and 
limit exposure to losses resulting from credit risk”.588  
The discussed divergence of the rating methodologies among three major rating agencies 
illustrates multiple analytical approaches that can be employed in rating analysis. None of them 
per se is right or wrong, but each method simply assigns different weights to the factors driving 
risks in money market funds. I view such diversity of analytical opinions based on diversity of 
rating approaches as a positive factor contributing to availability of information for fund 
investors. Investors are given a choice to consider one or another, or all of them in combination 
for a more complete picture of money market fund risks. This is an undeniably positive factor 
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from the standpoint of my theory of the dual regulatory goal as improving investor protection be 
a means of empowering investor with a greater array of fund data.            
All three credit rating agencies normally assign ratings to money market funds following 
a request for a rating from the fund or its asset manager and are paid by the fund or its agent for 
the rating. One of the strong advantages of the issuer-paid business model is a direct access to 
the fund data, management and other related actors.589 Rating opinions and related research are 
disseminated to financial media and are available on rating agencies websites thus further 
reducing information asymmetry between money market funds and investors. Assigned ratings 
are monitored and updated at least annually.590 Notwithstanding positive rating attributes, which 
include a timely portfolio risk assessment at no cost to investors, only approximately 35 per cent 
of the US money market funds are rated with investor’s interest in these rating being driven 
largely by their institutionalisation.591  
I attribute lack of retail investor interest in money market fund ratings to two factors. 
First, the US securities market regulation generally prohibits use of credit ratings in fund 
advertisement; therefore, retail investors may not be aware of the assigned rating.592 Second, a 
perceived complexity of the rating analysis has been deterring retail investors from incorporating 
rating opinions as a part of their investment decision making process. Nonetheless, institutional 
investors such as corporate treasurers and public fund managers use money market fund ratings 
as a part of their investment strategies, or even require these ratings as one of the investment 
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 It is often pointed out that an inherited conflict of the issuer-paid rating business model could 
discourage rating agencies from exercising a proper investigation of facts and in-depth analysis of risks. 
See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers in 
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 REGULATION (EU) No 513/2011 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 11 May 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies  (OJ L 
145/30 31.5.2011) at Annex III, Paragraph 46. Credit rating agencies are subject to a fine if ratings and 
rating methodologies are not reviewed on on-going basis and at least annually. 
591
 As of 30 September 2011, 193 US money market funds were rated by one or more credit 
rating agencies. As of the same date, there were in total 546 money market funds operating in the US 
managed by 97 asset managers. Source: iMoneyNet.  
592
 17 CFR § 230.482 Advertising by an Investment Company as Satisfying Requirements of 
Section 10   
146 
 
eligibility criteria.593 Therefore, those money market funds targeted to institutional clientele 
obtain ratings from one or more credit ratings agencies to facilitate distribution.594 This explains 
why nearly all institutional money market funds carry one or more credit ratings and why retail 
funds are seldom rated.595      
The negative aspects of being subject to rating for a money market fund relate to 
incremental costs of rating compliance costs and managerial time devoted to the rating 
management. These costs, however, are dwarfed by a probability of rating change even for the 
reasons outside the fund management control. Since a rating opinion remains a property of the 
credit rating agency, a money market fund rating could be changed or withdrawn at the 
discretion of the agency regardless whether there were any adverse changes in the fund’s risk 
profile.596 Thus fund managers would rather opt for not having a rating in order to avoid 
probable loss of investors should credit rating change.  
Therefore the power that credit rating agencies wield over the market is once again 
evidences their quasi-regulatory role. Nevertheless, I point out a counterproductive effect of this 
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 See, e.g., Treasurer's Statement of Investment Policy  (Office of the Auditor-
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process.   
595
 See, e.g., PETER CRANE, Money Fund Intelligence XLS Vol 6 No 8  (CraneData  1 August 
2011). Among 15 largest portfolios managing 32 per cent of total assets under management of the US 
money market funds 12 funds are institutional funds, all carry the highest money market fund rating from 
at least one rating agency. The remaining 3 funds, which do not carry ratings, are those funds mainly sold 
to retail investors. Available at:  http://www.cranedata.com/products/money-fund-intelligence-xls/.   
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 See, e.g., PETER CRANE, Moody's New Methodology Goes Live; Lots of Dropped AAA Ratings, 
CraneData 20 May 2011. The article reports that when Moody’s revised its money market fund rating 
methodology to include a newly developed stability score, a number of funds to dropped Moody’s rating 
out of concerns that the new rating approach would cause a downgrade. There were no changes in the risk 
profiles of these funds, but rather Moody’s view on how the funds should be managed has changed. 
Available at http://www.cranedata.us/archives/all-articles/3448/. 
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power from the standpoint of systemic stability. As discussed above, negative rating changes are 
likely to precipitate cash outflow from the funds and introduce additional liquidity pressure, 
which is likely exacerbate any looming credit concerns. Thus credit ratings have pro-cyclical 
characteristics as rating changes tend to follow credit developments, but not to forestall them.597 
An important implication of this analysis for my research question is that credit ratings may not 
be a helpful tool to use in the regulatory architecture proposed in my thesis given the objective of 
preserving systemic stability.   
This section described credit rating agencies’ contribution to the money market fund 
industry. It also explained who uses money market fund ratings and why, and what are the 
advantages and disadvantages of money market fund ratings. To summarise, credit ratings for the 
US money market funds serve as a differentiating factor and a marketing tool for the funds and 
an additional risk checkpoint for investors above and beyond regulatory requirements. This 
section also asserted that credit ratings, despite their quasi-regulatory effect could not be 
accepted as a proper regulatory tool due to their inherited pro-cyclical characteristics. The next 
section comments on the future direction of the US money market fund industry against the 
backdrop of its continuing reforms. 
3.5 US money market fund reform proposals 
This section examines certain regulatory proposals for the continuing reform of the US 
money market funds, which are currently extensively debated by various industry stakeholders 
(my own proposals for the new regulatory architecture is instead outlined in chapter 6). As 
explained in section 3.3, the amendments to Rule 2a-7 introduced in May 2010 were just the first 
step of a two-step process of a comprehensive regulatory reform of the US money market 
funds.598 The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets “Money Market Fund Reform 
Options” released in October 2010 discussed many of the concerns regulators still have and some 
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 Pro-cyclicality is a tendency of credit indicators, including credit ratings, to vary positively 
with economic cycles. See JOCHEN ANDRITZKY, et al., Policies to Mitigate Procyclicality, IMF Staff 
Position Note (7 May 2009) at 4.  See also JEFFERY D. AMATO & CRAIG H. FURFINE, Are credit ratings 
procyclical?, 129 BIS Working Papers (February 2003) at 12 – 13. 
598 SCHAPIRO, (2010) supra note 88. The statement proposes more “fundamental changes to the 
structure of money market funds to further protect them from the risk of runs” in addition to Rule 2a-7 
amendments introduced in May 2010. 
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of the alternative means of addressing those concerns.599 Following the release of the President’s 
Working Group report, the US Securities and Exchange Commission sought the industry 
comments and encouraged various alternatives ideas. The Commission ultimately received 
significant feedback: money market fund investors, issuers and asset managers filed well over 
100 comment letters. There also have been over 20 meetings conducted by the Commission’s 
officials with the industry stakeholders. In addition, the Commission held a roundtable to discuss 
benefits and possible unintended consequences of a broader money market fund reform.600 All 
these activities underscored the importance of the US money market fund industry and lack of 
ready answers.601  
Clearly, there has been a large amount of work done by regulators and the money market 
fund industry towards achieving a workable solution. However, at the time of writing, the final 
regulatory proposal is yet to emerge. The events of the fall of 2008 challenged the main premise 
underlying the structure of the US money market industry. The US Securities and Exchange 
Commission exempted money market funds from the general rule directing mutual funds to 
transact on the basis of the market-based value of their shares relying on the assumption that 
high-quality, short-term debt securities held until maturity will eventually return to the amortised 
cost value.602 Any temporary disparity between the amortized cost value and market value could 
be viewed as market noise that could be ignored. Therefore, Rule 2a-7 permits money market 
funds to use the amortized cost accounting method, but only if the deviation between the 
amortized cost and the market-based value remains minimal, generally within 0.5 per cent, 
which can also be rounded to the next cent.603  
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 PWG's Report supra note 7. 
600
 Comments letters to the Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
‘Money Market Fund Reform Options’ are available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4-
619.shtml#meetings 
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 See also Annual Report  (Financial Stability Oversight Council  2011) [FSOC 2011 Annual 
Report] at 13. The newly formed Federal Stability Oversight Council in its first annual report to the US 
Congress recommended the following reform options with respect to the US money market funds: a 
conversion to a floating net asset value format, an implementation of a loss-absorbing capital buffer and 
deterrent of redemptions as specific means to mitigate investor runs. 
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 SEC Rel. No. IC-28807 at 32690. 
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 Section 3.3 supra provided a detailed review of the processes and procedures that money 
market funds must follow to ensure that the stable share price fairly represents the current market-based 
value per share. 
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The credit events of 2007 and the extreme market volatility of 2008 illustrated that the 
amortised cost valuation could, at times, hide meaningful asset price fluctuations. Furthermore, 
in the eyes of regulators such hidden volatility may disproportionally disadvantage certain types 
of investors less aware of the money market fund structure. For example, large investors better 
informed of asset price fluctuations could take advantage of the fund and its other 
shareholders.604 Another important regulatory concern relates to the US money market funds 
using “the stable, rounded $1.00 net asset value [that fosters] the expectation that ... share prices 
will not fluctuate”.605 However, when shareholders accelerate redemptions, the change in net 
asset value may disproportionally affect the remaining shareholders. For this reason, the current 
structure of the US money market funds – a stable share price of $1.00 – is believed to be prone 
to investor runs and, therefore, create systemic risk.606  
As noted earlier, the President’s Working Group report on money market fund reform 
options released in October 2010 provided a review of the alternative ideas related to the money 
market fund structure and commented on benefits and shortcomings of these ideas.607 These 
options included: converging funds to the floating net asset value model; establishing a private 
emergency liquidity facility available to troubled money market funds; requiring redemptions in 
kind for large asset withdrawals; assessing a money market fund insurance; establishing a two-
tier system of the money market fund industry with enhanced protection for the constant net 
asset value funds; establishing a two-tier system with the constant net asset value money market 
funds reserved for retail investors; regulating constant net asset value money market funds as 
special purpose banks; and enhancing constraints on unregulated money market fund substitutes.  
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 See, e.g., ANDREW J. "BUDDY" DONOHUE, Keynote Address at the Practising Law Institute's 
Investment Management Institute  (2 April 2009). Consider a money market fund that has a loss of 0.4 
per cent of its assets, so value of its assets per share now $1.0000 - $0.0040 = $0.9960. Using a penny-
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net asset value becomes $0.9947 or $0.99, if rounded to the nearest cent. Thus, the remaining 
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 FSOC 2011 Annual Report supra note 601 at 50. 
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 Id. at 13. FSOC annual report noted that a number of features still make the US money market 
funds susceptible to runs and should be addressed to mitigate vulnerabilities in this market. 
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 PWG's Report supra note 7.  
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Advancing the mandatory conversion to the floating net asset value operational model as 
the very first option, the report noted that constant net asset value funds “have fostered investor’s 
expectations that money market funds shares are risk-free cash equivalents”.608 The report also 
asserted that the current structure of the US money market funds is inherently unstable, while “a 
floating net asset value may eliminate some of the incentives to redeem when a money market 
fund had experienced a loss”.609 I would like to note that in contrast to the view expressed in the 
report, the historical track record of money market funds does not support the assertion of these 
funds being susceptible to runs more than any other investment scheme.610 Prior to the crisis 
several asset management firms introduced low duration alternatives to money market funds 
featuring floating net asset values per share and not using a stabilising technique of the amortised 
cost valuation. These low duration funds “never achieved significant scale, performed poorly in 
the financial crisis, and were subject to redemption runs”.611  
Furthermore, no academic evidence was found to support the claim of money market 
funds being susceptible to runs.612 Nevertheless, one of the existing regulatory proposals for a 
further money market fund reform is focused on banning the funds from using the amortised cost 
valuation method and only permitting money market fund share transactions at a market-based 
price.613 Industry feedback regarding the other seven options outlined in the President’s Working 
Group report besides converting money market funds to a market-based pricing voiced negative 
views with respect to all but one option: the proposal to establish a private emergency liquidity 
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facility gained approvals from 67 per cent of responders.614 Furthermore, in response to this 
option the Investment Company Institute working together with some of the largest US asset 
managers developed a detailed plan for establishing a Liquidity Exchange Facility in a form of a 
bank that would provide liquidity for all US prime money market funds during times of unusual 
market stress.615 
 However, given that the fee for participation in the facility was not aligned with an 
individual fund liquidity risk, the Liquidity Exchange Facility could be an overpriced option for 
some funds. For this reason, some of the largest US managers of retail money market funds 
opposed this solution.616 All other options discussed in the President’s Working Group report 
were likewise voted out by the industry stakeholders as being unworkable, impractical or 
prohibitively expensive.617 Other reform options were proposed in addition to the eight provided 
in the President’s Working Group report. In particular, a group of 14 economists known as an 
academic “Squam Lake Group” suggested an alternative solution where money market funds 
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 ALEX ROEVER & TERESA HO, Short-Term Fixed Income  (J.P. Morgan Securities LLC  21 
January 2011) at 1 (on file with the author). 
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 PAUL SCHOTT  STEVENS, Comment Letter to the PWG's Report on Money Market Fund 
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Investments, the largest US asset manager to retail money market funds, voiced its concerns that the 
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would maintain a loss-absorbing capital buffer of ‘X’ per cent of the fund’s assets.618 The buffer 
would represent additional resources to be drawn upon as needed to support fund redemptions.619 
The proposal asserted that a buffer of at least three per cent would have been necessary to 
prevent the Reserve Primary Fund from breaking the buck. 
Other industry participants offered other versions of a loss-absorbing capital buffer for 
prime money market funds.620 In one of the proposals the buffer would belong to shareholders of 
each money market mutual fund, but not the asset management company, like the Squam Lake 
Group envisioned.621 Arguably, a capital buffer funded with a portion of income withheld from 
the fund shareholders greatly reduces shareholder incentives to leave the fund, which would 
mean abandoning their own protective buffer. A shortcoming of this scheme, however, is that a 
capital buffer would take a substantial time to build especially in the current low interest rate 
environment. Nevertheless, an introduction of a capital buffer to a structure of the US money 
market fund is one of the likely outcomes of the on-going regulatory reform debate.  
Arguably, a capital buffer addresses many of the concerns raised about the constant net 
asset value prime money market funds. First, it increases pricing transparency and enables 
money market fund investors to know how much support the fund has. Second, it reduces 
likelihood of a fund breaking the buck. Third, an implicit expectation of support from the fund 
sponsor is replaced with an explicit contract. Fourth, a capital buffer, especially if built with an 
undistributed income, lessens the incentive for shareholders to leave the fund. Fifth, it also 
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discourages the fund manager from attracting hot money.622 Nonetheless, these positive factors 
should be considered vis-à-vis the size of the capital buffer and a means of obtaining it. If the 
buffer is too large it is likely to be economically unfeasible. Furthermore, a buffer funded by an 
asset management company would place small and medium size firms in a disadvantaged 
position or even force them out of money market fund management business. This would result 
in further industry consolidation and, possibly, a version of a too big to fail problem in the 
money management sector.         
The pros and cons of the proposed reform options considered in this section underscore 
the complexity of the issues. After Rule 2a-7 amendments implemented in 2010, the money 
market fund resiliency to financial shocks has already improved. Given other changes affecting 
the capital markets it is especially challenging to gauge potential unintended consequences of 
any further reforms in this area. Nonetheless, as shown in this section, the majority of the reform 
options laid out in the President’s Working Group report were not friendly to the industry 
stakeholders and could result in significant assets outflows from the US money market funds 
causing disruption to the short-term capital markets. This outcome alone entails significant 
implications with respect to systemic stability concerns. In addition, some of the options result in 
significant costs to asset managers who may reconsider the economic fundamental of managing 
money market funds triggering further industry consolidation, which, in turn would weaken 
investor protection by the industry monopolisation and reduction in investment options. 
  3.6 Conclusion 
The analysis of the US money market fund industry offered in this chapter found that 
these funds emerged in the early 1970s as a response to restrictive banking regulation. Money 
market funds gained popularity among small investors by providing access to safe investments 
paying high market interest rates, which were previously only available to investors with large 
cash balances. Asset managers to the first money market fund developed investment practices 
that enabled them to achieve a dual goal of safety of principal and daily liquidity. These practices 
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liquidity and reinvestment risk of the fund and dilute yield of the core shareholders. 
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served as a source of emerging regulatory standards and formed a basis for developing legal 
rules governing activities of money market funds.       
My inquiry into the broad regulatory framework of the US mutual funds confirmed the 
existence of a comprehensive regime covering the funds’ investment activities, operations, 
corporate governance and oversight. Given the unique function of money market funds as 
important financial intermediaries in the short-term capital markets, these funds are also subject 
to risk-limiting prudential rules codified under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act. Rule 
2a-7 have recently been revised to address weaknesses and shortcomings in money market fund 
investment and operational practices that became apparent during the height of the financial 
crisis in the fall of 2008, which significantly enhanced investor protection in these funds.  
Above and beyond normative rules imposed and enforced by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, a subset of the US money market funds targeted to institutional investors 
voluntarily adhere to credit standards developed by credit rating agencies, which through their 
acceptance by the market participants have a quasi-regulatory impact. Positive from the investor 
protection standpoint, these standards seek to quantify abilities of money market funds to achieve 
their investment objectives and meet investors’ demand for custom-made credit rating opinions 
that address idiosyncratic risks in money market fund. Notwithstanding the value of credit 
ratings for investors, pro-cyclical characteristics of credit ratings make them a weak regulatory 
tool due to negative implication for systemic stability.        
The purpose of the inquiry undertaken in the last section has been to identify what the 
future of the US money market fund industry may look like given the whirlpool of the recent 
regulatory reform debates. The incremental way in which financial stability measures have been 
introduced in the course of the last two years and the fragmentation of prudential supervisory 
arrangements considered by various regulatory agencies explain the legal uncertainties 
surrounding the future of the US money market fund industry. The following chapter takes us 
across the Atlantic and focuses on money market funds in the EU.                
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CHAPTER 4: MONEY MARKET FUNDS IN THE EU 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 described the US money market funds. The scope of this chapter is European 
money market funds. It will be shown that money market funds in Europe are governed by the 
EU legal rules and are also subject to their national regulation. The chapter illustrates that the 
specific practices embraced by the EU and national regulators have often been inspired by the 
money market industry itself or sometimes imported from those jurisdictions featuring more 
developed regulatory regimes with respect to money market funds. With regard to the method, 
this chapter presents a historical narrative and utilises critical analysis as well as elements of 
legal analysis of the practices of money market funds in Europe. In effect, it offers an insight into 
the development of the law through the diffusion of particular legal practices across the borders. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study that systematically analyses the European 
Union’s regulatory framework applied to money market funds as well as details of national 
regulation relevant to this sector. Existing sources related to money market funds outside the US 
are extremely limited and are mostly focused on dissecting the funds’ performance. This study is 
instead unique in considering all aspects of European money market fund practices and 
operations be they developed locally, imported from other markets or introduced by credit rating 
agencies. Furthermore, the effect of the financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis on 
the funds’ practices is incorporated, thereby making this thesis especially relevant to the ongoing 
regulatory debate in terms of clarifying the significant issues relating to the development of 
sustainable market practices and setting appropriate and robust regulatory practices at the 
European and national levels. 
With regard to the structure, this chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 4.2 
describes the origin and evolution of European money market funds and profiles the 
contemporary state of the industry. Section 4.3 presents the Community legal rules underlying 
activities of European money market funds. Section 4.4 reports on the credit rating agencies’ 
contribution into the development of the European money market fund industry and governing 
regulatory practices.  Section 4.5 examines the future of European money market funds focusing 
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on challenges and opportunities prompted by the recent attempts to harmonise the diverse 
European practices. Section 4.6 concludes supporting the view that the product diversification 
that characterises the current state of European money market fund industry is the outcome of the 
diversity of the European capital markets at the national levels. Therefore, this chapter contends 
that the industry future rests on finding the right balance between the pan-European 
harmonisation trend and the need for diversification. 
4.2 History and current state of the money market fund industry in the EU 
This section is divided into two parts: the first describes the origins of money market 
funds in selected European countries starting from the 1980s, and the second discusses the state 
of the European money market fund industry from early the 2000s through the present. The 
selection of countries for the historical narrative featured in the first part was influenced mainly 
by the size of the assets under management of the local money market fund industry and its 
importance to the national capital markets. These selected countries are France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom.  
4.2.1 European money market funds from the 1980s to the early 2000s 
4.2.1.1 France 
The historical narrative starts with France because France led the development of 
European money market funds in the early 1980s.623 The reason for the emergence of money 
market funds in France was similar to that in the US, namely the restrictive banking regime.624 
French bank regulation capped interest rate that banks could pay their clients on savings accounts 
and, therefore, French money market funds were able to offer their investors a return consistent 
with the market rates, when banks could not.625 Coincidentally, in order to accelerate the post-
recession economic recovery in the early 1980s the French government increased issuance of 
short-term government obligations and encouraged retail investor participation by offering a tax 
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 See section 3.2.1 supra for the history of the US money market fund industry. 
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credit.626 Due to both a relatively high yield and a tax credit, government securities have quickly 
become an attractive investment option for retail investors providing a strong impetus for 
development of SICAV Monetaire, French collective investment schemes that facilitated investor 
participation in this market.627  
SICAV Monetaire invested in government and corporate obligations of relatively short 
duration and tracking short-term interest rates were marketed as money market funds. Unlike the 
US money market funds, which developed to a considerable product standardisation, the French 
money market funds have always featured varied risk profiles.  Generally, three broad types of 
French money market funds were recognized: regular money market funds, dynamic money 
market funds and dynamic plus money market funds, although a classification of these funds has 
always presented a challenge owning it to the diversity of investment strategies and the lack of a 
commonly accepted definition at that time.628 The most conservative regular French money 
market funds were managed to track short-term market indices, while dynamic and dynamic plus 
money market funds sought to obtain additional yield by investing a part of their portfolios in 
riskier assets.629 
Because French money market funds were aimed at tracking short-term market indices, 
share prices of these funds could increase or decrease depending on the behaviour of the selected 
index. Therefore, French money market funds have been referred to as variable net assets value 
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 The story of French money market funds was related to me by David Vriesenga, the first head 
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money market funds.630 In practice, share prices of French money market funds generally 
exhibited a steady growth owning it to a continuing reinvestment of capital gains and 
dividends.631 A comforting perception of a steady increase in share price was facilitated by a lack 
of market-based pricing in French money market funds.632 Until early 2000s, French money 
market funds have fully relied on amortised cost accounting ‘smoothing’ share price 
fluctuations.633 Distinctive attributes of French money market funds – an attractive yield relative 
bank deposits, a tax advantage and an impression of a steady positive performance – explain why 
French money market funds quickly gained investors’ acceptance and commanded the largest 
share of the European money market fund industry in the early 2000s.634 
4.2.1.2 Ireland 
In the early 1990s, approximately ten years after money market funds emerged in France, 
Ireland attracted international asset managers as a platform for further development of money 
market funds in Europe. The demand for money market funds established in European fund 
administration centres came from the US asset managers, who observed growing demand for 
cash management services from corporations with business franchises spread around the world. 
Fidelity Investments was amongst the first US asset managers who pioneered import of the US-
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BERNARD DELBECQUE, Trends in the European Investment Fund Industry in the First Quarter of 2003  
(European Fund and Asset Management Association  June 2003) [EFAMA Q1 2003] at 3. As of March 
2003, French money market funds managed $363.9 billion of $725.6 billion in asset under management 
of total European money market funds. 
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style money market fund, when it moved its Bermuda-domiciled money market funds to Europe 
in the early 1990s.635 Fidelity’s funds in Europe were managed just like the US money market 
funds, but were denominated in various European currencies. This development explains why the 
US-style money market funds in Europe have mainly been managed by the US asset managers 
for the benefits of their institutional clients operating multi-nationally.636  
Arriving to Ireland, the US-style money market funds exported the US cash culture, its 
investment and operational practices.637 With the exception of France, the majority of European 
fund accounting systems did not support amortized cost asset valuation employed by the US 
money market funds. The Irish fund administration system had to develop and implement the 
US-style operation practices to meet growing demand for this service.638 The Irish Financial 
Regulator facilitated this process by issuing a guidance related to acceptable asset valuation 
methods, including the amortised cost method.639 Allied Irish Bank was amongst the first to offer 
services in amortised cost asset valuation accompanied by market-based asset valuation known 
as the shadow pricing process, just like US money market funds would do at home.640 Thus, 
Ireland was able to harvest benefits of development in international trade and cross border cash 
                                                 
635
 I wish to express my sincere thanks for this story to David Hynes, one of the ‘founding 
fathers’ of the International Money Market Fund Association and to David Vriesenga, the first head of 
European money market fund business at Moody’s Investors Service. 
636
 After Fidelity Investments entered the European money markets, other US asset managers 
including AIM Investment, Goldman Sachs Asset Management and JP Morgan Asset Management 
established US-style money market funds in Europe. 
637
 See chapter 3 supra a detailed discussion of investment and operational practices employed by 
the US money market funds.  
638
 UCITS-authorized European money market funds could, in theory, use either amortized cost 
method or market-based valuation or a combination of these methods, as permitted by the applicable 
national laws and the fund’s incorporation charters. See Directive 2009/65, [2009] OJ L302/32  at Article 
85. The UCITS Directive relies on national laws, the fund rules and fund incorporation documents for 
assets valuation processes and methods of share/unit price calculation.  
639
 Irish Financial Regulator Guidance Note 1/00 allowed the amortised cost method to be applied 
to value money market instruments in a UCITS collective investment schemes where the individual 
instruments have a “residual maturity of less than three months and have no specific sensitivity to market 
parameters, including credit risk”. See European News & Views  (Citi Third ed. 2008) at 15. 
640
 According to my conversations with the European money market industry veterans, initially 
the US-style money market fund administration and accounting were almost exclusively outsourced to the 
Ireland-domiciled Allied Irish Bank. 
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flows that prompted expansion of the US money market funds overseas owning it to flexible 
regulatory regime and responsive fund service industry.641 
4.2.1.3 Luxembourg 
Luxembourg, another major European fund administration centre, likewise benefited 
from acceleration of cross-border cash flows. However, due to the proximity to France, the early 
versions of Luxembourg money market funds originated in the 1980s strongly resembled their 
French peers. The main reason for French money market funds migration to Luxembourg was 
taxation. As mentioned early, French money market funds provided investors with tax-
advantageous income, but only if the funds invested majority of their assets, or at least 90 per 
cent, domestically.642 Thus, while providing income tax-advantage for investors, these funds also 
limited investors in terms of diversification options. Money market funds could enlarge their 
investment universe by allocating more assets to foreign securities, but they wanted to do it in a 
tax-efficient way.643 These funds found Luxembourg a welcoming destination.  
The aspect of taxation explains the initial structure of Luxembourg money market funds 
featuring floating net assets value per share, which was widely accepted by investors in other 
European countries studied, e.g., in Germany and Spain, analysed later in this section, in addition 
to France.644 Moreover, following the development of the US-style money market funds initially 
hosted mainly by Ireland, Luxembourg fund services quickly embraced the US-style funds’ 
offering constant net asset value645 per share.646 Both Ireland and Luxembourg transposed the 
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 See, e.g., Right place right time. Ireland - the domicile of choice for regulated funds  
(PriceWaterhouseCooper  January 2012) at 6. Ireland commands over 30 per cent of assets under 
management of European money market funds, offers the highest quality fund administration services and 
an advantageous tax regime. Available at http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/2012_right_place_right_ 
time_ireland_the_domicile_of_choice_for_regulated_funds.pdf.    
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 I would like to thank David Vriesenga, the first head of the European money market fund 
business at Moody’s Investors Service in 1990s, who shared with me his knowledge of the history of 
money market funds in Luxembourg. 
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 See, e.g., KPMG Executive Briefing - UCITS in Luxembourg  (KPMG  June 2009) at 56. 
Luxembourg UCITS are exempt from tax on income or capital gain. UCITS that are institutional money 
market funds are also exempt from subscription tax that nonetheless is applied to other UCITS. Available 
at http://www.kpmg.lu/Download/Brochures/2009/ExecutiveBriefing_UCITS_Web.pdf. 
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UCITS Directive into their national laws by the late 1980s thus enabling their funds to pursue 
business freely across the EU on the basis of a single authorisation issued by the host country 
authorities.647 Even though the UCITS Directive does not specifically target money market 
funds, this thesis shows that the regulatory framework set forth under the UCITS Directive 
serves as a primary source of the investments and operational standards applicable to these 
funds.648  
The presence of the UCITS framework for marketing collective investment schemes 
throughout Europe have proven to be the most important factor enabling distribution growth of 
the US-style money market funds. These funds were offered mainly to institutional investors who 
sought professional cash management services generated only nominal sales in the host 
country.649 The US-style money market funds whether domiciled in Ireland or Luxembourg were 
almost exclusively sold cross-border as opposed to French money market funds mainly sold to 
French investors.650 
4.2.1.4 Germany 
In 1994 money market funds were introduced to Germany after a considerable resistance 
from the Bundesbank. 651 Similar to the US banking industry, German banks were fully aware of 
                                                                                                                                                             
646
 A number of the US asset managers, seeking flexibility, established Luxembourg-based 
money market funds in addition to similar strategy funds located in Ireland or other off-shore destinations. 
For example, Fidelity Investments and Morgan Stanley Asset Management have established US-style 
money market funds domiciled in both Ireland and Luxembourg. 
647
 Council Directive (EEC) 85/611, [1985] OJ L375/3. Adopted in 1985, the UCITS Directive 
refers to a series of European Union directives establishing a common regulatory framework for 
marketing collective investment schemes throughout Europe. See section 4.3.2.1 infra describing 
European money market funds and the UCITS framework. 
648
 See section 4.3.1 infra for a detailed review of the UCITS Directive in its aspects relevant to 
money market funds. 
649
 The cross-border nature of Irish money market funds is reflected in statistical methodologies 
for collecting data related to collective investments. To avoid double-counting of Irish funds’ assets in the 
combine per-country statistics these assets are normally excluded from available European investment 
fund statistics.  
650
 POIZOT, et al., (2006) supra note 209 at 1. The report points to the fact that French investors 
tend to place their cash with managers based in France and, therefore, the shareholder base of French 
asset managers to money market funds have remained largely domestic. 
651
 German money market funds were introduced as part of the II. Financial Promotion Act 




a competitive threat of money market funds to the banking community.652 Another reason for the 
Bundesbank’s resistance was a likely distortion to its control of the monetary base.653 Similar to 
those money market funds operating in France, German money market funds’ core objective was 
a performance that is broadly in line money market benchmarks.654 Given the opportunity for 
risk taking under the broad performance objective, German regulators limited final maturities of 
money market fund-eligible holdings to one year.655 This regulation brought German money 
market funds in line with a money market fund definition adopted by the European Central Bank 
in 1998.656  
From the standpoint of asset valuation, German money market funds have always relied 
on market-based asset values allowing their shares to float up and down reflecting the movement 
of the short-term market.657 That said German money market funds were managed with an 
implicit assumption that a share price of a conservatively managed fund would not decline 
significantly on any single day. This assumption boded well with retail clients, who were the 
main investors in German money market funds.658 Retail investors normally are not particularly 
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 As a response to the competition, German banks introduced new innovative short term savings 
accounts. Regarding the US banking community response to the introduction of the US money market 
funds, see section 3.2.1 supra. 
653
 See RICHARD G. ANDERSON, Monetary Base, 2006-049A Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Working Paper (August 2006 ) at 2. The author provides a definition of the monetary base, which 
includes bank deposits. The definition does not include shares of money market funds although such 
shares have been view by some authors as a close substitute for bank deposits. This issue of monetary 
base have been resolved by the European Central Bank collecting statistics on assets under management 
of the ‘qualified’ money market funds. See section 4.3.3 infra for the European central Bank’s definition 
of the ‘qualified’ money market funds. 
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 Supra note 629. See also COZ, (2009) supra note 625 at 1. 
655
 STEPHAN JANK & MICHAEL WEDOW, Sturm und Drang in Money Market Funds: When 
Money Market Funds Cease to be Narrow Deutsche Bundesbank: Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking 
and Financial Studies (2008) at 6 – 7. 
656
 Regulation (EC) No 2819/98 of The European Central Bank of 1 December 1998 concerning 
the consolidated balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector  (OJ L 356/7  30 December 
1998) at 11. In this documents Money market funds are defined as those collective investment units that 
can be viewed as close substitutes for deposits in terms of liquidity and “which primarily invest in money 
market instruments and/or in other transferable debt instruments with a residual maturity up to one year, 
and/or in bank deposits, and/or which pursue a rate of return that approaches the interest rates of money 
market instruments”. The bank also stated that the criteria identifying money market funds should be 
derived from the collective investment schemes’ “public prospectuses, fund rules, instruments of 
incorporation, established statutes or by-laws, subscription documents or investment contracts, marketing 
documents, or any other statement with similar effect”. 
657
 For that reason, German money market funds are referred to as floating net asset value funds. 
658
 See COZ, (2009) supra note 625 at 1. 
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sensitive to share price fluctuation as long as the fluctuations are minimal and consistent with a 
perception of low risk investments.659 Share price volatility of German money market funds was 
further ‘smoothed’ by adding income to the share price instead of paying it out. Culturally and 
historically European asset managers felt more comfortable with floating fund share prices and 
income accumulation naturally boosting share price. Income accumulation helped to off-set 
capital loss promoting an illusion of a consistent growth.660  
The concept of a constant share price, so favoured by the US money market fund 
investors, never took hold in Germany and their money market funds were not treated any 
differently for the purpose of asset pricing than any other collective investment scheme. 
Furthermore, it was too costly and operationally burdensome for asset managers to establish 
separate asset valuation practices and fund accounting systems designed specifically for money 
market funds, given their limited size of assets under management.661 A slow growth of assets 
under management in German money market funds could be explained by a low level of 
institutional investor participation. German business culture with its traditional reliance on banks 
for all cash management needs by corporate entities rendered money market funds 
predominantly retail.662 In addition, from the standpoint of a treasury of a multi-national 
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 According to Rudolf Siebel, ex-Moody’s Investors Services’ analyst, who is currently 
Managing Director/Head of Market and Service of BVI Bundesverband Investment und Asset 
Management e.V., in 1998 two German money market funds experienced portfolio losses in the 
magnitude of 3.5 per cent to 4 per cent of the funds’ total assets due to investments in notes linked to 
performance of Russia’s and Thailand’s markets. 
660
 A story of German money market fund development was shared with me by Rudolf Siebel, ex-
Moody’s Investors Services’ analyst, who is currently Managing Director/Head of Market and Service of 
BVI Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management e.V.   
661
 I would like to note a special challenge of obtaining precise statistics regarding the size of the 
domestic money market fund industry in Germany. The great majority of money market funds sold to 
German investors are UCITS funds domiciled elsewhere but mainly in neighbouring Luxembourg. 
Available statistics aggregates home country assets in both domestic UCITS and those sold cross-border. 
See European Investment Fund Industry in Q1 2003 supra note 634 at 9. The report shows that the total 
size of the German UCITS money market fund assets was €42.5 billion, or $43.3 billion. This data 
includes both types of UCITS, those domestic funds and fund sold cross-border.  
662
 For example, German corporate treasurers prefer keeping operating funds in a bank’s deposit 
account. Cash in a bank can be accessed immediately, as opposed to money market fund investments, 
which entail a somewhat more operationally burdensome process of analyzing a money market fund and 
authorizing share purchases and redemptions. 
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corporation operating in Germany, local money market funds with floating share prices would 
not be an appropriate instrument for operating cash, which translates into a lack of demand.663 
As mentioned earlier in this section, taxation played an important role in shaping the 
landscape of European money market funds. It was the issue of taxation that placed German 
money market funds in an unfair competition with other UCITS-authorized money market funds 
established elsewhere in Europe and ultimately inhibited the growth of domestic money market 
funds.664 As much as money market fund investors loath uncertainty, certainty of taxes is 
something they would rather avoid.665 While income derived from investments in German-based 
money market funds could be taxed at the same rate as that income from cross-border money 
market funds, investors in domestic funds were disadvantaged in terms of the timing of tax 
payments.  
Tax on investment income from domestic funds was deducted at the time when an 
investor received such income, therefore an investor would receive a lower after tax income. 
This was in contrast with money market funds sold cross-border paying out income before taxes, 
which was taxed only in the following year after such income was received. Thus, German 
money market funds have never become a significant factor in the German financial system as 
the taxation issue and the strong banking culture have overall pre-empted widespread investor 
acceptance 
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 Corporate treasurers are generally extremely averse to even minimal volatility of invested 
principal in their cash investments. See multiple letters from corporate treasurers to the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission rationalising their aversion to floating net asset value money market funds; 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4-619.shtml. 
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 Supra note 661. While precise data is difficult to obtain, anecdotal evidences suggest that a 
significant part of money market fund assets in Germany is managed by Luxembourg-based funds. 
German asset managers have long established subsidiaries in neighbouring Luxembourg to take 
advantage of responsive and flexible Luxembourg financial authorities that promptly authorized new 
products and had less restrictive investment regulation. 
665
 ‘The only two certainties in life are death and taxes’ is a quote attributed to Benjamin Franklin 




The Spanish money market developed in the mid-1980s facilitated by the introduction of 
Letras de Tesoro (Treasury Bills) in 1987.666  In addition to government securities, Spanish 
banking and corporate sectors issued a variety of money market instruments, including 
commercial paper, certificates of deposit, medium term notes and term deposits suitable of 
purchases of these funds.667 Spanish money market funds known as fondos de inversion en 
activos del mercado monetario, or investment funds in money market assets, were amongst the 
main investors in the short-term government and corporate securities. Regulation of these funds 
was focused on asset liquidity and to required final maturities of portfolio holding not exceeded 
18 months.668 Regulatory maturity limit, in turn, dictated duration of securities issuance, e.g, the 
Spanish Treasury Bills and commercial paper were issued in maturities of 12 and 18 months to 
meet final maturity limits of money market funds. 
Redemptions from money market funds could be achieved through use of a check book 
or a credit card tied to the fund. This means that investors could use their investment assets at 
any time, which explains the regulatory focus on fund liquidity, which was based on the 
underlying assumption that a security of no more than 1.5 years to maturity is liquid, or could 
always be sold to a willing buyer at a price close to what the fund has it on its book. Nonetheless, 
the views of pan-European and national regulators on what constitute a liquid security varied, 
e.g., German regulators concurred with the European Central Bank when limited the final 
maturities of their domestic money market funds to one year.669 These varying views, in turn, 
promoted diversity of national markets while impeding development of a uniform pan-European 
short-term market.   
Notably, an investment objective of Spanish money market funds to track short-term 
interest rates was consistent with that of French and German money market funds; thus Spanish 
money market funds’ share prices were expected to fluctuate reflecting the interest rate 
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 European Money Market Paper - Spain  (FA Verbriefte Geldmarktprodukt  March 2004) at 5. 
667
 Id. at 4. 
668
 This requirement covered 90 per cent of money market fund assets. The remaining 10 per cent 
of assets could be invested in other types of securities. 
669
 Supra note 656. 
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movements.670 In practice, investors in these funds expected values of their shares to increase 
steadily due to accumulation of capital gain and interest income, consistent with the investors’ 
expectations of money market fund performance in France and Germany. Thus, due to 
similarities of an investment objective to track short-term interest rates and an expectation of a 
steady increase in fund share prices due to accumulation of capital gains and interest income this 
type of funds are often considered as a homogenous group of Continental European money 
market funds.671   
4.2.1.6 The United Kingdom 
The history of European money market funds would be incomplete without mentioning 
the UK, even though its own domestic money market fund industry is rather limited.672 An 
example of the UK money market funds illustrates the importance of other factors for the 
industry development, including the position of banks and presence of a deep and liquid public 
market. Fidelity Investments, one of the largest US asset managers, laid the foundation of the UK 
money market fund industry in the late 1980s, when it launched its first sterling-denominated 
Fidelity Cash Unit Trust.673 Fidelity sought to offer an alternative means of managing cash to its 
institutional clients doing business in Europe and deliver a return consistently higher than that 
                                                 
670
 See section 4.2.1.1 supra note 629 describing short-term market indices tracked by money 
market funds.   
671
 The group of Continental European money market funds include money market funds 
domiciled in certain other counties of continental Europe pursuing a similar investment objective and 
offering a variable net asset value share price. Because assets under management of domestic money 
market funds in these countries are relatively small, they are omitted from the study of the origin and 
development of European money market funds.     
672
 As of 31 March 2011, assets under management of the UK money market funds were €3.4 
billion, or $4.8 billion, which constitutes 0.3 per cent of total assets under management in European 
money market funds. Source: the Investment Company Institute. Available at: www.ici.org.  
673
 Fidelity Investments has been managing money market funds in the US since 1974 by 
launching Fidelity Daily Income Trust only in two years after money market funds came about in the US.  
Fidelity Investments sought overseas expansion and in 1968 established a foreign subsidiary in Bermuda, 
Fidelity International to manage assets of non-US investors. Fidelity International had offices in London 
and other countries. 
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offered by banks.674 Launched by a US asset manager, the fund mirrored investment and 
operational polices accepted by the US money market funds.675  
While the US institutional investors looked for the US-style money market funds in other 
jurisdictions, the local UK investors did not have any particular need to look beyond banks. The 
UK banking regulation did not limit deposit rates the way the US or French regulators did 
enabling the UK banks to offer higher interest rates and rendering emerging money market funds 
lacking meaningful yield advantage.676 Another significant factor inhibiting development of the 
UK money market funds was scarcity of government and corporate short-term issuance. The UK 
corporations relied mainly on bank financing for their borrowing needs and did not actively 
utilise the public market. The UK money market funds invested mainly in banks’ call accounts 
and certificate of deposits and, therefore, lacked diversification.677 These two factors, namely 
competition from banks and the limited public short-term market curtailed development of the 
UK money market fund industry, which remained insignificant in terms of assets under 
management relative to other European countries.678 
The major themes that can be drawn from this historical narrative related to the early 
days of the European money market fund industry are as follows: first, domestic bank regulation, 
limiting interest rates on bank deposit accounts, was a strong positive factor for money market 
funds (e.g., France). Lack of such regulation rendered money market funds with no competitive 
advantage and hampered their development (e.g., the UK). Second, the development of domestic 
European money market funds has been strongly correlated with the depth of the local short-term 
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 FIDELITY INTERNATIONAL, Fidelity Cash Fund A Safe Haven for Your Cash   available at 
https://www.fidelity.co.uk/static/pdf/investor/forms-documents/cash-fund-brochure.pdf 
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 As opposed to continental European money market funds, Fidelity Cash Unit Trust maintained 
constant net asset value per share and daily liquidity at par. The fund was marketed as an alternative to 
bank deposits and had no penalties for early withdrawals. 
676
 See sections 3.2.1 and 4.2.1.1 supra analysing the origin of money market funds in the US and 
France, respectively. 
677
 Natwest Bank was amongst the first UK money market fund sponsors when launched the 
Reserve Fund. By the mid-1990s the Reserve Fund, which sold through the bank distribution channels 
and invested in bank deposits and corporate commercial paper, has become the largest sterling-
denominated money market fund. The fund was managed in line with the US money market fund 
investment and operational practices.  
678
 The story of the UK money market funds industry was shared with me by David Hynes to 
whom I would like to express my deepest gratitude. Mr. Hynes has managed money market funds for a 
number of the UK and US asset managers, including NatWest, in the 1990s.  
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markets. A limited size of the local corporate issuance restricted money market funds’ 
investment options and prevented the funds from achieving sufficient economy of scale to 
support their operations (e.g., in Germany and the UK). On the other hand, an active local short-
term market promoted domestic money market funds (e.g., in France). Third, a favourable tax 
treatment helped domestic money market fund to gain investors’ acceptance (e.g., in France). 
Alternatively, a disadvantaging tax regime inhibited growth of domestic money market funds and 
pushed fund origination and management to European fund administration centres (e.g., 
Germany).  
The next section moves from the regulatory influences to an analysis of the industry from 
the capital market perspective. This is important in order to gain an insight into the evolution of 
money market fund regulation at this stage of market development and it ultimately links to my 
research question how should money market funds be regulated?   
4.2.2 European money market fund industry from the early 2000s to today 
By 2003, the size of the assets under management in European money market funds 
reached €666 billion, or 22 per cent of total European UCITS industry indicating a strong 
investor acceptance.679 French money market funds accounted for over half of the total European 
money market fund assets followed by Luxembourg and Italy. Exhibit 8 illustrates the relative 
size of the money market funds by country of assets domicile at the end of the first quarter of 
2003.680 
Exhibit 8: Size of European money market funds by home-domiciled assets 
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 DELBECQUE, EFAMA Q1 2003 supra note 634 at 3. 
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 European Investment Fund Industry in Q1 2003 supra note 634 at 9. The available data 
provides county allocation by the assets domicile, but not by the fund domicile, e.g., Ireland is not 




As explained in the previous section, historically European money market funds 
employed a wide range of investment practices driven by the structure of the national capital 
markets and, therefore, had different risk profiles. Prior to the introduction of a common 
definition of European money market funds in July 2011, European money market funds were 
generally divided into three broad categories.681 First, there were liquidity – or treasurer – money 
market funds that sought principal preservation and provided on-demand liquidity at par.682 
Second, there were regular European money market funds aimed at tracking short-term interest 
rates. Third, there were other European money market funds with a somewhat broader 
investment mandate seeking to provide additional yield over the short-term interest rates. Hence, 
these funds were often referred to as enhanced money market funds.683 Exhibit 9 illustrates the 
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 See generally BAKLANOVA, (2010b) supra note 344. 
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 These funds are also often referred to as the US-style money market funds or offshore money 
market funds indicating their domiciliation outside the US. It is amusing that despite the majority of these 
funds’ domiciliation in the Europe’s leading fund administration onshore jurisdictions such as Ireland and 
Luxembourg it is an industry’s tradition to refer to such funds as offshore money market funds. That said 
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Cayman Islands or Bermuda.  
Another semantic detail is that the treasurer money market funds in the context of European 
money market funds have nothing in common with those US Treasury money market funds. One would 
refer to treasurer money market funds in Europe in case of funds that are mainly purchased by corporate 
treasurers, while a reference to the US Treasury money market funds assumes investment policies of 
such funds targeted at investments in the US Treasury securities.          
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funds’ classification in the order of priorities in terms of capital preservation, liquidity and yield, 
giving their varying investment objectives.  
Exhibit 9: European money market funds by investment objectives684 
Types of money 
market funds 
Liquidity Regular Enhanced 
Primary Objective Capital Preservation Capital Preservation Yield 
Secondary Objective Liquidity Yield Capital Preservation 
Tertiary Objective Yield Liquidity Liquidity 
 
The difference in classification type related mainly to the differences in the market 
performance. For example, the benign interest rate environment prevailing since 2002 to early 
2007 has encouraged the growth of enhanced money market funds.685 Yield enhancement was 
generally achieved through extension of credit to high quality mortgage-backed and asset-backed 
securities or investment grade corporate issuers.686 However, the deterioration in credit quality of 
mortgage-backed securities starting in 2006 exposed enhanced and dynamic money market funds 
to substantial losses.687 For example, BNP Paribas blamed “the complete evaporation of 
liquidity” for its decision of temporary suspending redemptions in its three dynamic money 
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 Fund classification offered in exhibit 6 did not amount to a regulatory definition, but was used 
rather loosely as an industry jargon. Meaning of the presented factors could vary depending on the fund’s 
domicile. The European Securities and Markets Authority introduced a common definition of European 
money market funds in July 2011. See CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. See also, EFAMA and IMMFA 
Recommendation for a European Classification and Definition of Money Market Funds  (European Fund 
and Asset Management Association / Institutional Money Market Fund Association  8 July 2009) at 7. 
The recommendation letter provided one of the versions for the European money market fund 
classification system. The version presented in this chapter is substantially similar to the one offered in 
the letter. 
685
 These funds were also known as dynamic money market funds in France. However, because 
no precise classification of French money market funds existed, some of these funds could also be 
classified as dynamic plus money market funds implying that these funds are taking on slightly more 
credit and/or interest rate risk relative to those dynamic funds. See POIZOT, et al., (2006)  supra note 209 
at 3.  
686
 Id. at 3. Between 2002 and 2006, dynamic and dynamic plus money market funds 
outperformed regular money market funds by 60 basis points and 250 basis points, respectively.  
687
 FCIC Report supra note 27 at 221 – 223. Major rating agencies conducted numerous 
downgrades of mortgage-backed securities; e.g., Moody’s downgraded 83% of Aaa-rated tranches of 
mortgage-backed securities originated in 2006. Nearly all investment grade tranches originated in the 
second half of 2007 were downgraded.  
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market funds.688 Two dynamic money market funds managed by AXA Investment Management 
lost approximately 13 per cent of their assets within just two trading days in July 2007.689 
Notably, these funds were misconstrued by investors as low risk money market funds.690 In July 
2007, another French asset manager ODDO announced that it would close and dissolve three of 
its enhanced money market funds.691 
It is because of these obvious differences in market performance amongst different types 
of money market funds in the EU encouraged the belief that it is plausible to provide a 
mechanism to protect investors by administering specifically designed investment rules. In 
retrospect, the credit deterioration in the enhanced money market fund segment in France served 
as the warning bell of the financial crisis.692 Indeed, on the next day after BNP Paribas suspended 
redemptions the Federal Reserve announced that it would “provide liquidity as necessary to 
facilitate the orderly functioning of financial markets”.693 The European Central Bank took steps 
to normalise the markets by injecting €47.7 billion through its open market operations and soon 
announced a supplementary longer-term refinancing programme to support the functioning of the 
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 BNP Paribas Investment Partners temporaly suspends the calculation of the Net Asset Value 
of the following funds : Parvest Dynamic ABS, BNP Paribas ABS EURIBOR and BNP Paribas ABS 
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 GILLIAN TETT, Subprime woe produces some unexpected casualties, see id. at 3 August 2007. 
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two funds only had 50 per cent of their assets in marketable securities. See also, NEIL UNMACK & 
JACQUELINE SIMMONS, Oddo to Shut Three Funds `Caught Out' by Credit Rout, Bloomberg 31 July 
2007. The closed funds held approximately 15 per cent of their assets in the US collateralised debt 
obligations. 
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 FCIC Report supra note 27 at 251 – 252. The significance of the BNP Paribas’s finds closures 
is evidenced by the fact that the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s report included an entire 
section focused on these funds and entitled “BNP Paribas: “The Ringing of the Bell”.    
693
 The Federal Reserve is providing liquidity to facilitate the orderly functioning of financial 
markets.  (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System / Press release  10 August 2007) 
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euro money market.694 Money market funds in other European countries have not been featured 
in the section of negative market news as prominently as French funds.  
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the resulting liquidity crisis 
in the US money market funds and short-term markets put considerable pressure on European 
money market funds. In the fourth quarter of 2008 institutional investors withdrew over €45 
billion from European money market funds.695 These redemptions gave rise to the market 
dynamic similar to that experienced by the US money market funds and their investors.696 When 
money market funds sought to raise cash to meet the redemptions and attempted to sell portfolio 
assets, the short-term market could not absorb all securities offered for sale and went into 
standstill. At the same time corporate issuers were unable to re-issue their commercial paper 
coming due because of a lack of money market fund investors. A funding source for corporations 
through money market funds had evaporated with negative consequences for the real 
economy.697   
In the fall of 2008 European money market fund sponsors have come to rescue their 
funds once again. Société Genérale, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, among others made 
considerable injections to their money market funds in order to protect fund investors from 
losses.698 There were, however, fund families unable to support their money market funds – 
those lacking ‘a deep pocket’ of a bank affiliation or themselves facing a financial distress. For 
example, the US-style liquidity money market funds managed by Lehman Brothers Asset 
Management had to suspend redemptions to prevent a run.699 Investors in money market funds 
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 Supplementary longer-term refinancing operation  (European Central Bank / Press release  22 
August 2007) 
695
 Annual Report 2008 - 2009  (European Fund and Asset Management Association  June 2009) 
at 9.   
696
 Chapter 3 supra. 
697
 Chapter 2 supra. 
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 See, e.g., Deutsche Bank provides update on fourth quarter 2008 performance  (Deutsche Bank 
/ Press release  14 January 2009). The bank announced that it anticipates “a fourth quarter [of 2008] loss 
... related to ... injections into money market funds”. See also Commission de Surveillance du Secteur 
Financier - Annual Report 2008  (1 March 2009) at 49. The Commission de Surveillance du Secteur 
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 Lehman Brothers Liquidity Funds Plc, an Irish Based UCITS Fund, Announces Temporary 
Suspension of Dealings in the Shares of its Cash Funds  (Lehman Brothers Liquidity Funds Plc / Press 
release  19 September 2008).  
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managed by Lehman Brothers Asset Management feared a contagion from the affiliated 
investment bank, rather than concerns with the funds’ intrinsic credit quality.700 A number of 
money market funds suspended redemptions, but ultimately paid shareholders in full.701     
Responses of national regulators to liquidity squeeze in money market funds appear to be 
correlated with the size of the domestic money market fund industry and importance of these 
funds to the domestic capital markets.702 Luxembourg government demonstrated its commitment 
to the money market fund industry declaring that “the Luxembourg Central Bank will take all 
necessary steps to secure the liquidity of money market funds established under Luxembourg 
law”.703 German Bundesbank also announced that it will take all necessary steps to secure 
liquidity in money market funds and near-money market funds established under German law.704 
The crisis management measures of other national governments varied causing concerns to 
financial regulators on the European level of potential inadequacy of unilateral actions.705 At the 
height of financial crisis in October 2008, the European asset management industry associations 
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 Id. Dealings in shares of all three sub-funds – the Lehman Brothers Euro Liquidity Fund, the 
Lehman Brothers Sterling Liquidity Fund and the Lehman Brothers US Dollar Liquidity Fund – were 
suspended due to an unprecedented level of redemption requests caused by the bankruptcy filing of the 
parent company Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. The directors of the funds believed that 
suspension of dealings is necessary to avoid having to sell portfolio securities that the funds would not 
otherwise sell. Such sales as a result of the market liquidity restraints would have caused the funds to 
incur losses. 
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 SHILLING, MMF Support Report supra note 156 at 1. One of the fund sponsors unable to 
provide support to its US-style money market funds was Reserve Management, whose flagship US money 
market fund broke the buck on 16 September 2008. Reserve Management has also managed International 
Liquidity Fund, an off-shore money market fund organised in the British Virgin Islands. This fund had 
exposure to defaulted commercial paper issued by Lehman Brothers, which cause the fund closure and 
liquidation. Because of its island domicile, this fund is beyond the scope of this chapter.     
702
 This conclusion is also supported by the actions of the US government that provided the most 
significant support to the US money market funds including issuing a temporary government guarantee 
covering investment in the US money market funds. See chapters 2 and 3 supra.  
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 JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER, Déclaration du gouvernement luxembourgeois sur les Fonds du 
marché monétaire  (Le gouvernement Luxembourgeois / Communiqué  14 octobre 2008).  
704
 German government measures: Package of measures to stabilise the financial 
markets and avoid adverse effects on the real economy  (European Banking Authority / News from EBA 
members  13 October 2008). 
705
 JAMES K. JACKSON, The Financial Crisis: Impact on and Response by The European Union  
(US Congressional Research Service / Report for Congress  24 June 2009) at 4. The report reviewed, 
among other paragraphs, the current regulatory architecture of the EU and noted that “each EU member 
has its own institutional and legal framework for regulating its banking market, and national supervisory 
authorities are organized differently by each EU country with different powers and accountability”. Thus, 
beyond vague statements of common goals, a process of achieving specific coordinated actions is prone to 
lack of consensus.   
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engaged in discussions with the European Central Bank to structure a support programme for 
European money market funds although the industry lobby failed to bring about the desired 
regulatory actions.706          
The two tumultuous periods of European money market funds in the fall of 2007 and in 
the fall of 2008 show that different degrees of risk taking in money market fund management 
strategies led to different levels of losses for investors. Those money market funds pursuing 
conservative investment strategies, which were mainly the US-style liquidity money market 
funds, weathered the financial crisis with no losses of capital to investors and only minimal loss 
of liquidity. However, money market funds investing in instruments with relatively high maturity 
and low credit quality and/or taking material exposures to relatively new types of financial 
instruments with unproven trading history sustained substantial losses.707 While both approaches 
have historically co-existed in the European money market fund industry, they clearly presented 
a challenge for regulators to conduct a meaningful oversight and also concerns were raised 
whether a two-tier industry structure could contribute to risk misrepresentation to investors.708  
As a part of a broader reform of financial regulation, the de Larosière’s Group report 
issued in February 2009 attempted to address these concerns by establishing “a much stronger 
coordinated supervision for all financial actors in the European Union”, which included 
establishing a common definition for European money market funds.709 Following the de 
Larosière’s Group recommendations, European asset management trade associations took an 
inventory of the existing European money market fund practices and proposed a two-tier 
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 EFAMA Annual Report 2008 - 2009 supra note 695 at 12 – 14. The report describes the 
initiatives undertaking by the European Fund and Asset Management Association together with the 
Institutional Money Market Fund Association to achieve coordinated pan-European response to the 
liquidity crisis in money market funds. The industry proposals involved structuring a money market fund 
support programmes similar to those implemented in the US. See chapter 3 supra.       
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 EFAMA and IMMFA Recommendation supra note 684 at 7. 
708
 See section 2.2 supra explaining money market fund categories. A two-tier stricture references 
to a co-existence of constant net asset value money market funds and floating net asset value money 
market funds in Europe. Generally, constant net asset value money market funds are managed to more 
conservative investment guidelines, while floating net asset value money market funds operate under a 
broader investment mandate. See Id. at 4. 
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 The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU Report  (The de Larosière Group  
25 February 2009) [The de Larosière Group's Report] at 4 and 26. The report highlights a particular need 
for a common pan-European definition of money market funds and a stricter codification of the assets in 
which they can invest in order to limit investment risks in these funds. 
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classification system allowing for two types of money market funds in Europe.710 This proposal 
served as one of the main sources for the Committee of European Securities Regulators to 
develop its guidelines for a common definition of European money market funds published in 
2010 and implemented in 2011.711 The next section offers a detailed analysis of these guidelines 
and other existing definitions of European money market funds against the backdrop of the 
overarching regulatory framework for collective investment schemes at the Community and 
national levels.     
4.3 Money market fund regulation in the EU  
The perceived need to regulate money market funds in Europe has been made most 
explicit on the EU level and it has been seen in a number of normative documents. I limit the 
discussion to what I consider to be the primary legislation of relevance to money market funds 
administered throughout the EU. Specifically, the Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities Directive, known as “the UCITS Directive”,712 the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive, known as “the MiFID”,713 and the CESR’s Guidelines on a common 
definition of European money market funds, referred in this thesis as “the CESR’s 
Guidelines”,714 which are currently administered by the European Securities and Markets 
Authority, represent the primary sources of harmonised rules for European money market funds. 
In addition, certain aspects of the European Central Bank regulation are relevant to money 
market funds.  
It appears that the motive for development of the Single Market for financial services in 
the EU and the related quest for harmonisation of regulation and oversight drives the policy 
debate towards providing regulation that controls investment activities and operations of money 
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 See, e.g., EFAMA and IMMFA Recommendation supra note 684. In addition to two 
permanent types of money market funds, the proposal included a temporary category of other money 
market funds seeking to grandfather a two-year grace period for the riskiest types of European money 
market funds. 
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 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. 
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 Directive 2009/65, [2009] OJ L302/32  
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 DIRECTIVE 2004/39/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 
93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing 
Council Directive 93/22/EEC  (OJ L145/1  30 April 2004). 
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 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. 
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market funds throughout Europe. However, as opposed to the elevated profile of the money 
market fund-related debate at the EU level, it appears that this issue is rather insignificant for the 
great majority of national regulators. This could be explained by a relatively limited size of the 
local money market fund industries with notable exceptions of France, Ireland and Luxembourg 
and a negligible impact of these funds on the capital market activities in the majority of the EU 
countries.715 Given this discussion, it is not surprisingly that the development of targeted 
regulation of money market funds at the member states’ levels has been viewed as hardly a 
necessity. The following sections examine how investment activities, marketing and distribution 
of money market funds in the EU are affected by the existing regulatory framework and by the 
norms developed by non-governmental actors such as the Institutional Money Market Fund 
Association, known as “the IMMFA” and credit rating agencies.  
4.3.1 UCITS framework 
The UCITS Directive refers to a series of the EU directives establishing a common 
regulatory framework for marketing collective investment schemes throughout Europe.716 
Adopted in 1985, the UCITS Directive is considered one of the most significant 
accomplishments in establishing European single market and promoting European investment 
funds globally.717 While the UCITS Directive does not target money market funds specifically, it 
still serves as a primary source of harmonised rules at the Community level applicable to 
European money market funds registered under the UCITS brand. There are, however, two 
general limitations of the UCITS regulatory framework regarding money market fund regulation. 
First, as explained later in this section, generic investment parameters established under the 
UCITS regime are too broad and, in and by itself, do not meet the spirit of a low risk investment 
product that is a money market fund. Second, a UCITS authorization is not compulsory. At the 
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 Exhibit 8 supra. 
716
 Directive 2009/65, [2009] OJ L302/32  
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 JEAN-PIERRE CASEY & KAREL LANNOO, Pouring Old Wine in New Skins: UCITS and Asset 
Management in the EU after MiFID, CEPS-ECMI Task force report  (2008) at 5. 
177 
 
end of 2010 approximately 25 per cent of European investment funds, including some money 
market funds, were established outside the UCITS brand.718          
Since its adoption, the UCITS Directive has undergone a number of adjustments. The 
initial version known as UCITS I was criticized for “unduly limiting the universe of eligible 
assets”.719 In 2002 the original UCITS Directive was modified into the Management Directive 
and the Product Directive, collectively known as UCITS III.720 The Management Directive 
sought to give a “European passport” to UCITS management enabling them to operate 
throughout the EU.721 The Management Directive also introduced a simplified prospectus, 
tightened up risk management frameworks and increased managers’ capitalisation 
requirements.722  The Product Directive expanded a set of eligible investments to include 
derivatives and to allow certain new types of funds.723 The combined UCITS III Directive was 
intended to widen consumer choice and provide better investor protection. On 13 January 2009 
the European Parliament approved the UCITS IV Directive that sought to further improve the 
regulatory framework for UCITS funds.724      
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 Quarterly Statistical Release No. 44  (European Fund and Asset Management Association  
2011) at 3. European investment schemes that are not authorized under the UCITS and not subject to its 
investment and operational restrictions are still subject to national laws and regulations. 
719
 DALE GABBERT, Europe’s Chance to Put Right UCITS Errors  (International Finance Law 
Review  June 2005) at 2. Specific to the subject of this study, deposits in banks not considered as 
transferable securities disadvantaged money market funds willing to operate under the UCITS brand 
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 The rise of UCITS III  (BlackRock ViewPoints  September 2010) at 1. The report explained 
that the second draft directive – UCITS II – was developed to rectify issues that were hampering 
implementation of UCITS I. However “extended political arguing between EU countries caused it to be 
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 DIRECTIVE 2001/107/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 21 January 2002 amending Council Directive 85/611/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities 
(UCITS) with a view to regulating management companies and simplified prospectuses  (OJ L41/20  13 
February 2002 ). 
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 The rise of UCITS III supra note 720. 
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 DIRECTIVE 2001/108/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 21 January 2002 amending Council Directive 85/611/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities 
(UCITS), with regard to investments of UCITS  (OJ L41/35  13 February 2002). 
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 Directive 2009/65, [2009] OJ L302/32  
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Essential for establishing a harmonised investment product, the UCITS IV Directive 
outlines a general framework for investment schemes operating under the UCITS brand. First, a 
UCITS must operate on a principle of risk spreading.725 Second, a UCITS must be open-ended, 
i.e., investors should be able to redeem shares or units on demand. Third, a UCITS must be 
liquid.726 Fourth, assets must be entrusted to an independent custodian or depositary and held in a 
separate account on behalf of investors.727 The UCITS-authorized money market funds adhere to 
these common product rules notwithstanding their long-standing differences in investment 
management culture, national tax laws and regulatory regimes discussed in section 4.2. 
In full accord with the general UCITS framework, money market funds operating under 
the UCITS brand seek to offer investors a convenient way to invest collectively in money market 
securities on the principle of risk spreading. The Product Directive, amending the scope of 
allowable investments to include money market securities, facilitated the use of the UCITS 
concept by European money market funds.728 In addition, in 2007 an implementing directive was 
adopted that allowed inter alia asset-backed securities and European commercial paper for the 
UCITS investments.729 Thus, besides its focus on facilitating cross-border distribution, the 
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 The UCITS Directive spells out specific limits on how the spread of investments and an 
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 The underlying assumption of the UCITS Directive is that transferable securities, or those 
traded on organised exchanges are liquid securities. An asset manager must be able to sell fund assets in 
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 Directive 2009/65, [2009] OJ L302/32 at Section I. The UCITS Directive defines ‘money 
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portfolios, short-term deposits with credit institutions and, to a lesser degree, units of other UCITS are 
considered UCITS-eligible investments. In addition, UCITS funds may invest up to 10 per cent of their 
assets in securities other than those described in the above thus providing money market funds with 
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 COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2007/16/EC of 19 March 2007 implementing Council Directive 
85/611/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to 
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UCITS Directive laid out a set of standards related to eligible asset types and risk exposures in 
registered investment schemes. Specifically, the UCITS Directive sought to limit credit risk by 
restricting exposures to a single issuer, a counterparty and a group of affiliated issuers as well as 
investments in other UCITS.   
It should be noted that despite its detailed investment guidance, the UCITS Directive 
delegates considerable powers to Member States with respect to local implementations of its 
prudential rules. Exhibit 10 illustrates what investments are allowed under the UCITS regime 
and what adjustments can be made by at a national level.730 
Exhibit 10: Selected investment rules codified in the UCITS Directive731 
 General Maximum Adjustment 
Maximum single issuer 
exposure (% of assets) 5% 
--up to 10% for no more than 40% of assets 
--up to 35% if issued or guaranteed by a Member 
State, or its local authorities, or a governmental 
international body 
--by way of derogation, up to 100% if issued or 
guaranteed by a Member State, or its local 
authorities, or a governmental international body 
--up to 25% for a bond issuer that is Member 
State’s credit institutions subject to prudential 
standards up to a maximum of 80% of assets 
Maximum investments in 
deposits with the same entity 
(% of assets) 
20%  
Maximum cumulative 
investments in a single entity 
through securities, deposits 
and/or derivative exposure (% 
of assets) 
20% 
--up to 35%, but only for a single issuer, if 
justified by exceptional market conditions in 
particular highly concentrated markets 
                                                                                                                                                             
undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as regards the clarification of 
certain definitions  (OJ L79/11  20 March 2007). 
730
 Directive 2009/65, [2009] OJ L302/32 Note that exhibit 10 lists only those rules directly 
relevant to money market fund investment practices. 
731
 The table in exhibit 10 is my own elaboration. 
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Maximum investments in 
another single UCITS (% of 
assets) 
10% --up to 20% 
Total maximum investments 
in other UCITS (% of assets) 30% --may not require this limit 
Maximum investments in non-
listed securities (% of assets) 10%  
Maximum borrowing limit, for 




Given the UCITS IV Directive’s flexibility with respect to transposition to national laws, 
local versions of these prudential rules may vary reflecting the structure of national capital 
markets. In addition, as mentioned earlier, investment limitations of the UCITS IV Directive that 
were designed to address a wide range of investment products may not be sufficient to 
adequately restrict credit, market and liquidity risks in money market funds. Therefore, while 
achieving a great deal for a broad harmonisation of European investment practices, the UCITS 
IV Directive was viewed as an insufficient tool to substitute for targeted pan-European money 
market fund regulation. The European Securities and Markets Authority, a successor of the 
Commission of European Securities Regulators, has become the regulatory body in charge of 
administering and enforcing guidelines related to a common definition of European money 
market funds.732 Section 4.3.4 analyses these guidelines and reports on their implementation 
across Member States.     
4.3.2 MiFID definition 
The market in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC, known as MiFID, seeks to 
provide harmonised pan-European regulation for investment services.733 Its relevance for 
European money market funds is mostly in MiFID’s focus on safeguarding of clients’ assets and 
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 Directive (EC) 2004/39, [2004] OJ L145/1 .     
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providing investment firms with adequate options for clients’ cash management.734 To achieve 
this end, the MiFID incorporates a definition of those money market funds deemed appropriate 
for a temporary placement of un-invested cash balances.735 Specifically, the implementing 
directive spells out specific legal structure and portfolio parameters of qualifying money market 
funds, which could be UCITS harmonised or non-harmonised investment undertakings with a 
primary investment objective of preserve investors’ capital.736  
The implementing directive further prescribes specific investment parameters of a 
qualifying money market fund and requires same or next day liquidity.737 These parameters are 
largely consistent with investment and operating practices of the US-style liquidity money market 
funds thus promoting a wider acceptance of these funds as a cash management alternative to 
bank deposits. Other types of European money market funds appear to be unqualified for this 
purpose under the definition set forth by the MiFID.   
4.3.3 European Central Bank 
In order to fulfil its supervisory task the European Central Bank inter alia takes stock of 
balance sheet items of the Community’s monetary financial institutions.738 Shares/units of money 
market funds are subject to reporting requirements under this regulation aimed at collecting 
monetary statistical information.739 Given lack of a uniformly accepted definition of European 
money market funds prior to the guidelines on a common definition being introduced in 2011, 
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 Id. at Article 13(8). MiFID in its Level 1 Directive requires investment firms to make adequate 
arrangements to safeguard client rights and “prevent the use of client funds for its own account”. 
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 Directive 2006/73, [2006] OJ L 241/26  at Article 18(1)(d). MiFID requires investment firms 
receiving any client funds to promptly place those funds into an account opened with a bank, a credit 
institution or a qualifying money market fund.   
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 Id. at Article 18(2)(a). A qualifying money market fund could be offering constant net asset 
value per share or accumulating shares. Constant net asset value money market funds price their shares 
net of earnings. Accumulating share classes do not pay out, but accumulate capital gain and interest 
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 Id. at Article 18(2)(b)-(c). The major investment parameters of qualifying money market funds 
are as follow: (1) the funds must invest exclusively in high quality money market instruments generally 
maturing within 397 days; (2) the weighted average maturity of a qualifying money market fund portfolio 
must be limited to 60 days.  
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the collection of 
statistical information by the European Central Bank  (OJ L318/8  27 November 1998). 
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 Regulation (EC) No 2423/2001, [2001] OJ L333/1 at Part 2, Table A. 
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the European Central Bank has developed its own approach to analysing this type of investments 
and provided a definition to be used strictly in connection with the collection of banks’ balance 
sheet statistical information.  
Under this definition money market funds are collective investment undertakings that are 
“close substitutes for deposits and which primarily invest in money market instruments…with a 
residual maturity of up to one year”.740 The European Central Bank also prescribed a process 
under which the definition could apply. It recommended analysing fund prospectuses and other 
documents of incorporation in order to establish whether a particular investment undertaking 
meets the definition.741 Bank holdings in those money market funds meeting the European 
Central Bank’s definition are deemed to be a reportable item by European monetary financial 
institutions. 
4.3.4 European Securities and Markets Authority 
This section is focused on the main source of the targeted money market fund regulation 
in the EU, namely the CESR’s Guidelines for a common definition of European money market 
funds currently administered by the European Securities and Markets Authority.742 Established in 
January 2011, the European Securities and Markets Authority took over regulatory and oversight 
responsibility of the Committee of European Securities Regulators.743 Relevance of the European 
Securities and Markets Authority to money market funds is multi-pronged and includes issuances 
of guidelines concerning investment and operational practices as well as information 
transparency.744 Importantly for money market funds, the guidelines legalised amortised cost 
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 Id. at Annex 1, Part 1, (I)(6).  
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 REGULATION (EU) No 1095/2010 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities 
and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 
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 Regarding the eligibility of investments, in March 2007 the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators issued Level III guidelines concerning eligibility of securities for investments by UCITS, 
which further reinforced eligibility of money market instruments for collective investment undertakings 
thus facilitating creation of European money market funds under the UCITS brand. See CESR's 
guidelines concerning eligible assets for investment by UCITS  (Committee of European Securities 
Regulators  March 2007) [Eligible Assets Guidelines] at 7. The guidelines clarified that “treasury and 
local authority bills, certificates of deposit, commercial paper, and banker’s acceptances will usually 
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valuation for money market instruments by all UCITS provided that amortised cost valuation 
“will not result in a material discrepancy between the value of an instrument and its amortized 
cost value”.745  
The guidelines further advised to monitor potential discrepancies between the market-
based value of portfolio assets and their amortized cost to avoid material discrepancies between 
these two values. Furthermore, shares or units of those UCITS that invest solely in high quality 
short maturity instruments may be valued at amortised cost.746 This guideline mimics, albeit in a 
general and simplified way, the valuation approach employed by the US money market funds. 
Nonetheless, the Commission of European Securities Regulators’ guideline does not define 
parameters of material discrepancies thus UCITS including European money market funds may 
potentially have varying thresholds of materiality.747 Thus, in theory, valuations may vary 
radically depending on individual fund practices defined a material discrepancy is. Given this 
example, I would like to underscore an imbedded lack of specificity in the EU regulatory 
documents underlying the market infrastructure, which, in effect, contradicts to the thrust for 
development a uniformed regulatory regime in financial services.     
Most importantly from the perspective of the money market fund industry is the 
European Securities and Markets Authority’s function of administering and enforcing a common 
definition of European money market funds that came into effect in July 2011.748 As explained in 
the previous sections, European money market fund definitions used prior to 2011 were 
developed by the European Central Bank and MiFID and describe these funds as collective 
                                                                                                                                                             
comply with the criterion of “normally dealt in on the money market”. In addition, the same guidelines 
advised on factors to consider while assessing liquidity of a UCITS portfolio such as frequency of trading, 
number of dealers/market-makers, size of the issuance and any repurchase or put features. At the portfolio 
level, in order to fulfil the Directive’s requirement of constant repurchase of UCITS’s units the following 
factors should be considered: the nature and the concentration of the unit holders, their cash flow patterns 
and, where appropriate, limitations on massive withdrawals. 
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 Id. at 8. The guidelines state that valuing a money market security with “a residual maturity of 
less than three months and with no specific sensitivity to market parameters, including credit risk” at 
amortized cost would be appropriate. 
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investment schemes akin to bank demand deposits. These definitions were tailored to the tasks of 
the respective organisations, but did not mean to cover the entire diverse landscape of European 
money market funds. In May 2010, the Committee of European Securities Regulators issued the 
guidelines on a common definition, which codified specific portfolio management and 
operational rules deemed appropriate for European money market funds.749 Given the diversity 
of these funds analysed in section 4.2, the guidelines provided for a flexible two-tier structure of 
the European money market fund industry. 
The two-tier structure sought to legalise different kinds of money market funds in the 
European marketplace and assist investors in distinguishing between two major types of money 
market funds: those holding short-dated securities and those investing in relatively longer-dated 
assets.750 Any investment schemes marketing itself as a money market fund must now conform to 
the definitions of either a short-term money market fund or a money market fund established by 
the European Securities and Markets Authority.751 It was expected that the great majority of 
European money market funds would be able to meet the standards of a common definition with 
an exception of enhanced money market funds, which generally operate under less restrictive 
credit and interest risk standards than those deemed appropriate under the guidelines.752 The 
majority of the US-style liquidity money market funds were expected to fall into the short-term 
money market fund category and regular money market funds were expected to fall into the 
money market fund category. This structure illustrates the divergence of market segments.  
Notwithstanding the differences in risk profiles of the two fund types, both categories of 
money market funds must meet three requirements. First, the primary objective of the fund must 
be to maintain principal and provide returns in line with money market rates.753 Second, the fund 
must invest in money market instruments that comply with criteria set out under the UCITS IV 
                                                 
749
 Id.  
750
 Changes to European Money Market Fund Definitions  (JP Morgan Asset Management  2011). 
751
 CESR's Guidelines  supra note 9 at 3. Funds operating prior to 1 July 2011 were allowed for a 
six-month transitional period until 31 December 2011. The semantics of the definition is indeed confusing 
as a general reference to any money market fund could be confused with a reference to that less restrictive 
money market fund category. Thus, the market promptly adopted referring to the less restrictive money 
market funds as regular money market funds, while referring to the most restrictive money market funds 
as short-term money market funds.   
752
 Id. at 6. 
753
 Id. at Box 2, paragraph 1 and Box 3, paragraph 1. 
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Directive or in deposits with credit institutions.754 Third, the fund must provide daily price 
calculations and daily liquidity.755 Definitional standards related to quality, diversification and 
maturity applicable to both fund categories are presented in Exhibit 11. These standards apply to 
all European money market funds regardless of the country of domicile and cover both UCITS-
authorized funds and the ones regulated under national laws.756 
Exhibit 11: Risk-limiting provisions for European money market funds757 
Elements 
Provisions 
Short-term money market fund Money market fund 
Quality Subjective standard: 
Each portfolio holding should be of high quality758  
Objective standard: 
A security should not be considered 
of high quality unless it has been 
awarded one of the two highest 
available short-term credit ratings by 
 
In addition, may hold sovereign 
issuance of at least investment grade 
quality760  
 
                                                 
754
 Id. at Box 2, paragraph 2 and Box 3, paragraph 1. 
755
 Id. at Box 2, paragraph 6 and Box 3, paragraph 1. Daily liquidity requirement means that the 
fund must allow daily subscriptions and redemptions of its shares/units. Exception is made for those non-
UCITS money market funds marketed solely through employee savings schemes and/or to specific 
categories of investors. These funds may provide weekly subscriptions and redemptions. 
756
 Id. at 3. 
757
 The table in exhibit 11 is my own elaboration. 
758
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at Box 2, paragraph 3 and Box 3, paragraph 1. The 
determination of asset quality is made by management companies, including self-managed schemes and 
operators of non-UCITS investment undertakings. The guidelines offer a range of factors to consider 
while making an asset quality determination. These factors include, but not limited to the credit quality, 
liquidity, the nature of the asset class and specific risks inherent within the structured financial 
transaction. See also, Questions and Answers: A Common Definition of European Money Market Funds  
(European Securities and Markets Authority  August 2011) at 5. The regulator expects management 
companies to conduct an assessment of credit quality in line with provisions of Article 23 of 
COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2010/43/EU of 1 July 2010 implementing Directive 2009/65/EC of the 
European  Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements, conflicts of interest, 
conduct of business, risk management and content of the agreement between a depositary and a 
management company  (OJ L176/42  10 July 2010).     
186 
 
each recognised credit rating 
agency759  
Maturity Objective standard: 
Each security must mature within 
397 days761  
Weighted average maturity may not 
exceed 60 days762 
Weighted average life may not 
exceed 120 days763 
 
Each security must mature within two 
years764  
Weighted average maturity may not 
exceed six months765 
Weighted average life may not 
exceed 12 months766 
 
As one can see from the above table and the following discussion, these rules go some 
way in establishing certain investment benchmarks, but are not anywhere near of providing 
guidance for genuine pan-European standardisation. For example, the objective standard of the 
high quality relies on credit ratings assigned by rating agencies.767 The guidance does not seek to 
further spread credit risk in money market funds through any additional diversification 
requirements above and beyond those imposed by the UCITS IV Directive. Given this approach, 
those money market funds unauthorised by the UCITS IV Directive could be managed to varying 
                                                                                                                                                             
760
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at Box 3, paragraph 2. Sovereign issuance are those securities 
“issued or guaranteed by a central, regional or local authority or central bank of a Member State, the 
European Central Bank, the European Union or the European Investment Bank”. See also, Id. at 11, 
paragraph 25. An investment grade rating category generally encompasses ratings from AAA to BBB. 
See. e.g., www.fitchratings.com/Credit Rating Scales.     
759
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at Box 2, paragraph 4. See also Q&A: A Common Definition 
of European Money Market Funds supra note 758 at 6. The regulator explains that recognised credit 
rating agencies are those agencies registered in accordance with REGULATION (EC) No 1060/2009 OF 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 September 2009 on credit rating 
agencies  (OJ L302/1  17 November 2009).  
761
 Id. at Box 2, paragraph 5. 
762
 Id. at Box 2, paragraph 7. 
763
 Id. at Box 2, paragraph 8. 
764
 Id. at Box 3, paragraph 4. The regulator requires, however that any security not maturing 
within 397 days would be a floating rate security with the interest rate reset date within 397 days provided 
that such a security resets to a money market rate index, e.g., LIBOR or EONIA.  
765
 Id. at Box 3, paragraph 5. 
766
 Id. at Box 3, paragraph 6. 
767
 Id. at 9, paragraph 11. This standard must be maintained at all times while the fund holds the 




diversification requirements based on the national laws and thus exhibiting varying degrees of 
concentration risk.768 Furthermore, (regular) money market funds are able to assume higher credit 
risk through investments in relatively low rated sovereign securities driving the differences in 
credit profiles between short-term and (regular) money market funds farther apart.769 Thus, 
extending to the relatively lower spectrum of credit risk, the rule may actually promote greater 
risk-taking by this type of funds, unfavourably for the fund investors seeking a low-risk 
investment option.  
European money market funds manage their exposure to interest rate and market risk by 
limiting portfolio maturity. Exhibit 11 points to three tests related to maturity. The first test limits 
final maturities of all eligible securities to 397 days for short-term money market funds and two 
years for (regular) money market funds thus enabling (regular) money market funds to assume 
significantly greater market risk.770 The other two portfolio maturity tests are designed to limit 
interest rate, spread and liquidity risks. Weighted-average portfolio maturity may not exceed 60 
days in short-term money market funds and six months in (regular) money market funds implies 
that (regular) money market funds are able to assume three times higher interest rate risk as 
compared to short-term money market funds.771 To illustrate, an instant three per cent increase in 
interest rates would cause a short-term money market fund to lose 50 basis points, or a half of 
one per cent of its assets.772 The same three percent increase in interest rates would cause a 
(regular) money market fund to lose 150 basis points, or one and a half of one per cent of its 
assets.773 For the sake of comparison with the US money market funds, this price volatility 
                                                 
768
 Id. at 3. 
769
 Id. at 3. The allowance for investment grade sovereign securities was introduced to 
accommodate “possible difficulties” that would arise for funds based lower rated European countries and 
the need for financing of short-term sovereign debt across the European Union. 
770
 Id. at 6. The two-tier approach has recognised the historical structure of the European money 
market fund industry and codified “the distinction between short-term money market funds, which operate 
a very short weighted average maturity and weighted average life, and (regular) money market funds, 
which operate a longer weighted average maturity and weighted average life”.  
771
 Weighted-average maturity serves as a measure of portfolio’s modified duration that indicates 
the charge in value of a fixed income security for a given change in the level of interest rates. See STIGUM 
& CRESCENZI. supra note 225 at 85. In this example a fund portfolio as a whole is viewed as a single 
security.      
772
 Id. An assumption is made that a short-term money market fund has maximum allowable 
weighted-average maturity of 60 days. 
773
 Id. An assumption is made that a (regular) money market fund has maximum allowable 
weighted-average maturity of six months. 
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would be inacceptable by placing it well beyond the materiality threshold of 50 basis point at 
which the fund boards must consider corrective actions.774    
The potential for significant loss differential in two types of European money market 
funds – stemming mainly from the ability of (regular) money market funds to extend duration – 
raised concerns regarding merits of two-tier industry structure from the standpoint of investor 
protection.775 A common definition of European money market funds attempted to address this 
concern by requiring the funds themselves to indicate to investors what type of money market 
funds they belong to.776 No portfolio information is required to be disclosed to investors under 
the CESR’s Guidelines, which is, in my view, one of their most significant weaknesses in terms 
of not doing nearly enough for establishing the good disclosure standards, but instead relying on 
the boiler-plate language of bad disclosure that investors routinely ignore.777      
Notably, the CESR’s Guidelines do not contain any specific liquidity standards either in 
the context of individual asset liquidity or portfolio liquidity of European money market funds, 
which could be explained by the fact that the European money market funds’ harmonised 
definition does not include fund liquidity as an objective.778 Instead, liquidity considerations are 
embedded in the asset credit quality assessment as one of the factors to consider in investment 
                                                 
774
 Section 3.3.3.3 supra. 
775
 JP Morgan Comment to CESR supra note 13. JP Morgan Asset Management in its comment 
letter to the Committee of European Securities strongly disagreed with the proposal of two-tier structure 
of European money market fund industry. JP Morgan argued that a common definition “should only 
encompass funds that have short duration, daily liquidity, stable net asset value and invest in high quality 
money market instruments”. See also Feedback Statement supra note 112 at 4, paragraph 2. The feedback 
statement summarising the comment letters to the proposal on a common definition of European money 
market funds issued by the Committee of European Securities Regulators in October 2009 noted that 
respondents expressed mixed views related to the proposed names the two categories of money market 
funds. Some respondents suggested replacing the longer-term money market funds denomination with 
short-term bond funds.  
776
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at Box 1, paragraphs 3 and 4. In addition, all European money 
market funds must indicate in their prospectuses and, in the case of UCITS, in their Key Investor 
Information Document whether it is a short-term money market fund or a (regular) money market fund. 
See also Id. at 7.   
777
 See sections 1.1.3 and 1.2 supra for a discussion of the concept of good disclosure used in this 
thesis. 
778
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 Box 1, paragraph 1 and Box 1, paragraph 1. 
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decisions.779 This implies the regulatory view that high quality short-term instruments are 
generally sufficiently liquid. However, this view ignores credit risk and a lack of secondary 
market liquidity demonstrated during the financial crisis.780   
With respect to portfolio-level liquidity, the guidelines rely on Article 51 of the UCITS 
Directive requiring UCITS to employ a risk management process that enables them “to monitor 
and measure at any time the risk of the positions and their contribution to the overall risk profile 
of the portfolio”.781 Specifically related to money market funds, the risk management process 
should include “a prudent approach to the management of currency, credit, interest rate and 
liquidity risk”, and stress testing.782 Finally, with respect to liquidity of money market fund 
shares, the guidelines document refers to national authorities to establish an appropriate 
settlement process aligned with local practices.783 Thus, as shown in this section, in establishing 
investment management framework for European money market funds, regulators were mainly 
focused on issues of credit and interest rate risk exposure in individual funds, but not very 
concerned with developing regulatory parameters that would promote the market for European 
investors. To close this gap, this thesis seeks a solution for money market funds that protects 
investors not only through limiting idiosyncratic fund risks, but rather by a means of improving 
the market infrastructure through good disclosure.        
With respect to currency risk, the CESR’s guidelines permit European money market 
funds’ investments in securities denominated in other than the fund’s base portfolio currencies 
                                                 
779
 Id. at Box 2, paragraph 3(d) (In addition, money market instruments must comply with the 
criteria set forth in the Directive 2009/65, [2009] OJ L302/32  Non-UCITS money market funds are 
mandated to ensure that the liquidity of the portfolio is assessed on an equivalent basis.)  
780
 See section 4.2.2 supra for a detailed narration of market events concerning European money 
market funds during the financial crisis. 
781
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at 10, paragraph 20. See also Directive 2009/65, [2009] OJ 
L302/32  at Article 51(1).  
782
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at 10, paragraph 20. See also Directive 2010/43/EU, [2010] 
OJ L176/42   at Article 12. An implementing directive mandates every management company operating 
under the UCITS brand to establish a permanent risk management function.  
783
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at 9, paragraph 14. (Notwithstanding the derogation of the 
settlement to national authorities it was expected that ‘as a matter of best practice for UCITS money 
market funds, settlement would not exceed T+3’. This means that the payment for redeemed money 
market shares would be made by the management company within three days after shares have been 
redeemed. Fund shares, however, could be redeemed on daily basis in line with Article 84(1) of the 
Directive 2009/65, [2009] OJ L302/32 )    
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provided exposure to the non-base currencies is fully hedged.784 However, such tolerance on the 
part of regulators with respect to the foreign currency exposure was not universally shared by the 
industry participants, who believe that currency risk and derivatives activities are inappropriate 
in European money market funds just like these activities are inappropriate in the US money 
market funds.785 Nevertheless, the EU regulator approached foreign currency risk by imposing 
disclosure requirements with respect to foreign currency trades in the funds’ offering documents, 
but not through prohibiting or limiting transactions in foreign currencies and thus, on balance, it 
could be seen as encouraging risk-taking behaviour.786   
To conclude the analysis of the common definition of European money market funds, I 
reiterate that, introducing a uniform two-tier industry structure, the guidelines sought to provide 
a more detailed understanding of the distinction between various types of funds operating in 
Europe and sold cross-border. The harmonised definition was expected “to play an active role in 
building a common supervisory culture by promoting common supervisory approaches and 
practices [within the EU]”.787 The common definition was not structured in isolation, but built 
upon an existing framework for the regulation of harmonised investment schemes in the EU. It 
could be retorted, however, that the UCITS regime when implemented at the national level 
results in a certain degree of diversity; in addition the CESR’s Guidelines  for a common 
definition also cover non-harmonised collective investment undertakings established under the 
national laws of Member States. Thus, the need to reconcile different objectives of various 
constituencies has weakened the regulatory response to the issue of standardisation of the money 
market fund practices in the EU.    
                                                 
784
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at Box 2, paragraph 11 and Box 3, paragraph 1. European 
money market funds are invested in securities denominated in various currencies with funds investing in 
securities denominated in the US dollars, British pound sterling and Euro being the most widely accepted 
by investors. A specific currency is normally chosen as a portfolio base currency. Investments in 
securities denominated in other than the portfolio base currency pose additional investment risks.  It 
should be noted that no limiting criteria for foreign currency exposures relative to the fund assets are set 
by a common definition. 
785
 See, e.g., JP Morgan Comment to CESR  supra note 13 at paragraph 11. JP Morgan Asset 
Management believed it would be inappropriate for European money market funds to assume currency 
risk neither did it believe that money market funds should be engaged in derivative transactions including 
those conducted for the hedging purposes. See also Feedback Statement supra note 112 at 6. 
786
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at 10. 
787
 Q&A: A Common Definition of European Money Market Funds supra note 758 at 3. 
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In developing the definition, European regulators drew on the money management 
practices established internationally as well as the lessons learned from the financial crisis. 
Reflecting on the simple structure of the US money market fund industry, it is a valid concern 
that a two-tier approach may create confusion regarding a true investment nature of various types 
of money market funds. As the recent history of investor communication showed, funds with 
seemingly identical investment characteristics could easily be misrepresented unless clearly 
delineated.788 The next section discuses the voluntary measures that the European money market 
fund industry itself has developed to promote the best international practices in money market 
fund management, first, in the absence of specific regulation and, later, in the environment when 
the newly established definition seems to lack desirable clarity.   
4.3.5 Self-regulation by the IMMFA 
The first attempts to define and harmonise European money market funds can be 
attributed to the Institutional Money Market Fund Association, a trade association of triple-A 
rated European money market funds, formed in June 2000.789 The association was envisioned as 
a lobbying venue for regulatory issues related to money market funds and investor education.790 
In addition, the association sought to facilitate distributional efforts of those asset managers 
lacking significant distributional channels.791 The organisational efforts were backed by the 
                                                 
788
 Supra note 692 and accompanying text. 
789
 More information about the Institutional Money Market Funds Association can be found at 
www.immfa.org.   
790
 The story behind formation of the International Money Market Fund Association was related 
to me by David Vriesenga, the first head of European money market fund business at Moody’s Investors 
Service and by David Hynes, the first Chairman of the newly established Association. The ‘founding 
fathers’ of the Association were experienced industry insiders managing money market funds for large 
asset management firms and understood mutual benefits in consolidating industry efforts to promote high 
quality cash management services. 
The formation of the International Money Market Fund Association was, in part, inspired by the 
experience of the Investment Company Institute in the US, which contributed significantly in protecting 
the US money market funds from banking lobbyists and represented the interests of mutual funds in front 
of regulators. See generally FINK, (2008) supra note 143. 
791
 As to sources of asset inflows, large investment management firms and asset management 
subsidiaries of global banks were normally supported by internal distribution channels, while small and 
independent asset managers were struggling to achieve broader distribution of their products. 
192 
 
largest US asset managers who witnessed a spectacular growth of the US money market funds in 
the late 1990s and expected this trend to continue in the European market.792  
The diversity of European money market funds presented a substantial challenge in 
determining the association’s membership base – whether to accept the Continental Europe-style 
managers or limit it to the US-style managers only – the membership parameters were debated 
for several years after the association had been formed. The association sought to overcome 
investment and operational inconsistencies of European money market fund by developing an 
industry Code of Practice, which was put in place in 2003.793 The Code of Practice mirrored the 
main aspects of the US money market fund regulation and sought to provide portfolio 
management and operational guidance to those asset managers willing to join the association. 
Another pre-requisite of the membership besides accepting the Code of Practice was a triple-A 
money market fund rating from at least one of the three global credit rating agencies.794 
The nascent association benefited from analytical services of credit rating agencies by 
adopting a triple-A rating as the central criterion of its membership. It is because a triple-A rating 
was mainly assigned to the US-style money market funds that the association de-facto became a 
European platform promoting the US-style money market funds, but not an association 
representing the full spectrum of European money market funds.795 Thus, the money market fund 
management practices originated in the US to meet the US regulatory requirements and credit 
rating agencies’ criteria were exported to Europe by asset managers offering cash management 
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 In late 1990s the size of the assets under management in the US money market funds more 
than tripled expanding from $753 billion at the end of 1995 to $2,285 at the end of 2001. See 
www.ici.org.  
793
 Section 4.2.1 supra. Money market funds operating in various European countries exhibited 
vastly different portfolio characteristics and risk profiles. 
794
 Code of Practice  (Institutional Money Market Funds Association  2009) [IMMFA Code of 
Practice] at Article 5. 
795
 Therefore, the US-style European money market funds are sometimes referred to as the 
IMMFA funds. See Id. at 1. The mission statement of the Institutional Money Market Funds Association 
reads that the association “represents promoters of, and providers of services to, triple-A rated constant 
and accumulating net asset value money market funds, domiciled in Europe”. Note that floating net asset 




services internationally.796 These practices formed the foundation of the Code of Practice and 
were embraced by European asset managers. As money market fund management practices and 
regulation continue to evolve, the IMMFA’s Code of Practice has been reviewed several times to 
ensure that the practices recommended by the association remain appropriate.797  
Post-crisis, the Code of Practice has remained reflective of the developments in the US 
money market fund regulation. Amendments to Rule 2a-7 implemented in 2010 were largely 
mirrored by the Code of Practice albeit in somewhat abbreviated manner, e.g., the IMMFA funds 
have changed their practices to meet the liquidity rules spelled out in the Code of Practice, while 
the newly adopted harmonised common definition of European money market funds does not 
impose any specific liquidity requirements.798 Thus, the Code of Practice serves as a source of 
self-imposed regulation for the IMMFA funds, a segment of European money market funds, 
which were largely transplanted to the European land by international asset managers, usually 
domiciled in the major European fund administration centres and distributed cross-border under 
the UCITS brand.  
In my view, self-regulation by the IMMFA has succeeded in its consistent adoption and 
dissemination of the best industry practices, even though a self-regulatory regime is weakened by 
a lack of the enforcement power of a governmental regulatory regime. For this reason, self-
regulation is unlikely to serve as a primary vehicle for production of standardised investment and 
operational norms adopted by the entire money market fund industry in the EU – self-regulation 
simply cannot promote the investor trust needed to support the market in the long-run.      
                                                 
796
 According to my conversations with David Hynes, the first members of the Institutional 
Money Market Fund Association included some of the largest US asset managers such as AIM, Fidelity 
Investments, Goldman Sachs Asset Management and JP Morgan Asset Management. 
797
 The Institutional Money Market Fund Association’s Code of Practice was last updated in 
December 2009 with the changes coming into effect in January 2010. See IMMFA Announces Revisions 
to Code of Practice (Institutional Money Market Funds Association / Press release  14 December 2009) 
798
 IMMFA Code of Practice supra note 794 paragraph 33. The Code of Practice maintains that 
“the IMMFA funds should maintain no less than five per cent of net assets in securities which mature the 
following business day and no less than 20 per cent of net assets in securities which mature within five 
business days”. See also CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 and section 4.3.4 supra. 
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4.4. Credit rating of money market funds in the EU 
The history of the rating business with respect to the European money market funds is 
firmly associated with the development of international trade and import of the cash management 
culture from the US. As explained in section 4.2.1, in the 1990s some of the large US asset 
managers expanded their money market fund businesses in Europe in an attempt to provide their 
multi-national corporate clients with the type of cash management services they were getting in 
the US. Thus, money market funds administered by the US asset managers in Europe inherited 
key investment and operational characteristics of the US money market funds. Specifically, those 
US funds catered to institutional clients often carried a credit rating agency’s rating due to 
corporate investment policies normally requiring a credit rating on all permissible investments.799 
By the year 2000, credit rating agencies have been rating US money market funds for over 10 
years and were able to adopt their rating methodologies for money market funds operating in 
Europe.800  
Moody’s Investors Service initiated money market fund ratings in Europe in 1993 and 
received over 60 rating requests just that year.801 The volume of business suggested the high 
demand for professional cash management in Europe and related rating opinions at that time. 
Furthermore, in the absence of uniform government regulation of European money market funds, 
rating criteria administered by credit rating agencies served as a source of regulation albeit 
provided by non-state actors in markets with little homogeneity.802 A number of objective rating 
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 Available data suggest that demand for credit ratings from money market funds targeted to 
institutional investors trumps demand for ratings from retail funds. E.g., Moody’s Investors Service rates 
92 per cent of the US institutional government money market funds, but only 29 per cent of this type of 
funds targeted retail investors. Furthermore, Moody’s rates 64 per cent of the US prime institutional 
money market funds while only six per cent of retail funds of this type are rated, according to iMoneyNet 
data as of September 2011.   
800
 The story of money market fund rating in Europe was related to me by David Vriesenga, who 
head up the European money market fund business at Moody’s Investors Service in 1990s and early 
2000s. My conversations with Rudolf Siebel, ex-Moody’s money market fund analyst and currently 
Managing Director/Head of Market and Service of BVI Bundesverband Investment und Asset 
Management e.V. have also contributed to this section. 
801
 According to industry practitioners, the European money market fund rating history started in 
the UK. Fidelity Cash Unit Trust was the first European money market fund rated by Moody’s Investors 
Service in 1993. By that time, Standard & Poor’s has already had a few ratings assigned to European 
money market funds. Fitch Ratings has not entered the money market fund rating business until late 
1990s. 
802
 Section 4.2 supra underscores diversity of the European money market fund industry. 
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criteria established by credit rating agencies as guideposts to their highest money market funds 
rating have been adopted by the fund voluntarily and paved the way to the product 
standardisation in Europe. Moreover, rating agencies criteria applied uniformly to money market 
funds in the US and Europe, arguably, provided a venue for their comparability.803 The 
Institutional Money Market Fund Association adopted a requirement of a triple-A rating as a pre-
condition of its membership thereby de-facto outsourcing credit risk assessment of the IMMFA 
funds to rating agencies.804  
Prior to an implementation of a common definition of European money market funds in 
July 2011, the rating criteria for money market funds have been viewed as a suitable substitute 
for official regulatory norms albeit covering mainly US-style money market funds.805 The lack of 
formal rating criteria enforcement did not appear to weaken their bond on the investment 
management practices. The coercive power of rating criteria was evidenced in the way rated 
money market funds are managed to meet credit rating agencies’ requirements. If the rating 
criteria are not met, a rating on a money market fund in violation could be lowered. Due to 
investment guidelines employed by institutional investors, a rating downgrade for a money 
market fund would likely result in cash outflows. Therefore, money market fund managers 
generally attempted to cure any breaches of rating criteria in a short order.806 This investment 
practice has resulted in a remarkable stability of ratings assigned to money market funds.807  
                                                 
803 See chapter 5 infra for analysis of the basic assumptions underlying such comparability.  
804
 The Code of Practice administered by the Institutional Money Market Fund Association does 
not contain any credit quality standards for its members above and beyond their ability to obtain a triple-
A rating from at least one of the credit rating agencies. See IMMFA Code of Practice  supra note 794. 
805
 Current information about rated money market funds can be found at Fitch Ratings web-site 
www.fitchratings.com; Moody’s Investors Service www.moodys.com; and Standard & Poor’s 
www.standardsandpoors.com.  
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 See, e.g., Fitch MMF Rating Criteria  supra note 573 at 12. Fitch recognised that from time to 
time money market funds may moderately and temporarily deviate from the required rating parameters. 
Fitch would generally allow for a short grace period to cure the deviation without negative rating 
implications. See also S&P MMF Rating Methodology supra note 573 at paragraph 32. Standard & 
Poor’s requires that money market fund net asset value deviations from the prescribed limits be cured 
within five business days.  
807
 While the author is not aware of any formal studies with respect to money market fund rating 
transition, the current inventory of rating assigned to these funds by all three rating agencies shows that 
approximately 99 per cent of published ratings on money market funds are triple-A ratings. Rating 
changes on money market funds are extremely rare, e.g., Fitch Ratings only reduced ratings assigned to 
the US money market funds twice since it started rating these funds in late 1990s. Both downgrades have 
taken place in 2010 and 2011. See Fitch Downgrades Alpine Municipal Money Market Fund to 'AAmmf'  
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In addition to its rating services, credit rating agencies have contributed in promoting 
better information flow in the European money market fund industry.808 Historically, European 
money market funds have limited their disclosures to prospectuses and annual reports, but 
seldom revealed contents of their investment portfolios to investors.809 Furthermore, in the 
absence of a central information depository, collection of data and fund analysis constitute a 
resource-intense task. Credit rating agencies’ rating opinions and credit reports on money market 
funds provided periodic portfolio information, albeit limited, to fund investor, including retail 
investors who often lack of sophistication to conduct a detailed portfolio analysis.810 
Thus it is evident that credit rating agencies have played an important role in the 
evolution of the European money market fund industry. At the early stages of the industry 
development, the credit rating criteria voluntarily adopted by money market fund managers 
served as a substitute for government-administered regulatory norms in the absence of thereof. 
Although rating criteria only covered the US-style money market funds and lacked a formal 
enforcement mechanism, institutional investors’ preference for highly rated funds provides an 
evidence of coercive power of these self-made and self-imposed norms. In addition, credit rating 
opinions and fund reports added valuable insights into the money market funds’ investment 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Fitch Ratings / Press release  31 January 2011). This track record suggests a much greater stability of 
money market fund ratings relative to ratings assigned to corporate issuers or structured finance issuers. 
By way of comparison, 7.7% of financial institutions rated triple-A at the beginning of 2010 saw their 
ratings downgraded by the end of the year. See CHARLOTTE L. NEEDHA & MARIAROSA VERDE, Fitch 
Ratings Global Corporate Finance 2010 Transition and Default Study (Fitch Ratings  23 March 2011) at 
22.      
808
 Credit rating agencies published their rating opinion in a form of press-releases disseminated 
to financial media and available on respective rating agencies’ web-sites at no charge. See 
www.fitchratings.com, www.moodys.com, www.standardandpoors.com. Press-releases contain pertinent 
information regarding fund investment objectives and policies as well as risks of investing in these funds.  
809
 See, e.g., IMMFA Code of Practice supra note 794 at Part VII. The Code of Practice requires 
the IMMFA funds to disclose asset maturity schedules, weighted average maturity and weighted average 
life of fund portfolios. The percentage invested in the fund by the top ten shareholders should also be 
made available to any fund shareholder upon request. Disclosure of portfolio holdings is not required by 
the Code of Practice. 
810
 For example, Moody’s Investors Service consolidated information on all its rated funds in its 
annually published “Fund Directory”. The “Fund Directory” was discontinued in approximately 2005 and 
replaced with fund profile information available at www.moodys.com. See, e.g., DAGMAR SILVA, et al., 
Deutsche Investment Management Americas Inc.  (Moody's Investors Service / Fund Analysis  29 April 
2011). The credit report covers the main aspect of investment operations conducted by the asset manager 
and 14 money market funds managed by Deutsche Investment Management Americas Inc. and rated by 
Moody’s Investors Service. The report is available at http://www.moodys.com/ 
researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_132918 at no charge.    
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practices and their risk profiles. These reports contributed to improvement of information flow in 
the European asset management that lacked transparency relative to the US regulatory regime.811 
The next section discusses the future of the European money market fund industry including a 
potential effect of the enhanced transparency regime on money market funds under the UCITS 
Directive.       
4.5 European money market fund industry outlook 
The events of the financial crisis and liquidity squeeze confronting European money 
market funds in the fall of 2007 have moved the subject of the money markets high up on the list 
of financial regulatory agenda in Europe.812 The fragmentation of the European money market 
fund industry has been viewed as not only a source of confusion for investors, but also as a 
significant challenge in fostering a single market for financial services impeding the 
development of pan-European money market fund-specific regulation.813 The European 
Securities and Markets Authority guidelines on a common definition of European money market 
funds were aimed at overcoming these challenges.814  
However, the international comparability of the US and European money market funds, 
the aspect of importance to institutional investors operating in many countries, is yet to be 
achieved.815 A common definition of European money market funds did not close the gap, but 
                                                 
811
 See chapter 5 infra for a comparative analysis of the US and European regulatory regimes 
applicable to money market funds. 
812
 See, e.g., The de Larosière Group's Report supra note 709. TUCKER,   supra note 2. 
813
 Section 4.2.1 supra analyses historical conditions of local European markets leading to the 
diversity of European money market funds.  
814
 CESR Press release 19 May 2010 supra note 187. Lamberto Cardia, Chair of the Italian 
Commissione Nazionale per la Societa e la Borsa and Chair of the Committee of European Securities 
Regulator's Investment Management Standing Committee, noted that the guidelines on a common 
definition of European money market funds are  
 
...a significant step in improving investor protection and will help stakeholders -- competent 
authorities, management companies and investors -- to draw a clearer distinction between funds 
according to their investment strategies….[because]…the strategies of some funds may not 
always have been consistent with the generally accepted concept of money market funds as being 
relatively liquid, short-term investments.  
 
815
 PETER CRANE, European Regulators Keep Two-Tiered Definition of Money Market Fund, 
CraneData 10 May 2010. The article stated that the Committee for European Securities Regulators 
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rather legalised the diversity of European money market fund management practices driving it 
further away from the unified view on these funds fostered in the US. On the other hand, the 
heterogeneity of European money market funds should be appreciated on its own grounds and, 
possibly, promoted as one of the factors limiting systemic implications of a money market fund 
failure. It was the definitional conundrum and attempts to mask the divergence of investment 
practices under the rhetoric of harmonisation that prompted investors’ criticism.816 Whether the 
harmonisation of European money market funds by way of eschewing their diversity is the 
desirable end from a standpoint of systemic stability remains to be debated. I contend that 
variability of investment practices must be preserved, while investors should be empowered by 
good disclosure to make their informed investment decisions.   
Nonetheless, the positive aspects of formalising the standing of European money market 
funds under the common definition should not be overlooked.817 At least three factors could be 
pointed out that stand to improve the position of investors in these funds. First, a common 
definition – despite all the criticism for its lacking desirable precision – still limits the appetite 
for risk of the asset managers and narrows their investment options to relatively safe investment 
alternatives. Second, fund risk-related disclosure requirements created an obligation for asset 
managers to report the risk profiles of European money market funds.818 Third, the new powers 
given to the European Securities and Markets Authority offset, to some extent, the non-binding 
legal nature of the guidelines.819 These factors provide some assurance that inconsistencies in 
                                                                                                                                                             
decision to keep a two-tiered system for European money market funds “is likely to cause continued 
confusion in the money markets”. 
816
 One of the industry practitioners participating in the negotiation process related to developing 
a common definition of European money market funds, wishing to remain anonymous, admitted that “it 
was impossible for domestic regulators in Italy, Spain, Germany and Scandinavian countries to go back to 
their home countries and announce to their local investors that the product that they have held as a money 
market funds is no longer a money market fund”. See also Feedback Statement  supra note 112 at 10. The 
initially proposed title longer-term money market funds was changed to (regular) money market funds in 
the final version. This change in the naming for the riskier type of European money market funds 
broadened the gap between the US money market funds (least risky) and European (regular) money 
market funds (most risky). 
817
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. 
818
 Id. at 3, 7 and 10. The guidelines require money market funds to clearly explain non-
guaranteed nature of money market fund investments and disclose the fund risk profiles including risks of 
investing in foreign currency-denominated assets.  
819
 Frequently Asked Questions: A Guide to Understanding ESMA  (European Securities and 
Markets Authority  3 January 2011) [FAQ: A Guide to ESMA] at 4 – 7. Even though guidelines issued by 
the European Securities and Markets Authority remained not legally binding, national competent 
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European money market fund portfolio management and lack of transparency resulted in investor 
confusion and headline risk during the crisis could be mitigated.820   
A common definition of European money market funds remains a work in progress as 
evidenced by continuing activities of the European Securities and Markets Authority in this 
field.821 Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that a lack of uniformity inherited in the two-tier 
industry structure will inspire further lobbying activities from proponents of either approach.822 
Thus the continuing search for its own identity will be one of the major contributing factors in 
the future of the European money market fund industry.823 The second unknown is the outcome 
of other regulatory debates especially potential structural changes to the US money market 
funds.824 Some of the groundbreaking proposals discussed by the US regulators have only slim 
chances of being adopted in Europe thus largely negating previous efforts for the global 
comparability of money market funds.825     
                                                                                                                                                             
authorities are now required to indicate  publicly if they comply within two months, and if they do not 
comply they will need to explain why. Financial market participants could be required to report publically 
whether or not they comply with non-binding guidelines and standards. The Authority’s new powers also 
includes a power to ban financial products and services for up to three months and, potentially, investor 
compensations.      
820
 Section 4.2.2 supra at n. 699 and accompanying text.   
821
 Q&A: A Common Definition of European Money Market Funds supra note 758. 
822
 See, e.g., Procedures for implementing new classifications for money market funds (The 
Autorité des marchés financiers / News release  3 May 2011). French financial regulator stated that while 
the guidelines document on a common definition of European money market funds also considers that a 
short-term money market fund may have a constant net asset value, the Autorité des marchés financiers 
would not approve development of this type of funds in France. In the opinion of French financial 
regulator this type of funds present accounting issues and specific risks. 
823
 REBECCA BRACE, Redefining Europe's 'Money Market Funds', Treasury & Risk May 2011. 
The article quotes IMMFA chairman Travis Barker pointing that a common definition is “definitely 
represents progress—but it doesn’t represent the final word on the matter. It’s hard to be sure of the time 
frame, but I think there will be further developments here”. 
824
 See section 3.5 supra for commentaries relating to the challenges facing the US money market 
funds including regulatory uncertainties. See also COZ, (2011) supra note 610 at 1. The comment letter to 
the PWG’s report on money market fund reform options from the Institutional Money Market Fund 
Association urge the US Securities and Exchange Commission to analyse regulatory changes being 
instigated elsewhere as “some of these changes will likely have substantive impacts upon the global 
money market fund industry”. The letter added that it is the IMMFA’s strong opinion that “the changes 
introduced by Basel III combined with the changes already made to the money market fund industry 
provide a framework for money market funds that is sufficiently robust to not require further wholesale 
alterations”. 
825
 Some of the groundbreaking proposals related to changing the money market fund industry 
structure include requirements for money market funds to establish a capital buffer that would absorb the 
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As opposed to the US regulators – with their drive for more substantive changes to the 
structure of the US money market funds – European money market funds are largely content 
with the recent changes within their respective sub-sectors, short-term money market funds and 
(regular) money market funds.826 With respect to the short-term money market fund sector, 
members of the Institutional Money Market Funds Association managing these funds believe 
that if capital buffer requirements are adopted in the US, it should not be copied by European 
short-term money market funds.827 Even though such a descent would drive a further gap in risk 
profiles of the US and the US-style European money market funds, the members of the 
Association argue that any benefit of reduction in investment risks would be greatly overweighed 
by the costs of establishing the new money market fund structure.828 
European (regular) money market funds operating mainly in Continental Europe, largely 
untouched by the US regulatory conundrum, are content with the definitional changes 
implemented in 2011 and believe this development has already provided sufficient product 
differentiation. Thus, the near future of the European money market fund industry rests on the 
outcomes of two divergent trends: further harmonisation of investment products toward 
convergence of investment and regulatory practices and a desire for product differentiation 
driven by local nature of collective investments especially in regard of retail investors’ 
preferences. These trends will be shaped by their respective costs and benefits for asset managers 
and investors in the contest of national laws including applicable tax regulation. Lastly, on-going 
European sovereign debt carries profound consequences for money market funds in the US and 
Europe.829 The major unknown with respect to the state of the future Europe creates, in turn, the 
major unknown for its money market fund sector.        
                                                                                                                                                             
first loss and further insulate money market fund shareholders from larger losses. See BARBARA NOVICK, 
et al., Money Market Funds: Potential Capital Solutions (BlackRock ViewPoint August 2011).  
826
 See, e.g., PWG's Report supra note 7. The report offers seven alternatives for changes in the 
US money market fund industry structure. See also section 3.5 supra discussing potential consequences 
of some of these alternatives.  
827
 Short-term money market funds also known as the US-style money market funds. See also 
section 4.3.4 supra.  
828
 Proposal to IMMFA  (Institutional Money Market Funds Association / Technical Committee  
Summer 2011) (On file with the author). 
829
 See, e.g., CHARLOTTE QUINIOU, et al., European Money Market Funds Sector Update  (Fitch 
Ratings  September 2011) at 4. The report noted that as the European sovereign debt crisis intensified in 




The analysis of the European money market fund industry conducted in this chapter has 
confirmed my hypothesis that the heterogeneity of European money market funds is a product of 
diverse local investment traditions that were shaped by national capital markets and applicable 
national laws. Section 4.2 described the emergence of money market funds in selected European 
jurisdictions profiling those countries dominating the money market fund landscape including 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Section 4.2 concluded 
that the heterogeneity of European money market funds was a product of the local investment 
traditions which were, in turn, shaped by the national capital markets and applicable national 
laws.  
My study of the European money market fund regulation in section 4.3 drew upon 
various sources of regulatory norms applicable to these funds including rules promulgated under 
the European Central Bank, guidelines and recommendations administered by the European 
Securities and Markets Authority and self-regulation developed by a professional trade 
association. Section 4.3 pointed to an on-going drive for harmonisation of investment standards 
across Europe and noted regulatory challenges in its attempts to standardise the inherited 
diversity of European money market funds. 
Section 4.4 examined the practices of credit rating agencies in relation to European 
money market funds. The conclusion drawn from this section supports the notion of a diffusion 
of the investment practices developed in the US to Europe which at the time was lacking targeted 
money market fund regulation. Section 4.4 documented the regulatory effect of the criteria that 
credit rating agencies apply to money market funds: these criteria have been voluntarily adopted 
by the asset managers in Europe seeking recognition and legitimisation of their money market 
funds at the time when such funds were relatively new and largely unfamiliar to investors outside 
the US. 
My inquiry in section 4.5 sought to identify the major trends that may potentially affect 
the structure and regulation of the European money market fund industry and change its outlook. 
                                                                                                                                                             
entities, both in terms of percentage allocation and tenor of investments. Funds avoid peripheral euro zone 
countries such as Ireland, Portugal and Greece. See also ROBERT GROSSMAN, et al., U.S. Money Funds 
and European Banks: Exposures and Maturities Decline Further  (23 September 2011). 
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Section 4.5 concluded that the recently adopted CESR’s Guidelines on a common definition of 
European money market funds was a step towards product harmonisation consistent with the 
idea of a single pan-European market for financial services. Yet, I point out that the CESR’s 
Guidelines, while claiming investor protection, run a significant risk of confusion of purpose as 
investors may, in effect, suffer consequences of reduction in diversification and number of 
investment options.830 Moreover, it was noted that further harmonisation attempts are likely to 
run into standstill due to divergent objectives and practices of the US-style money market funds 
and those money market funds managed under a broader risk mandate. These findings are further 
examined in chapter 5 vis-à-vis the US regulatory model and serve to inform my normative 
proposals presented in chapter 6. 
  
                                                 
830
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. 
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CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE US AND EUROPEAN 
MONEY MARKET FUND REGULATORY MODELS 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapters 3 and 4 revealed a fundamental divergence of approaches relating to money 
market fund regulation between the US and the EU. The dominating thrust of the US federal 
securities law relating to investor protection has been disclosure, which in connection with 
money market fund regulation translated into an exhaustive transparency regime that makes 
actual portfolio holdings and pricing information available to any industry observer on a frequent 
basis. In Europe, regulators are less focused on establishing the market and fostering better 
consumer decision-making through transparency, but rather emphasise the development of 
prudential standards for money market funds as the primary mechanism of investor protection.831  
It is contended in this thesis that, with regard to the development of an appropriate 
regulation of money market funds, the establishment of a European regulatory framework 
outside the US that contemplates the same regulatory goals – investor protection and systemic 
stability – represents the pivotal opportunity for the development of a consistent regulation of 
these funds internationally. From a normative perspective, the comparison between the US and 
European money market funds presented in this chapter will lead to the advancement of a global 
view on what is perceived to be an increasingly global market. Indeed investors and financial 
media view all money market funds as substantially similar investments.832 When the news of 
suspended redemptions in French money market funds was reported in the US, concerned 
investors increased their scrutiny of the US money market funds and their investments in asset-
backed commercial paper and structured investment vehicles.833 None of the US funds 
experienced losses or suspended redemptions albeit some of them relied on financial support 
                                                 
831
 The US money market funds are also subject to risk limiting investment standards. 
Nevertheless, these standards built upon and reinforced by the overarching framework of investment 
management regulation. See section 3.3.1 supra.     
832
 Lack of appreciation for the differences in money market fund structure and regulation 
amongst media ignited a wave of ill-informed reports on money market fund failures in 2007. See section 
4.2.2 supra. 
833
 ICI Report supra note 21 at 48. 
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from their institutional sponsors.834 Learning from this episode of mass confusion, the US money 
market fund industry participants expressed objections to the two-tier structure of the industry in 
Europe precisely on the grounds of investor protection concerns.835 This point of diversion is 
worth highlighting: while in Europe a two-tier money market fund industry structure was praised 
citing enhanced investor protection, the US market participants stressed the confusion inherited 
in such a structure and related investor protection concerns.836  
Chapter 4 demonstrated that when used in the European context the term money market 
fund does not identify a specific type of entities, but rather a set of financial products. The 
current heterogeneity of the European money market fund industry is largely attributable to the 
diverse structure of the national capital market and local investment preferences. This 
comparative chapter seeks to establish what are those fundamental divergences that so far have 
prevented an otherwise natural – amid the prevalent trends of globalisation of financial products 
and services – convergence of the US and European money market funds. It also assesses the 
similarities that inspire future efforts to develop homogenous cross-border money market funds. 
In connection with my research question – how should money market funds be regulated? 
– this chapter further develops the arguments underpinning the normative proposals presented in 
chapter 6. For example, with respect to investor protection, two main approaches were identified 
in chapters 3 and 4: first, development of objective and subjective investments standards; and, 
second, good disclosure.  This chapter compares and contrasts the US and European money 
market fund regulatory models to identify their prevailing venues for better investor protection. 
With respect to promoting systemic stability, once again, good disclosure was identified as a 
means to trace market interconnectedness and manage funding risk. It will be shown in this 
chapter that while the US regulatory model has made a significant progress to achieve this end, 
European money market fund regulators are counterproductively focused on the issue of 
harmonisation, which, in fact, may introduce a greater degree of systemic risk to the market.    
This chapter prepares the ground for answering these questions by comparing the US and 
European money market fund regulatory models and the outcomes of the respective regulation. 
                                                 
834
 Id. at 49 – 50.   
835
 See section 4.3.4 supra. 
836
 Supra note 13. 
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Section 5.2 comprises two parts: first section 5.2.1 discusses the main differences between 
governmental regulations originated in the US and the EU. The second section 5.2.2 reviews 
non-governmental self-regulatory standards for European money market funds developed by the 
Institutional Money Market Fund Association, a unique way to offer the industry-backed 
guidance in areas lacking government-administered regulation.    
Section 5.3 analyses the similarities in regulatory approaches on both sides of the Atlantic 
and is divided into two parts: the first part reviews the commonalities in government-
administered regulation, while the second part analyses the claim of a global view on money 
market funds advanced by non-governmental actors, namely the major international credit rating 
agencies. Examined from the standpoint of an international view on the capital markets, this 
section investigates whether such international regulatory norms could be drawn from the criteria 
used by credit rating agencies. Section 5.4 concludes by reporting the findings of my 
comparative analysis.          
5.2 Main differences 
The main differences in the regulatory approaches to money market funds on both sides 
of the Atlantic are captured in exhibit 12. The exhibit maps the major features of both regulatory 
regimes including risk-limiting standards, stress testing, asset valuation and disclosure 
requirements. 
Exhibit 12: Money market fund regulation in the US and the EU837 
Location: The US Europe 
Applicable 
regulation: Rule 2a-7838 
IMMFA’s Code 
of Practice839 
Common Definition of 
European money 
market funds840 
Portfolio risk-limiting standards: 
--Credit risk Money market funds Money market Short-term money market 
                                                 
837
 The table in exhibit 12 is my own elaboration. While some items are market as ‘Not addresses’ 
in the table under the respective rule, guidance or recommendation, other parts of securities or company 
laws may have addressed this aspect. Items marked as ‘Not required’ are not required or considered under 
any applicable laws.  
838
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 See also section 3.3.3 supra. 
839
 IMMFA Code of Practice supra note 794. See also section 4.3.5 supra. 
840
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. See section 4.3.4 supra. 
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must invest at least 97 
per cent of their assets 
in first tier securities 
and no more than 
three per cent in 
second tier securities 
No more than five per 
cent per a first tier 
issuer, no more than 
0.5 per cent per a 
second tier issuer 
funds must be 
rated triple-A 
funds may  invest in first 
or second tier securities 
In addition, money 
market funds may invest 
in sovereign securities 
rated investment grade 
--Interest rate risk Each first tier security 
must mature within 
397 days; each second 
tier security must 
mature within 45 days 
Weighted average 
maturity may not 
exceed 60 days  
Weighted average life 
may not exceed 120 
days 
Each security must 
mature within 397 
except for 
government 
securities that may 
have a maturity 
date within two 
years 
Weighted average 
maturity may not 
exceed 60 days  
Weighted average 
life may not 
exceed 120 days 
Short-term money market 
funds: each security must 
mature within 397 days 
Weighted average 
maturity may not exceed 
60 days  
Weighted average life 
may not exceed 120 days 
Money market funds: 
each security must 
mature within two years  
provided it has the next 
interest rate reset date 
within 397 days  
 Weighted average 
maturity may not exceed 
six months  
Weighted average life 
may not exceed 12 
months 
--Liquidity risk  Invest no more than 
five per cent of total 
assets in illiquid 
securities  
Invest at least ten per 
cent of total assets in 
daily liquid assets  
Invest at least 30 per 
cent of total assets in 
weekly liquid assets 
Invest at least five 
per cent of total 
assets in daily 
liquid assets  
Invest at least 20 
per cent of total 





Required Not addressed Required 
Asset valuation and accounting operations: 
--Net asset value per 
share 
Constant  Constant Short-term money market 




Money market funds: 
floating 
--Accounting Amortised cost 
checked against 
market values 






Deviations of 10, 





No addressed Money market 
fund’s Board must 
approve a formal 
policy to address 




--Portfolio holdings On monthly basis on 
public web-site within 
five day after the  
month end 
Not required Not required 
--Market-based net 
asset value 
On monthly basis 
with a 60-day lag via 




Not required Not required 
--Portfolio statistics Weighted-average 
maturity 
Weighted-average life 
Both are disclosed on 
public web-site within 





the expiry of a 
reasonable period 





should be available 






life should be 






A discussion of each of the major features of the above table follows from section 5.2.1 
to section 5.3.1.  
5.2.1 Rule 2a-7 and the CESR’s Guidelines on a common definition of European 
money market funds  
5.2.1.1 Inconsistent definitions 
My comparative analysis has, first, revealed that a divergence between the US and 
European regulatory models are what I call here the statutory and substantive definitions of 
money market funds. While the US money market funds are defined under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, as amended, in the EU countries a statutory definition is enshrined in the 
national laws of only those countries with a significant money market fund sector.841 The Irish 
financial regulator is a notable exception among other European national regulators as it has 
restricted the use of the term money market fund to only those funds defined in its guidance.842 
The lack of a statutory definition at the national level in the prevailing majority of European 
countries is due to a broad pre-crisis view on money market funds as a low-risk investment 
option.  As shown in exhibit 8, in a majority of European countries money market funds account 
for a relatively small segment of the national capital markets; thus this segment did not warrant a 
significant regulatory attention before the crisis.843    
                                                 
841
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, 
defines money market funds by establishing a set of prudential rules that a mutual fund must follow if it 
wishes to market itself as a money market funds. Section (b) of the rule makes it illegal for the US mutual 
fund to hold itself out as a money market fund while not following the risk-limiting standards set forth in 
the rule.)  
842
 See, e.g., A Guide to UCITS in Ireland (Dillion & Eustace  20 November 2009) at 17 – 18. 
The Irish regulator defines money market funds as those collective investment schemes following 
prescribed investment parameters and accounting practices, and carrying a triple-A rating from an 
internationally recognised credit rating agency or managed by an experienced management company. 
843
 Section 1.2 supra points to a nearly complete lack of academic and regulatory attention to 
money market funds pre-crisis with an exception of the US market.  It can be retorted, however, that the 
definitional vagueness per se may have served as one of the obstacles for the industry development in 
Europe. Analysis of regulatory developments in the US offered in chapter 4 validates this argument as the 
US the money market fund industry itself petitioned regulators for establishing a clear statutory definition 
as a means to legalise its activities. See section 3.2.1 supra. The industry dialogue with various regulators, 
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The post-crisis review of financial regulation in Europe, which most directly affects the 
money market fund industry, resulted inter alia in the establishment of a harmonised definition 
of European money market funds currently administered by the European Securities and Markets 
Authority.844 The definition formulated by the Commission of European Securities Regulators, 
the predecessor of the European Securities and Markets Authorities, presupposed a two-tier 
industry structure comprising short-term money market funds and (regular) money market 
funds.845 The short-term money market funds are expected to be managed in a conservative 
fashion generally similar to the US money market funds.846 Money market funds managed to a 
broader risk profile were expected to qualify for the (regular) money market fund category.847    
This lack of homogeneity within a common definition itself was cited by the market 
participants as a constraining factor to a further harmonisation of the money market fund 
industry not only in Europe, but also, and most importantly, internationally.848 In relation to the 
semantics of the definition, as noted earlier, the use of the term money market fund is 
inconsistent between the US and Europe.849 To clarify, the US money market funds are known to 
be held to the most conservative risk standards, while in Europe (regular) money market funds – 
as opposed to short-term money market funds – are the riskiest ones within their two-tier 
gradation. The inconsistent definitional semantics, which inevitably contributes to the investor 
confusion, highlights the barriers to the natural conversion of European money market funds into 
a homogenous investment product offered throughout all European markets.  
As highlighted earlier, investors and financial media tend to disregard the definitional 
minutia perceiving all money market funds as substantially similar investments.850 Learning from 
the experience of the financial crisis, some industry stakeholders expressed objections to the two-
                                                                                                                                                             
especially if popularised by the media, was one of the significant factors in promoting the US money 
market funds to investors. 
844




 See section 4.3.4 supra. Those European money market funds previously referred to as the US-
style funds, the IMMFA funds, treasury funds and liquidity funds would generally fall into this category. 
847
 Id. This type of money market funds is generally offered in Continental Europe. 
848




 A lack of appreciation for the differences in money market fund structure and regulation 




tier structure of the industry in Europe citing investor protection concerns.851 Indeed, from the 
standpoint of the US investor, those collective investment schemes qualified as (regular) money 
market funds under the European definition should have been designated as bond funds.852 This 
is because the bond fund designation is aligned with the substantive function of bond funds to 
track certain market indexes as opposed to the substantive function of the US money market 
funds to preserve principal value and provide liquidity. Nonetheless, while acknowledging these 
concerns, European regulators have chosen the semantics that remains at odds with the US 
naming conventions. Exhibit 12 sets out money market fund definitions accepted in the US and 
Europe underscoring the lack of convergence of money market funds across the borders. 
Second, my analysis points to ambiguities related to the jurisdictional reach and 
enforcement of a common definition of European money market funds as compared to the US. 
As explained in Chapter 3, it is unlawful in the US to use the term a money market fund unless 
the fund in question complies with the risk-limiting provisions of Rule 2a-7.853 The more 
complex architecture of the European money market fund industry makes the application of the 
definition less clear-cut.854 The common definition guidelines are a non-binding document 
implementation and enforcement of which depends on the actions of 27 national regulators.855 
However, it appears that the regulation of money market funds is not a priority for national 
regulators to consider it in their agenda setting.  
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 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 at (b)(1). Sections (b)(2) and (3) of the same rule also prohibit mutual 
funds from adopting a name that is substantially similar to a ‘money market fund’ such as ‘cash’, ‘liquid’, 
‘ready assets’ or other similar terms unless such a fund complies with the risk-limiting standards of Rule 
2a-7.    
854
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at 3. The definition is designed to apply to both, UCITS-
authorised funds and those funds “regulated under the national law of a Member State and which are 
subject to supervision and comply with risk-spreading rules”. By July 2011 when the definition has come 
into effect, a number of national regulators made pertinent changes in the national laws. See, e.g., UCITS 
IV News - Issue 18  (PricewaterhouseCooper  May 2011) at 2. The newsletter notes that by May 2011, 
two months prior to the date of compliance [1 July 2011] with a common definition of European money 
market funds, only Luxembourg, Ireland, France and Germany have considered adaptation of the 
guidelines. 
855
 The European Securities and Markets Authority that administers a common definition of 
European money market funds at the level of the European Community is lacking enforcement authority 
at the national level for the Level III guidelines and standards. Supra note 819. 
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In effect, those European money market funds that have long been in operation may find 
limited benefits in changing their investment parameters only to conform to the pan-European 
guidelines. Lastly, the structure of the national markets in terms of their size and duration of the 
traditional security issuances may not support the required investment parameters under a 
common definition.856 The lesson learned from the new money market fund investment standards 
introduced in the US in May 2010 is that investment requirements, if not coordinated with the 
availability of investments, are prone to unintended consequences when the market focuses on 
creating financial instruments that have little economic purpose and, in fact, serves only 
regulatory compliance.857    
Thus, the above discussion argues that benefits and incentives of transposing the 
European common definition guidelines into national laws could be rather weak for both national 
regulators and the regulated entities. Furthermore, hoarding of local money market funds into 
standardized investment parameters could be impractical in certain national markets. This 
finding comes in contrast to the history of the US money market funds, which have themselves 
been the greatest proponents of the regulatory standards and strict delineation of money market 
funds from other types of funds due to the causal link between strong regulation and investor 
acceptance. The difference in practical usefulness of a statutory definition is a result of the 
differences in the money market fund industry structures: homogenous in the US versus 
heterogeneous in Europe.    
                                                 
856
 I am not aware of any consultations whether securities of desirable quality and maturity are 
available in the national markets to provide necessary supply of assets for money market fund portfolios 
invested in line with a common definition, i.e., if in a certain markets 18-month securities have 
traditionally been issued and purchased by local money market funds, issuance of 12-month securities for 
the sole purpose of meeting the new money market fund investment requirement would, in fact, 
disadvantage the issuers, who would have to assume greater funding risk by shortening their liabilities.       
857
 Sections 3.3.3.2 and 3.5 supra. E.g., under the latest amendments to Rule 2a-7, the US money 
market funds inter alia must allocate at least 30 per cent in securities that recover their principal within 
seven days. Prior to this requirement coming into force in May 2010, there was little availability of 
securities maturing weekly. After that date the market has become focused on developing new 
instruments that would meet money market fund demand for securities maturing within seven days or 
having a weekly demand feature even though there is no real economic need amongst issuers to finance 
themselves with such short-dated securities. See, e.g., VIKTORIA BAKLANOVA, et al., Primer: CEF 
Variable-Rate Demand Preferred Shares - Closed-End Fund VRDPs Target Short-Term, Money Market 
Investors (Fitch Ratings 27 October 2011). The report describes the process of issuance of new securities 
featuring liquidity within seven-day to specifically meet demand for such securities from the US money 
market funds.   
212 
 
Likewise, significant differences exist in connection with the substantive definition of the 
term money market fund (i.e., a definition that places the emphasis on a fund’s investment 
strategies rather than on its nomenclature). Whilst both the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission and European Securities and Markets Authority rely on a set of prudential rules to 
limit the ability of a money market fund manager to undertake risky strategies, cross-
jurisdictional differences reveal variances in national regulatory perceptions of an appropriate 
level of risk in money market funds as shown in exhibit 12 earlier in this chapter. The US and 
European regulators diverge in their views on what are the appropriate credit risk and duration 
management standards, accounting, operations, recordkeeping, corporate governance and 
disclosure. It could also be said that such cross-jurisdictional differences are primarily driven by 
the nature of the national capital markets, not the risk perception per se. For example, if only 18-
month securities are issued in a particular market, such securities are viewed as the least risky in 
the given market. For an observer operating in the market where overnight investments are 
traditional for money market funds, a duration mandate that include investments due in one and a 
half years would be viewed as inappropriate if not reckless.   
5.2.1.2 Divergent views of investment risks 
The level of credit risk in the US money market funds is constrained by a set of 
subjective and objective standards that impose minimum credit quality and diversification 
requirement for portfolio securities.858 These rules are a part of the overarching regulatory 
framework for all US collective investment schemes that provides inter alia the general basis of 
risk-spreading rules and prohibitions on affiliated transactions.859 The regulatory framework, 
including the roles of federal and state laws may specify, by implication, certain standard views, 
practices and processes of the market participants. As shown in chapter 3, Rule 2a-7, which is an 
essential regulation for the US money market funds, by virtue of market participants’ 
compliance, established the discussed standards.860 For example, it limits credit quality of 
                                                 
858
 Section 3.3.2 supra. 
859
 Section 3.3.1 supra. See also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 Subclassification of management companies.  
The US money market funds fall in to a diversified investment company classification, which generally 
limit such companies to investments of at most five per cent of their assets in securities of one issuer for 
75 per cent of their portfolios. 
860
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7  
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eligible securities for the US money market funds to those securities rated in two highest short-
term rating categories by credit rating agencies with only up to three per cent of assets allowed to 
be invested in securities rated in the second highest short-term rating category.861  
In contrast, a common definition of European money market funds omits diversification 
requirements while relying on the risk spreading rules as set forth in the UCITS Directive for the 
UCITS-authorised money market funds or in the national law of a Member State for those non-
harmonised money market funds.862 The guidelines document directs European short-term 
money market funds to invest only in high quality securities, which could generally be 
interpreted as securities rated in the two highest short-term rating categories by recognised credit 
rating agencies.863 European money market funds could add securities of investment grade 
sovereign issuers, which are those rated in the three highest short-term rating categories or four 
highest long-term rating categories from AAA to BBB.864 Thus, the maximum dispersion of 
credit quality among money market funds in the US and Europe could be quite significant.865   
In addition, the US and European regulators diverge in their views on the appropriate 
interest rate risk management standards in money market funds. Duration of the US money 
market funds is limited to 60 days, while the maximum duration of European (regular) money 
market funds could be three times of that, or these funds could incur three times higher interest 
rate risk.866 Final maturities of portfolio securities in the US money market funds are limited to 
397 days with exception of the US government securities, while final maturities of European 
(regular) money market funds could be as long as two years, if floating rate securities.867 That 
said I note the conservatism of the European short-term money market funds standards that are 
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 Section 3.3.2 supra. 
862
 Section 4.3.1 supra. 
863




 Based on my experience, for practical purposes, the US money market funds generally limit 
themselves to investment in securities rated in the highest short-term rating category A-1 by Standard & 
Poor’s, F1 by Fitch and/or P-1 by Moody’s. The majority of European short-term money market funds 
adhere to investment practices of the US money market funds although they are allowed to assume greater 
credit risk under the common definition guidelines. European (regular) money market funds operate under 
a broader risk mandate especially with respect to European sovereign debt securities whose credit quality 
has been deteriorating as a result of the sovereign debt crisis of 2011.      
866
 Sections 3.3.2 and 4.3.4 supra. I note that those short-term money market funds are limited to 





generally in line with the US money market fund regulatory requirements in terms of both 
duration and final maturities of portfolio securities.868 The above analysis shows that those 
collective investment schemes referred to as short-term money market funds in Europe exhibit a 
high level of convergence with the US money market funds, while European (regular) money 
market funds may incur substantially higher credit and interest rate risks.      
5.2.1.3 Different asset valuation practices 
The US and European regulator have different views on the acceptable accounting 
methods and asset valuation practices employed by money market funds. As explained in chapter 
3, the US money market funds maintain their share price at a constant net asset value by valuing 
their assets at the amortised price according to the operational standards outlined in Rule 2a-7 
and employing other measures that help to stabilise the share price.869 To insure that the 
amortised cost-based share price does not materially deviate from the market-based share price, 
the US money market funds undertake a parallel market-based pricing of their shares, a process 
referred to as shadow pricing.870  
To compare, a common definition of European money market funds permits short-term 
money market funds to offer their shares at either a constant net asset value or fluctuating net 
asset value, while not allowing money market funds to peg their share to a constant net asset 
value.871 The guideline document does not lay out any specific operational protocol, but instead 
refers to other Level III guidelines regarding UCITS asset valuation and the national laws.872 Not 
surprisingly, European national regulators depart widely in their approaches to asset valuation in 
collective investment schemes. For example, the French regulator has commented that, 
notwithstanding the new guidelines for European money market funds, short-term money market 
funds offering constant net asset value per share “present accounting issues and specific risks 








 Section 4.3.4 supra. 
872
 Section 4.3.4 supra. 
215 
 
which are currently being examined... it is too early for [these funds] to be developed in 
France”.873  
In contrast, the Irish financial regulator expressed the opposite view when published its 
guidance note concerning asset valuation by money market funds in 2008.874 Under the 
guidance, those collective investment schemes that apply strict criteria to portfolio construction 
are permitted to use the amortised cost method for valuation of their assets and when 
accompanied by periodic mark-to-market and stress testing.875 Prior to publication of a common 
definition of European money market funds, only this type of funds were able to market 
themselves as money market funds in Ireland.876 The Irish regulator had to revise its guidelines 
to allow for other types of money market funds, namely those operating under a broader risk 
mandate, to be registered in Ireland.877       
I point out the differences in views on harmonisation between the French and the Irish 
regulators. The French regulator refrained from allowing constant net asset value short-term 
money market funds to be developed in France, while the Irish regulator fully adopted a common 
definition of European money market funds even though prior to July 2011 the riskier version of 
these funds would not be qualified as a money market fund in Ireland.878 This episode 
underscores the limited practical usefulness of the harmonisation efforts if they are not in accord 
with the investment customs, traditions and risk perception of the particular investment 
community.      
 
                                                 
873
 See AMF's Procedures for implementing new classifications for MMFs supra note 822. 
874
 For UCITS-authorised money market funds see Guidance Note 1/08 Valuation of Assets of 
Money Market Funds (Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority  August 2008) [Irish Regulator 
Guidance Notes 1/08]. For non-UCITS money market funds see NU 17.4 Collective Investment Schemes 
Other Than UCITS: Money market schemes  (Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority  August 
2003).  
875
 Irish Regulator Guidance Notes 1/08 supra note 870. 
876
 Id. These funds would generally fall under a definition of short-term money market funds 
under the new common definition. 
877
 For UCITS-authorised money market funds see UCITS NOTICES Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities authorised under European Communities (Undertakings for 
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) Regulations 2011  (Central Bank of Ireland July 2011) 
at 136. For non-UCITS money market funds see Appendix 7 Money Market Schemes (NU 17)  (Central 
Bank of Ireland / Instructions paper  July 2011). 
878
 See AMF's Procedures for implementing new classifications for MMFs supra note 822. 
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5.2.1.4 Divergence of operational practices 
A significant divergence exists between the US and European views on operational 
practices related to the treatment of capital gain or losses and income received by a money 
market fund. The US money market funds strictly separate interest income on portfolio securities 
from any capital gain or losses incurred from asset transactions, a practice that helps to maintain 
a constant net asset value per share.879 This practice also appeals to certain US investors, who 
separate capital gain from dividends for tax purposes.880 European money market funds may 
employ different approaches to capital gain or loss, or interest income treatment, sometimes 
within one fund structure.881 Generally, the US-style money market funds in Europe follow the 
same operational practices as their US peers. European money market funds featuring floating 
net asset value per share add capital gain/loss and interest income to the share price.882    
Furthermore, given that money market funds are amongst the most credit-sensitive 
investors, in-house credit research and recordkeeping are also subject to detailed regulation in the 
US, but not in Europe.883 The CESR’s Guidelines for European money market funds are much 
less detailed with respect to the operational aspects of the fund activities. The guidelines refer to 
an obligation of a management company to conduct a review of its investments’ credit quality 
and points to a range of factors to consider thus deferring the legal framework of the operational 
aspects of the fund management to the national laws.884          
                                                 
879
 Section 3.3.2 supra. The practice of separation of capital gain/loss eliminates the fluctuations 
of share prices caused by the accrued interest. 
880
 Id. Certain US investors apply different tax rates to dividends versus capital gains. Thus, the 
practice provides additional operational efficiency. 
881
 (1) a US-like practice of separating capital gain/losses from interest income by short-term 
money market funds using amortised cost asset valuation accompanied by shadow pricing; (2) a practice 
of accumulating of capital gain/losses and interest income by short-term money market funds using 
amortised cost asset valuation accompanied by shadow pricing; (3) a practice of accumulating of capital 
gain/losses and interest income by money market funds using amortised cost asset valuation not 
accompanied by shadow pricing.       
882 This practice, called smoothing, helps the fund manager to project an appearance of a steady 
increase in the fund’s share price. See section 4.2.1 supra.   
883
 Section 3.3.3.5 supra. 
884
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at Box 2, paragraph 3 and Box 3, paragraph 1. Management 
company’s operations and recordkeeping are covered in the Level II Management  Directive 
2001/107/EC, [2002] OJ L41/20  The UCITS IV implementing directive sets forth additional 
organisational requirements, rules on conduct of business, risk management, among other items. See 
Directive 2010/43/EU, [2010] OJ L176/42   
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5.2.1.5 Differences in fund governance 
My analysis found that corporate governance plays a more significant role in the US 
money market fund operations as compared to European money market funds. As shown in 
section 3.3.1.2, the first level of investor protection in the US money market funds is built upon 
activities of the mutual fund boards of Directors or Trustees that are independent from the asset 
management company and are charged with a range of the oversight responsibilities.885 Rule 2a-
7 further counts on the money market fund Boards for investment, operations and stress testing 
processes and for an ultimate decision at the time of a crisis to suspend redemptions and liquidate 
the fund.886 Under the UCITS Directive framework, Directors are not required to be independent 
parties and may represent the management company or depositary. The role of Directors is 
mostly focused on safekeeping of the clients’ assets and does not extend to oversight credit 
decisions or investment processes, both of which fall solely under the purview of the 
management company.887      
5.2.1.6 Differences in disclosure requirements 
The US and the European money market funds are separated by a disclosure gap as wide 
as the Atlantic Ocean. The US money market funds are subject to a unique transparency regime 
that includes public disclosure of portfolio holding information and asset pricing in addition to 
regular filings of updated prospectuses and financial statements.888 Portfolio holdings are 
published on the funds’ public web-sites on a monthly basis within five business days after the 
end of each calendar month; the same information is furnished to the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, which also makes it available to public through its centralised database 
EDGAR albeit with a 60-day lag.889  
                                                 
885
 Section 3.3.1.2 supra. 
886
 17 CFR § 270.22e-3   See also section 3.3.3 supra. 
887
 Directive 2009/65, [2009] OJ L302/32 at Article 5 and Article 29. Non-UCITS money market 
funds regulated under the national law of a Member State are subject to the corporate governance 
structure established therein. 
888
 Sections 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.3.5 supra.  
889
 Section 3.3.3.5 supra. The US money market funds also disclose their market-based share 
pricing in monthly filings to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, who makes this information 
available to public with a 60-day lag.   
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The CESR’s Guidelines do not contain fund-specific disclosure requirements except for 
requiring funds to identify risks of their investments strategies to investors.890 Therefore, with 
respect to details of disclosure, European money market funds are subject to varying 
requirements depending on the country of domicile’s national law and whether the fund is a 
UCITS.891 Generally, UCITS are required to provide offering documents and financial 
statements to their investors, but are not required to place these documents in the public 
domain.892 Investors are further handicapped by lack of a centralised filings database. Currently, 
unearthing and interpreting information regarding European money market funds is challenging, 
if not impossible, especially for retail investors, who may not have sufficient resources to obtain 
and analyse the fund data. With the UCITS IV Directive implementation underway, the 
expectations are that a Key Investor Information Document, dubbed as KIID, will improve 
UCITS transparency and facilitate analysis of the fund information.893  
Nonetheless, in the absence of adequate pan-European transparency standards for 
collective investment schemes, institutional investor-oriented European money market funds 
have voluntarily established a relatively high level of transparency, which goes above and 
beyond the KIID data.894 Because corporate treasurers normally conduct their cash investments 
on the basis of detailed due diligence requirements, which include a review of fund holding 
information, institutionally-oriented money market funds regardless of their domiciles meet the 
investor-determined level of transparency.895 Thus, regulatory requirements in Europe do not 
establish de facto baseline disclosures. In fact, it is the purchasing power and sophistication of 
institutional investors that define the level of disclosure in European money market funds. Given 
these differences in the powers to obtain disclosures, retail investors are disadvantaged.    
                                                 
890
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at Box 1, paragraphs 3 and 4. 
891
 Section 4.3.1 supra. 
892
 Directive 2009/65, [2009] OJ L302/32  
893
 Id. at 38. KIID is a two-page document featuring a consistent format across all UCITS. 
Information presented in KIID must be organized in five predetermined sections including the fund’s 
investment policy and objectives, its risk/return profile, charges, past performance and contact 
information of the relevant parties. See, e.g., UCITS IV - Key Investor Information Document (KIID)  
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In sum, as exhibit 13 illustrated, the current money market funds regulatory models on 
both sides of the Atlantic are not symmetrical and, thus, are likely to entail material revisions if 
the objective of international harmonisation continues being pursued.896 It has been established 
that the US regulatory model that features good disclosure meets the underlying regulatory goal 
of investor protection and also establishes a foundation for managing systemic risk through 
transparency of fund investments.897 The EU regulatory framework, on the other hand, lacks 
disclosure requirements, but instead is primarily focused on coordination of investment standards 
cross-border, which is currently viewed as a primary investor protection tool in European money 
market funds.    
5.2.2 IMMFA’s Code of Practice 
While de jure the Code of Practice administered by the Institutional Money Market Fund 
Association has no power, de facto it establishes an additional level of self-imposed regulation 
for the US-style money market funds in Europe.898 The main unique feature of the IMMFA’s 
Code is a requirement for the funds being rated triple-A by at least one credit rating agencies.899 
By virtue of this requirement, the Association assumed credit rating agencies’ criteria as a 
workable substitute for its own credit risk-limiting rules. Hence, the IMMFA’s Code of Practice 
does not impose any other credit quality standards above and beyond those outlines in the credit 
rating agencies’ criteria.900 
The Code is tailored to those European money market funds employing an amortised cost 
valuation method accompanied by a shadow pricing and features a detailed operational process 
                                                 
896
 That said, the thesis highlights the misguided regulatory move for harmonisation of money 
market fund investment practices, which ultimately runs contrary to a regulatory objective of systemic 
stability. The normative proposal presented in chapter 6 focuses on preserving the heterogeneity of money 
market fund investment practices as a means to enlarge consumer choices and improve credit availability 
through protecting diversity of funding options.              
897
 Section 1.2 supra 
898
 Section 4.3.5 supra. These funds generally fall into a short-term money market fund category 
under a common definition of European money market funds. 
899
 IMMFA Code of Practice supra note 794 at Articles 5 and 6.  
900
 Credit rating agencies generally view only securities rated in the highest short-term rating 
category as appropriate for triple-A rated funds. Specific credit quality and diversification criteria adopted 
by credit rating agencies with respect to money market funds in the US and Europe are discussed in 
sections 3.4 and 4.4, respectively.   
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for the IMMFA funds.901 This level of operational details sets the Code apart from the guidelines 
on a common definition of European money market funds and brings it closer to the US legal 
framework.902 With respect to operational practices, the IMMFA’s Code recommends the funds’ 
Boards to develop policies addressing allocation of realised capital gain or loss, or so-called ‘loss 
smoothing’.903 Issuing this recommendation, the Code once again seeks to mirror the operational 
practices employed by the US money market funds that carry realised losses forward for a 
number of years and offset these losses over time with realised capital gain. This process 
dampens volatility of the fund’s net asset value per share.904   
As shown in exhibit 12, other areas of divergence of the IMMFA’s Code of Practice from 
the guidelines on a common definition of European money market funds can be found in 
managing liquidity risks and the disclosure regime. 905 Because the IMMFA funds are deemed 
similar to the US money market funds, it is not surprising that the IMMFA’s Code adopted the 
US approach to money market fund liquidity management and requires a certain amount of the 
fund assets to be maturing daily and within one week.906 This is in contrast to a common 
definition of European money market fund, which does not establish objective standards for 
liquidity management. The IMMFA’s Code addresses liquidity risk by recommending an 
                                                 
901
 IMMFA Code of Practice supra note 794 at Articles 25 and 26. The Code also requires 
marking assets to market periodically, generally weekly, to ensure that the deviation of the fund’s market-
based share price from the amortised cost-based share price remains immaterial. 
902
 Id. at Part V. The Code of Practice includes a detailed process for monitoring of the market-
based net asset value deviations from a constant net asset value, or so-called ‘escalation policy’. The 
escalation policy prescribes certain actions to be taken by specific individuals such as directors of the 
fund’s management company in the case of the fund’s net asset value calculated on the basis of amortised 
cost deviates from its market-based net asset value more than a predetermined amount, e.g., if the 
deviation reaches 20 basis points, it should be reported to the senior management of the fund’s 
management company; a deviation of 30 basis points is to be reported to the fund’s trustee. See also 
CESR's Guidelines supra note 9.  
903
 IMMFA Code of Practice supra note 794 at Articles 29 (The policies related to treatment of 
realised capital gain/loss must be approved by the fund’s board and reviewed at least annually.) 
904
 The treatment of capital gain/loss is not addressed in Rule 2a-7, but falls under the purview of 
the US Internal Revenue Code. 
905
 Section 5.2 supra. 
906
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 at (c)(5)(ii) and (iii). Rule 2a-7 requires the US money market funds to 
invest at least ten per cent of their total assets in securities maturing daily and at least 30 per cent of their 
assets in securities maturing weekly. See also section 3.3.3.2 supra. 
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allocation of at least five per cent of the funds’ assets in securities maturing daily and at least 20 
per cent of the funds’ assets in securities maturing within one week.907 
Lastly, the transparency regime recommended by the IMMFA goes far beyond the 
CESR’s Guidelines.908 In line with its focus on liquidity, the IMMFA’s Code requires the 
IMMFA’s funds to report their liquidity profiles to the public on a monthly basis and to disclose 
the composition of the top ten shareholders to other fund shareholders upon request.909 This 
transparency regime seeks to inform fund shareholders, mainly institutional investors, regarding 
those with whom they share fund liquidity. Nonetheless, even though the IMMFA funds are 
positioned to mirror the US regulatory practices, the IMMFA’s Code falls short of the 
comprehensive disclosure regime for the US money market funds detailed in section 3.3.3.5.910 
Drawing on the experience of the US money market funds, it is the availability of portfolio 
holding information that enables a healthy discussion of portfolio risks between the fund 
management and its investors and promotes prudent investment behaviour among asset 
managers.911  
To summarise, the IMMFA’s Code of Practice, the industry-developed self-imposed 
regulation for triple-A European money market funds, has made a significant stride to bridge the 
gap between the US and the EU money market fund regulatory models. Its investment standards 
which are, in effect, the industry best practices adopted internationally, provide a strong example 
of a natural conversion of regulatory standards cross-border.  The IMMFA’s Code is generally in 
line with regulatory requirements for the US money market funds and provides recommendations 
that are more detailed in operational aspects and require more comprehensive disclosure relative 
to the CESR’s Guidelines for European money market funds. Nonetheless, neither the IMMFA’s 
Code of Practice nor CESR’s Guidelines require good disclosure. As such, these regulations are 
not enough to empower investors or adequately inform regulators of looming systemic risks.                                  
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 IMMFA Code of Practice supra note 794 at Article 33. See also section 4.3.5 supra. 
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 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. 
909
 IMMFA Code of Practice supra note 794 Articles 42 and 43. See also section 4.3.5 supra. 
910
 See also 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (c)(12). The rule features a powerful requirement of a full 
disclosure of portfolio holdings on frequent basis with a minimum time lag. 
911
 Supra note 565. 
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5.3 Main similarities  
5.3.1 Similarities shared by the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority 
As shown in the previous section, while the US and European money market fund 
regulatory regimes differ substantially in details, they nevertheless share a number of common 
features. Thus, a closer review of cross-jurisdictional patterns can provide useful insights into the 
design of an optimal money market fund regulatory scheme covering both sides of the Atlantic. 
One of the principal conceptual similarities shared by the US and European regulators is the 
view on the essential function of money market funds as collective investment schemes 
providing safety of principal, liquidity and yield consistent with short-term market rates.912 
Another area of concord is that regulators orient themselves towards controlling the product-side 
aspects through a set of prudential rules. Unfortunately, in Europe the ideology of harmonisation 
seeks to transform the naturally diverse industry landscape into a limited number of specific 
investment strategies thus increasing – not decreasing – systemic instabilities.  
Contemporary money market fund regulation, motivated by investor protection, focuses 
mainly on portfolio investment restrictions, which, not surprisingly, becomes the main areas of 
contention when it attempts to alter investment policies that have served local investors for years. 
There are only two aspects of money market fund investment practices where the US and 
European regulators have achieved a relative accord. First, both the US and European money 
market funds are expected to invest only in high quality securities rated within two highest short-
term rating categories by major credit rating agencies with certain limited exceptions.913 Second, 
both the US and European regulators expect money market funds to pursue conservative 
portfolio management strategies consistent with the notion of safety and demonstrate prudent 
risk management by stress testing their portfolios periodically.914 The Venn diagram in Exhibit 
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 Section 1.1.1 supra. 
913
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 at (c)(3) and CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at Box 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, 
Box 3, paragraph 1. European (regular) money market funds can invest in sovereign securities rated at 
least investment grade, which would generally fall within three highest short-term rating categories. See 
also sections 3.3.3.2 and 4.3.4 supra.  
914
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 at (c)(10)(v). CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at Article 20. See also 
sections 3.3.3.3 and 4.3.4 supra. It worth noting that stress testing process has been mandated by the Irish 
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13 depicts a small area of overlap between the US and European regulatory standards related to 
the credit quality and stress testing.915 
Exhibit 13: Money market fund regulation in the US and the EU: lack of common 
grounds    
 
The exhibit above contains three large areas depicting the US Rule 2a-7, European short-
term money market funds and European (regular) money market funds. Each area has specific 
characteristics: first, the exhibit shows that Rule 2a-7 limits credit risk by imposing credit quality 
and diversification standards.916 It also limits market risk exposures by placing specific 
requirements on the asset maturities, the weighted average maturities and the weighted average 
                                                                                                                                                             
regulator for Ireland-domiciled money market funds since 2008 prior to implementation of the guidelines 
on a common definition of European money market funds. The Irish Regulator also requires making 
results of the stress tests available upon request. See Irish Regulator Guidance Notes 1/08 supra note 874 
at 5. In 2009, when the US Securities and Exchange Commission considered amendments to Rule 2a-7, 
stress testing requirement was included following the practice of the Irish regulator. See SEC Rel. No. IC-
28807 at note 125 and accompanying text.  
915
 The proprietary diagram represents a compilation of the main rules applicable to money 
market funds in the US and Europe discussed throughout this thesis.   
916
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7  
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life of the fund portfolio.917 Importantly, Rule 2a-7 prescribes specific liquidity parameters for 
the fund in an attempt to manage their liquidity risk.918 Other aspects targeted by Rule 2a-7 are 
fund operations and accounting practices, recordkeeping, fund governance and disclosure.919    
The CESR’s Guidelines, which cover two types of European money market funds, 
govern significantly fewer aspects of the funds’ investments and operations and are mostly 
focused on establishing credit and market risk parameters in these funds.920 Notably, an 
important aspect of asset liquidity for money market funds is missing from this regulation.921 As 
exhibit 13 shows, the only fully intersecting area is indeed the asset credit quality section, which 
is featured as an important part of money market fund regulations on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Partially intersecting are the views on asset maturities, portfolio weighted average maturities and 
weighted average life, parameters that are meant to limit market risk exposure in money market 
funds. However, these regulations are only similar for the US and European short-term money 
market funds. On the other hand, European (regular) money market funds have little in common 
with their US peers.    
Notwithstanding the concord in the regulatory views on appropriate credit quality 
evidenced from exhibit 13, diversification requirements, which are another aspect of the credit 
risk management, differ substantially.922 The US regulators are quite restrictive with respect to 
money market fund holdings of securities rated in the second highest short-term rating category 
limiting such holdings to no more than three per cent of the funds’ assets, while the European 
Securities and Markets Authority offer no money market fund-specific diversification 
guidance.923 Therefore, European money market funds are able to invest in a portfolio of greater 
concentration and thus execute riskier investment strategies from the diversification standpoint 
as compared to their US counterparts. 












 Sections 3.3.3.2 and 4.3.4 supra. 
923
 Section 3.3.3.2 supra. Rule 2a-7 limits investments in second tier securities to three per cent of 
the fund’s assets with no single issuer exceeding a half of one per cent of the fund’s assets. In addition, 
such investments must have maturity dates within 45 days. 
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Consistent with the notion of safety and low risk investment, both the US and European 
regulators provide very specific guidance with respect to interest rate and market risk 
management by establishing limits concerning maturities of fund holdings and the overall 
portfolio duration.924 However, only guidelines for short-term money market funds in Europe can 
be viewed as isomorphic to those rules imposed on the US money market funds.925 The outer 
boundaries of interest rate risk taking deemed acceptable for European (regular) money market 
funds represent a significant divergence of the US and European approaches due to a much 
broader risk mandate of European (regular) money market funds.926 As explained in section 
5.2.1, European (regular) money market funds could incur three times greater interest rate risk 
relative to the US money market funds and even relative to their peers in the short-term money 
market fund category.  
Lastly, both the US and European regulators require consumer disclosure and periodic 
information documents as those specified for mutual funds in the US and UCITS in Europe.927 In 
addition, the CESR’s Guidelines require more exacting language with regard to the risks 
associated with money market funds that seeks to set money market funds apart from bank 
deposits and revolves around lack of a government guarantee for these funds.928 Thus, European 
money market funds are also required “to provide sufficient information to explain the impact of 
the longer duration on the risk profile”.929 Here is where the similarities end and the differences 
in the scope of disclosure become prominent. As shown in section 5.2.1.6, the US money market 
funds are subject to a unique good disclosure regime and must reveal the content of their 
                                                 
924
 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 at (c)(2) and CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at Box 2, paragraphs 5, 7 and 
8, Box 3, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6. See also sections 3.3.3.2 and 4.3.4 supra. 
925
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at Box 2, paragraphs 5, 7 and 8. See also section 4.3.4 supra.   
926
 In the US this type of funds could not be marketed as money market funds, but fall into a bond 
fund category and sometimes are also referred to as ultra-short or short-term bond funds. 
927
 Sections 3.3.1.3 and 4.3.1 supra. 
928
 A typical US money market fund prospectus language reads “An investment in [the fund 
name] is not a deposit of any bank or other insured depository institution and is not insured or guaranteed 
by the FDIC or any other government agency. Although [the fund name] seeks to preserve the value of 
your investment at $1.00 per share, it is possible for an investor to lose money by investing in [the fund 
name]”. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Institutional Liquidity Funds Prospectus  (Morgan Stanley Investment 
Management  28 February 2011) Available at http://www.morganstanley.com/msamg/msimintl 
/docs/en_US/publications/prospectus/MSIL/inst_cl_port_pro.pdf. See also CESR's Guidelines supra note 
9 at 3.   
929
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9 at 3. 
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investment portfolios in the public domain on frequent basis. In contrast, European money 
market funds are not obligated to reveal the content of their portfolios to the public. 
5.3.2 Credit rating agencies’ approach to money market funds in the US and the EU 
This section discusses the unique position of credit rating agencies as organizations 
empowered enough to form a cross-border view on risks in money market funds and provide 
their relative risk gradation. By virtue of rating assignment and maintenance requirements, credit 
rating agencies enjoy an availability of fund information regardless of the state-mandated 
transparency regime in a given jurisdiction. Thus, armed with an access to the funds’ data and an 
array of tools for measuring portfolio risks, credit rating agencies are the best positioned to serve 
as information hubs for all other industry stakeholders.930 However, notwithstanding the 
informational advantage, credit rating agencies have so far been unable to establish themselves 
as a significant factor in dispelling the information asymmetry between money market funds and 
their investors.  
As explained in sections 3.4 and 4.4, there are three international credit rating agencies – 
Fitch, Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s – that currently offer money market 
fund ratings in the US and Europe. These ratings are assigned on the basis of proprietary rating 
criteria and incorporate any unique views that a particular agency may have with respect to the 
product.931 This comparative analysis identifies three factors that make money market fund 
ratings assigned by any of the agency sufficiently comparable to the others despite proprietary 
rating criteria developed by each rating agency. First, all three agencies are focused on the funds’ 
abilities to fulfil their essential functions of preserving capital and providing liquidity.932 Second, 
all three rating agencies use unique rating scales applied exclusively to money market funds to 
distinguish these ratings from traditional credit ratings assigned to debt securities.933 Third, the 
                                                 
930
 All three international credit rating agencies, Fitch, Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & 
Poor’s, require rated money market funds to submit rating monitoring reports on weekly basis. The 
reports typically include selected portfolio statistics and a list of portfolio holdings. See Credit rating 
agencies’ methodologies supra note 573.   
931
 Credit rating agencies’ methodologies supra note 573. 
932
 Id. For example, Moody’s money market fund rating methodology states that Moody’s “will 
rate money market funds based on [Moody’s] opinion of [funds] ability to meet the dual objectives of 
preserving principal and providing liquidity to holders”. 
933
 Exhibit 7 supra.  
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analytical framework of money market fund ratings is applied uniformly across different 
jurisdictions, i.e., fund ratings are independent from the funds’ domicile.934  
The last factor is especially important in the context of this chapter. If rating agencies 
succeeded in measuring money market fund risks on a uniform basis cross-border, their 
framework could be used as a foundation for a normative proposal for money market fund 
regulation applicable on both sides of the Atlantic. Unfortunately, the answer is in the negative. 
As explained in sections 3.4 and 4.4, rating agencies are uniquely positioned to obtain money 
market fund information and, thus, offer the best informed rating opinions.935 The rating 
agencies’ ability to obtain information is especially valuable in Europe, where the disclosure 
requirements from money market funds are lower relative to their peers in the US.936 Even 
though the information obtained in the course of the rating assignment, as a general rule, may not 
be revealed to public, rating opinions should have reflected the difference in funds’ risk 
profiles.937 Notwithstanding this opportunity for differentiating funds on the basis of their risk 
                                                 
934
 See, e.g., Moody's MMF Rating Methodology supra note 573 at 3. Moody’s money market 
fund rating methodology states that “The same methodology applies to both constant and variable NAV 
funds, both in the US and Europe, as long as both fund types pursue the primary objectives of the 
preservation of principal and providing liquidity on demand”. See also Fitch MMF Rating Criteria supra 
note 573 at 1. Fitch states that its rating criteria reflect its “views on assigning ratings to constant net asset 
value and variable net asset value money market funds globally”. Fitch also points to its rating criteria for 
‘AAmmf’ and ‘Ammf’ rated funds that are expected to have particular relevance in the context of the 
harmonised pan‐European definitions of money market funds.  
935
 See, e.g., Standard & Poor's Fund Ratings Criteria  (The McGrew-Hills Companies  2007) at 
16. Standard & Poor’s requests at least 30 pieces of information from a money market fund for an initial 
rating assignment including the most recent prospectus, statement of additional information, annual 
report, a copy of the fund’s investment policy, and copies of material agreements with third parties, to 
mention just a few. See also Detailed Guidance on the Application of Moody’s Money Market Fund 
Rating Methodology  (Moody's Investors Service  25 August 2011) at 8. Moody’s analysts meet with the 
money market fund’s asset management company on annual basis to review the portfolio strategies in the 
coming year, to discuss trends in the markets, and any other factors potentially affecting the fund 
management. See also Fitch MMF Rating Criteria supra note 573 at 13. Fitch states that as a part of in the 
rating maintenance process it “performs periodic site visits, and meets with senior managers responsible 
for portfolio management, credit analysis, risk management, operations.” In addition, Fitch may request 
“access to senior management as events may warrant, and on an as‐needed basis may request meetings 
with relevant external parties, such as fund boards of directors, accountants, or legal counsel”.  
936
 Sections 3.3.3.5 and 4.3.4 supra discuss disclosure requirements applied to money market 
funds in the US and Europe, respectively. 
937
 See, e.g., Worldwide Confidentiality, Conflicts of Interest and Securities Trading Policy  
(Fitch Ratings  1 October 2011) at 5. Fitch confidentiality policy states that it “shall not reveal any third 
party inside information to anyone, except those employees, consultants and agents of Fitch needing such 
information in connection with Fitch products”. 
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profiles, no empirical evidence has been found of credit rating agencies achieving this end. Quite 
the opposite, an academic study taking a cross-section of money market fund risks conducted 
post-crisis revealed that the presence of a fund rating has been of little use in predicting the risk 
of money market fund portfolios.938 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of a distribution of ratings assigned 
to money market funds. For example, a review of 269 money market fund ratings assigned by 
Moody’s to the US and European funds as of May 2011 revealed that all but two ratings are 
triple-A.939 Fitch and Standard & Poor’s money market fund ratings are likewise largely 
concentrated within the triple-A rating category.940 Furthermore, despite the differences in credit 
rating agencies’ views related to the risk factors in money market funds discussed in section 3.4, 
to the extent a fund applied for ratings with two or three agencies, these agencies assign the 
same-level ratings.941 Different credit rating agencies tend not to give different ratings to the 
same money market funds.942     
These observations are hardly the evidence of credit rating agencies providing 
idiosyncratic information regarding the fund risk profiles. Such homogeneity of credit opinions 
not only across funds rated by the same agency, but across all three major agencies could be 
viewed as a strong statement of confidence that nearly all funds are approximately equal and are 
of the highest abilities to achieve the preservation of principal and providing liquidity.943 Yet, it 
can be argued that the uniform highest ratings to these funds are of little use for investors since 
                                                 
938
 MCCABE,   supra note 210 at 33. According to the study, a triple-A rating was a weak 
indication of cash outflows during the run in 2008 or exposure to distressed paper during the ABCP crisis. 
Thus, credit agencies’ ratings failed to differentiate money market funds on the basis of their risk profiles 
and, in addition, had little in any predictive power of the future negative outcomes. 
939
 Moody's Money Market Fund Ratings, Based on New Rating Methodology  (Moody's 
Investors Service  21 May 2011). Available at http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Money-Market-
Fund-Ratings-Based-on-New-Rating-Methodology--PBC_133314.  
940
 All but two ratings on the list of 89 public ratings assigned by Fitch to the US and European 
money market funds as of October 2011 were triple-A ratings. Available at http://www.fitchratings.com/ 
jsp/sector/Sector.faces?selectedTab=Issuers&Ne=11+4293330944+4294965802&N=4293330818+42949
65741+416.    
941
 Id. These ratings are normally triple-A ratings. 
942
 This observation is as of September 2011 and is based on my review of money market rating 
lists available on credit rating agencies’ web-sites www.fitchratings.com, www.moodys.com and 
www.standardandpoors.com, respectively. 
943
 See generally Credit rating agencies’ methodologies supra note 573 for money market fund 
rating definitions at a respective rating agency.  
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they do not provide sufficient fund differentiation.944 Furthermore, differences across national 
capital markets, corporate structure, fund governance, to mention just a few aspects, are assigned 
no weights in credit rating agency analysis.945 Instead, certain assumptions are made with respect 
to specific legal contracts, e.g., Standard and Poor’s assumes, for the purposes of money market 
fund rating analysis, that European repurchase agreement contracts backed by investment grade 
quality sovereign securities are equivalent to those contracts originated in the US and backed by 
the US government securities.946 Obviously, this is a quite crude interpretation that ignores 
multiple risks entailed by the differences in the market infrastructure.  
Understandably, this and other similar assumptions are conventions put in place for the 
purposes of achieving a broad comparability of the US and European money market funds solely 
on the basis of portfolio investments. Nonetheless, contractual and structural market differences 
result in uncertainties which are significant sources of portfolio risks. It is obvious that a 
complete disregard of these factors lessens the value of the rating analysis. Indeed, despite 
homogenous ratings – over 95 per cent are triple-A – money market funds have exhibited 
varying degrees of susceptibility to credit events during the financial crisis. Frequency and size 
of fund bailouts of the US money market funds by their institutional sponsors underscore the fact 
that some money market funds do incur more risk than others.947   
                                                 
944
 Differentiation among peers was cited by money market funds as one of the motivating factors 
when the funds apply for a rating. See section 3.4 supra. 
945
 Credit rating agencies’ methodologies supra note 573. 
946
 S&P MMF Rating Methodology supra note 573 at paragraph 117. The assumption 
significantly underestimate the legal and structural differences of the repurchase agreement markets in the 
US and Europe. Specifically, the US money market funds settle all trades via a third party repo settlement 
banks, which mitigates the settlement risk, while the majority of the repo trades in Europe is conducted 
bi-laterally. The US money market funds haircuts the collateral in addition to marking it to market, while 
European money market funds do not assign haircuts to the collateral.  Lastly, the US contracts are 
covered under the US Bankruptcy Code, while European money market funds’ repo contracts could be 
under a number of national laws thus increasing legal uncertainties. For a detailed description of the 
infrastructure of the US repurchase agreement market see Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure 
Report  supra note 264. For a description of the infrastructure of the European repurchase agreement 
market see European repo market survey Number 21 - conducted June 2011  (International Capital 
Market Association  September 2011). Available at http://www.icmagroup.org/ICMAGroup/files/02/ 
023c9f4c-062f-4750-a6f8-167514ab3497.pdf. 
947
 See no-action letters filed to the US Securities and Exchange Commission by money market 
fund affiliates purchasing impaired securities from money market fund portfolios. Available at Division of 
Investment Management Staff No-Action and Interpretive Letters Affiliated Transactions — Money 
Market Fund Letters, US Securities and Exchange Commission (27 October 2011), at 
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To sum up, while the agencies have all necessary information to grade the funds 
according to their risk profiles, they have come short of achieving this end. Instead, generic 
rating opinions are normally issued attesting the funds’ ability to perform their essential 
functions.948 I attribute the failure on the part of credit rating agencies to diagnose incremental 
differences in fund risk profiles to two factors. First, credit rating agencies’ methodologies are 
geared mainly towards controlling credit, marker and liquidity risks in individual funds through a 
uniform set of investment restrictions and place little weight on other portfolio management 
aspects that could alter the fund’s risk and return profile.949 Second, money market fund rating 
criteria tend to discount the lack of homogeneity in the national markets, e.g., rating agencies 
operate under an implicit assumption that the market for Euro bonds is just as active and liquid 
as the market for US dollar bonds.950     
This thesis found that changes in fund yield, the primary indicator of the fund’s risk 
taking, do not matter to money market fund ratings and do not translate in the rating differential, 
i.e., the highest and the lowest yielding funds are rated at the same rating level.951 Despite a 
significant yield spread between the US and European money market funds, ratings on all funds 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/im-noaction.shtml#affiliatedtrans_mm. Nonetheless, some 
commentators noted that while there were 36 US money market funds that received financial support at 
the height of the crisis in the fall of 2008, these funds accounted for only five per cent of all US money 
market funds; hence 95 per cent of the funds were managed to adequately perform their essential 
functions during the worse crisis since the Great Depression. See JOHN D.  HAWKE JR., Supplemental 
Comment of  Federated Investors, Inc. in Response to Comment of  The Squam Lake Group; the PWG's 
Report on Money Market Fund Reform SEC Rel. No. IC-29497 (Arnold & Porter LLP  24 February 
2011) at 3. 
948
 See sections 3.4 and 4.4 supra. 
949
 Credit rating agencies’ methodologies supra note 573. Although in the latest version of its 
rating criteria that came into effect in May 2011, Moody’s has included considerations of shareholder 
concentration, i.e., assessment of the liabilities of money market funds, not only their assets.  
950
 Of course, this is widely untrue. For a comparison of trading activities of the US and European 
government bond markets see, e.g., ROBERT GROSSMAN & MARTIN HANSEN, U.S. Treasuries Expected 
to Remain Global Benchmark  (Fitch Ratings 27 July 2011). For example, the size of the US government 
securities market (appr. $12 trillion) exceeds the largest European market (France, $1.9 trillion) six-fold. 
The difference in the market size leads to differences in trading activities and the overall market liquidity. 
951
 See, e.g., MARCIN KACPERCZYK & PHILIPP SCHNABL, Implicit Guarantees and Risk Taking: 
Evidence from Money Market Funds, NBER Working Paper No. 17321 (August 2011) at 20. The authors 
found that starting in August 2007 money market instruments become significantly riskier, which allowed 
more scope in funds’ risk-taking choices. It could be argued that with a change in riskiness of the 
portfolio investments, the fund ratings should have been reviewed to reflect an incremental increase of 
risk in some funds overweighed in such risky investments. Nonetheless, it did not happen.  
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are the same highest triple-A ratings.952 Given this evidence of a lack of discrimination among 
money market funds as well as among different national markets on the part of rating agencies it 
is hardly surprising that these ratings are mainly used for the purposes of regulatory compliance 
and seldom as an input in the investment decision making process.953 As shown in this section, 
notwithstanding the appeal of uniform standards, money market fund rating criteria developed by 
credit rating agencies could not substitute for a regulatory framework and oversight due to 
observable lack of discrimination of fund risk profiles.                          
5.4 Conclusion 
The comparative analysis of the US and the European money market funds regulation 
conducted in this chapter revealed that despite their functional similarities and shared rationale, 
the US and Europe present two regulatory models that differ in several significant respects from 
one another. The main difference arises from the deep fragmentation of the European money 
market fund landscape leading to a more complex industry structure. A two-tier structure is 
complemented by differences of regulatory culture and investment and saving attitudes at the 
national level as well as by differences in the interpretation of the European Union rules relating 
to money market funds.  
The US and the European money market funds regulation departures extend over so wide 
a range of factors that they are unlikely to wither away without significant alterations of the 
industry structure on the either side of the Atlantic. Given the uniform regulatory focus on 
managing the product side, the major points of discord relate to establishing harmonised 
prudential rules that are workable in a given national market. The challenge arises from the 
diversity of the national capital markets, in which such rules, especially if imported from other 
more established money market fund jurisdictions, may either be not practical and thus 
unworkable or fail to achieve the goal of limiting portfolio risks. 
                                                 
952
 E.g., in October 2011, while the top-yielding US money market fund were gaining 0.21 per 
cent per annum, the top-yielding European money market funds operating in US dollars, Euro and Pound 
Starling delivered 0.33 per cent, 1.26 per cent and 0.87 per cent per annum, respectively Source: 
iMoneyNet. Available at Offshore Money Market Funds, iMoneyNet.  (28 October 2011), at 
http://www.imoneynet.com/offshore-money-funds/index.aspx. 
953
 Chapter 3.4 supra.  
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Another significant point of divergence between the US and European regulatory 
approaches to money market funds relates to information transparency. As explained in section 
1.2, the theoretical roots of the US securities laws in the neoclassical economic theory are 
traceable in the regulatory approach to money market funds with its emphasis on the information 
symmetry. Good disclosure is viewed as an important mechanism of investor education and a 
tool that empowers investors to make rational investment decisions. This comes in contrast to the 
European approach to money market funds, which emphasises the product homogeneity as a 
primary mechanism of investor protection. While a consideration is given to a certain level of 
disclosure, the transparency mechanism is not envisioned as the central piece of the money 
market fund regulation in Europe.          
The analysis identified a non-governmental actor – the IMMFA, a professional trade 
association – which contributed to the development of the European money market fund 
regulation. The IMMFA is also mostly focused on limiting idiosyncratic fund risks by 
establishing additional prudential rules and other requirements largely imported from the US 
securities market regulation. Because the IMMFA’s primary focus is on promoting a particular 
type of money market funds, namely the IMMFA funds, the recommendations offered under its 
auspices are geared towards promoting this product notwithstanding other regulatory concerns.   
Lastly, a review of the methodologies of the credit rating agencies for money market fund 
ratings, which claim a global comparability of the rating analysis, revealed that the 
harmonisation of the rating approach was achieved on the basis of crude assumptions which 
disregard the contractual and structural differences of the national capital markers. As a result, all 
three major international credit rating agencies arrived at a uniform conclusion of the highest 
triple-A quality of nearly every money market fund that applied for a rating. Having examined 
existing regulatory practices with respect to money market funds operating in the US and 
Europe, in the next chapter I present my normative proposals that seek to answer the research 




CHAPTER 6: NEW REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE FOR MONEY 
MARKET FUNDS 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 illustrated that the state of the money market fund industry and its 
regulation in a particular jurisdiction depend on multiple factors spanning the nature of the 
national capital markets, investor demand and the rationale behind regulation. As demonstrated 
in chapter 3, the structure of the US money market funds was shaped by investor demand for 
alternative ways to manage cash assets away from banks. While initially this demand was driven 
by the yield differential, later, with an increase of the cash assets, diversification and specialised 
liquidity management has become the primary motivator for money market fund investments. 
Chapter 4 depicted a striking diversity of the European money market fund landscape and 
reflected differences in the relative importance of the money market sector from one country to 
another. The differences and similarities of the regulatory approaches affecting money market 
funds in the US and the EU were assessed and analysed in chapter 5.  
Chapter 6 seeks to answer the research question of this thesis – how should money market 
funds be regulated? – by offering the normative proposals that reconcile the dual regulatory goal 
of investor protection and systemic stability.954 I contend that currently the implementation of 
measures to support investor protection and systemic stability presents shortcomings – and often 
paradoxes – in different jurisdictions. For example, in EU countries valuation recommendations 
for money market securities in UCITS that are based on amortised cost valuation result in 
decreasing rather than increasing share price transparency for investors.955 Thus the investors’ 
purchase price could overestimate the market value of the fund’s assets causing the investor loss. 
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 See section 1.1.3 supra that purports that both the US and the European regulatory models 
ought to feature investor protection and systemic stability as their primary goals.  
955
 See section 4.3.1 supra. The current guidelines concerning valuation of money market 
securities in UCITS do not require marking such securities to market provided they are scheduled to 
mature within three months. Assets of short-term money market funds are not required to be marked to 
market. These recommendations are rooted in a long-standing assumption that market prices of high 
quality securities with short periods remaining until maturity exhibit low volatility and generally 
approximate amortised cost. In a volatile market environment, which tends to persist in the present, 
market price fluctuations for portfolio assets may cause the fund’s net asset value per share being over or 
under stated. See also Eligible Assets Guidelines supra note 744 at 8. 
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Furthermore, if the investors are unsure about the true market value of the fund’s assets, it may 
create a run on a fund, which on a bigger scale could lead to a manifestation of systemic risk. 
This thesis detected another paradox in the implementation of systemic stability-inspired 
measures. As chapter 4 demonstrated, the post-crisis emphasis on the harmonisation of the 
European money market funds through consolidation of a diversified universe of money market 
funds operating across different national markets in prescribed strategies may lead to heightened 
systemic risk.956  
On the other side of the Atlantic, the US money market fund regulation has benefited 
from the deep commitment to the principles of disclosure in the federal securities law. Moreover, 
as reported in section 3.3.1, the strength of the US money market funds is rooted in the overall 
regulatory framework covering other US investment management companies that includes 
oversight of funds, safekeeping of fund assets, restrictions on leverage, prohibition of affiliated 
transactions as well as asset valuation transparency. Despite the strength of the foundation tested 
through the multiple economic cycles, the US regulators believe that “additional money market 
fund reforms are necessary”.957 The current US regulatory focus on more money market fund 
reforms is, however, facing opposition from all other industry stakeholders – investors, including 
their political representatives in Congress, issuers and asset managers.958 These parties do not 
share the view of the on-going money market funds riskiness, but rather believe that the US 
money market funds continue to provide a safe investment product.959 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 evaluates the dual regulatory goal 
outlined in section 1.1.3 – investor protection and preservation of systemic stability – as it 
applies to regulation of money market funds in the US and the EU. The normative proposals 
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 A number of academic studies have suggested that lack of harmonisation, implying the 
possibility that different jurisdictions make different decisions, introduces benefits of risk diversification, 
thereby limiting the overall society’s exposure to risk. See, e.g., ALESSANDRA ARCURI & GIUSEPPE 
DARI-MATTIACCI, Centralization versus Decentralization as a Risk-Return Trade-Off, 53 Journal of Law 
and Economics 359 (2010)    
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 SCHAPIRO, (2011) supra note 31. 
958
 See comment letters to the PWG's Report supra note 7. Available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/4-619/4-619.shtml.  
959
 Senate Letter to SEC Chairperson Mary Schapiro (United States Senate  15 November 2011). 
The letter from the US Senate warns of additional regulatory action towards money market funds such as 
imposing bank-like capital buffers, which are likely to force the industry consolidation and, ironically, 
lead to the “too big to fail” risk.   
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presented in section 6.3 outlines specific policy steps aimed to promote each regulatory goal in 
the US, the EU and at the level of national regulation. Section 6.4 reviews the quasi-regulatory 
standards administered by non-governmental actors with respect to the attainment of these two 
goals. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter commenting on the role and problems of the 
international regulatory regime in the money market fund sector. 
6.2 Dual regulatory goal of money market fund regulation in the US and the EU  
6.2.1 Investor protection 
As pointed out in section 1.2, the investor protection-based measures in application to 
money market funds have resulted in a two-pronged regulatory approach currently shared on 
both sides of the Atlantic, albeit with different degrees of emphasis. First, both the US and the 
European regulatory schemes feature a set of prudential rules related to limiting idiosyncratic 
risks in money market funds. These rules seek to promote conservative investment practices 
thereby facilitating low-risk investment products for investors. Second, a comprehensive 
transparency regime that enhances the investors’ ability to make informed investment decisions 
and enables regulators to monitor activities in the liquidity markets has emerged as another 
cornerstone of money market fund regulation, particularly in the US.       
My analysis of the existing money market fund regulatory models in chapter 5 
highlighted a number of controversies and inconsistencies with the dual regulatory goal of 
investor protection and systemic stability. Indeed, it was pointed out in this thesis that technical 
rules related to money market fund investments upon which the current regulatory models are 
based, while providing guidance for building a conservative portfolio, may increase systemic 
vulnerabilities of the overall capital markets and add to the fragility of those firms borrowing 
from money market funds.960 Notwithstanding its shortcomings, such an approach is most 
commonly used in financial product regulation as it is practical. 
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 Section 3.5 supra. See also GORDON,   supra note 216 at 3. Gorton states that “...by shortening 
maturities [of money market funds’ investments] the SEC proposal will increase rather reduce the 
fragility of these markets because it makes it easier for MMFs to “run” at a time of financial distress”. 
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Nonetheless, given the role of money market funds as financial intermediaries – as 
identified in section 2.3 – which is somewhat similar to the intermediating function of banks, the 
introduction of prudential rules would be entirely defensible provided that accumulation of risk 
could be monitored and corrected if warranted.961 This thesis approaches the issue of market 
integration and development of uniform investment standards applied cross-border with a fair 
amount of scepticism.962 Because of the existing heterogeneity among the types of European 
money market funds, the recent introduction of a harmonised common definition for these funds 
has been a contentious process. From the standpoint of the European national markets, their 
regulators and local investors, the necessity to change investment strategies solely to conform to 
the new definition adds little value and could prove impractical.  
There are three reasons for this view. The primary concern with respect to the one-size-
fits-all standardisation relates to the potential reduction in consumer choices in countries lacking 
the depth and diversity of those markets where the investments standards had originated. Second, 
the lower disintermediation of European national capital markets, where borrowers generally 
exhibit greater dependence on bank credit facilities than the public market, may not be able to 
maintain the issuance in particular credit and maturity segments to meet money market funds 
demand under the new rules.963 The third reason relates to the difference in investment 
preferences of local money market fund investors: while the US money market funds are 
marketed as a close substitute for cash forfeiting yield for safety and liquidity, investors in 
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 Sections 1.3.4 and 1.3.5 supra discuss academic literature and other sources related to 
overlapping functions of banks and money market funds and unique issues raised by these funds under 
banking laws.   
962
 Prudential rules that set money market funds apart from other mutual funds were first 
promulgated in the US in the early 1980s. See section 3.3.2 supra. The same rules then formed a basis for 
credit rating agencies criteria for rating money market funds and were later imported to Europe to form a 
foundation for managing US-style European money market funds. See sections 3.4 and 4.4 supra. 
However, this thesis also found that money market funds in the Continental Europe have historically 
placed less reliance on generic investment limitations, but adhered to asset management policies deemed 
consistent with a low risk investment option. See section 4.2.1 supra. 
963
 Supra note 666. For example, issuance of commercial paper in Spain has historically been 
focused on 18-month maturities. The new harmonised European money market fund standards call for 
limiting maturities of fixed-rate securities to 13 months. See also GERARD HERTIG & RUBEN LEE, Four 
Predictions About the Future of EU Securities Regulation, 3 JCLS 359 (2003) at 8. The article asserted 
that national regulators, German in particular, resisted liberalisation of the financial services sector, which 
could penalise the German financial centre.   
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Continental Europe emphasise the role of money market funds as low risk investment option and 
expect yield tracking short-term interest rates.964  
Thus, prudential rules originated in the US and appropriate for the US money market 
funds could be impractical for funds in other markets. To further explain this point, because the 
bank-like function of money market funds as the place to park cash and to outsource liquidity 
management is de-emphasised in Continental Europe, in particular, I contend that risk-limiting 
rules initially envisioned for the US money market funds are not an appropriate investor 
protection tool for the use in every other market. Instead, such ill-fitted rules may interfere with 
the accepted investment products, reduce consumer choice and negatively affect the structure of 
the national capital markets.965 Furthermore, given the mutual recognition principles for 
collective investment schemes under the UCITS framework, the harmonised common definition 
for European money market funds will cause further fund concentration in fewer countries that 
have already established themselves as fund administration centres with the likely consequences 
that some national markets will see their money market sector shrinking.966 
With respect to the role of information disclosure, the analysis of the existing regulatory 
framework of mutual funds in the US in section 3.3.1.2 (applicable to all mutual funds) and 
section 3.3.3.4 (specific to money market funds) found that a comprehensive disclosure regime is 
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 Section 4.2.1 supra. This distinction is particular important during the current economic cycle 
of exceptionally low policy rates, i.e., interest rates set by monetary authorities in respective countries. 
Market rates such as LIBOR or EONIA could be substantially higher reflecting market expectations 
regarding ability of financial institutions fund themselves at these rates. Therefore, investors in money 
market funds tracking market indexes would require higher yield relative those money market funds 
focused on stability of principal and daily liquidity.    
965
 This outcome has became apparent after one of my conversations with a representative of the 
Institutional Money Market Fund Association, who related me a story of internal debates surrounding the 
consultation period with respect to a common definition of European money market funds in 2009. Before 
vetoing a common definition, a few national regulators expressed concerns whether the existing money 
market funds would continue to qualify as money market funds under the new definition. National 
regulators simply could not come back home and announce to local investors that their holdings of money 
market funds are no longer money market funds. 
966
 Ireland and Luxembourg command the largest market shares of the money market fund 
industry by domicile. Irish national law has historically supported the operational structure typical for the 
US-style money market funds, while Luxembourg accommodated both the US-style and the Continental 
money market funds. Under a common definition of European money market funds all Member States are 
expected to accept a two-tier industry structure. See section 4.2.1 (historical background of European 
money market funds and the size of the industry by country) and section 4.3.4 (a common definition of 
European money market funds) supra.   
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placed at the core of the investor protection measures. In the context of this thesis the meaning of 
comprehensive disclosure, which I labelled as good disclosure, goes well beyond of the 
boilerplate language of the funds’ offering documents, generally found to be “lengthy, legalistic 
and confusing”, which could be appropriately labelled as bad disclosure.967 The essence of the 
good disclosure regime applicable to money market funds is in public availability of portfolio 
holding information and in complete transparency of the fund’s share pricing mechanism.  
Good disclosure not only benefits fund investors, who are now empowered to curb asset 
managers’ risk appetite, but also enables other industry stakeholders, including regulators, to 
monitor portfolio management activities. In turn, asset managers have become more cognisant to 
the broader effect of their investment actions from the standpoint of investor perception.968 
Furthermore, given the view that the US money market funds are among the most sophisticated 
investors in the short-term capital markets, their investment preferences are analysed as forward-
looking indicators of credit risk, which could indicate early signs of a funding stress for a 
particular issuer, better than credit default swaps spreads and market-implied pricing.969 The 
importance of this aspect for other prudential regulators and systemic risk regulators is further 
explained in section 6.2.2 infra.  
The second ingredient of a good disclosure regime, in addition to the full transparency of 
portfolio holdings, relates to transparency of portfolio pricing mechanism. Section 3.3.3.3 
described the pricing mechanism utilised by the US money market funds to maintain constant net 
asset value per share, which has been a point of contention since the concept was introduced in 
the early 1980s through the present.970 Nonetheless, its convenience and operational efficiency 
has been prized by investors on numerous occasions.971 As illustrated in section 3.3.3.4, asset 
                                                 
967 Andrew J. Donohue, Director of the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of 
Investment Management noted that “many investors often find current fund prospectuses to be lengthy, 
legalistic and confusing...” See SEC Improves Disclosure for Mutual Fund Investors, US Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  (19 November 2008), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-275.htm.  
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 Section 3.3.3.4 supra. 
969
 See, e.g., ROBERT GROSSMAN, et al., CDS Spreads and Default Risk: A Leading Indicator?  
(Fitch Ratings 12 May 2011) at 1. Grossman, et al. found that credit default swap spreads are only a week 
indicator of a future default. 
970
 Section 3.2 supra.  
971
 The origination of the stable net asset value concept is described in section 3.2.1 supra. 
Section 3.3.2 supra relates the legislative history of Rule 2a-7 that establishes conditions under which the 
US money market funds may maintain a stable net asset value per share. The current regulatory debate 
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valuation in the US money market funds under the existing regulatory regime is transparent to 
investors – assets are valued twice: at amortised cost (daily) and at their market value (normally, 
weekly) – with both prices disclosed to investors.972  
An analysis of the freely accessible analytical coverage of the US money market fund 
investment activities illustrates a sharp increase in availability of such information since the good 
disclosure regime was put in place.973 Investors preferences formed on the basis of good 
disclosure have caused changes in money market fund portfolio compositions (e.g., reduction of 
investment risks as illustrated by decrease in allocations to European banks in the summer of 
2011). These changes are illustrative of the impact of disclosure on the behaviour of both fund 
managers curbing in unwarranted risks and fund shareholders exhibiting a higher level of 
engagement with their investments – the outcome consistent with the goal of investor protection.   
Against this backdrop, portfolio analytics for European money market funds remains 
unavailable due to the limited scope of disclosure requirements for these funds.974 As illustrated 
                                                                                                                                                             
related to whether to permit the US money market funds to continue to price their shares at a stable net 
asset value is analysed in section 3.5 supra. Section 4.2.1 supra reported on the use of the stable net asset 
value concept by certain European money market funds. For letters from investors advocating usefulness 
of the stable net asset value concept see supra note 357. See also SCHAPIRO, (2011) supra note 31. Mary 
Schapiro, the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s chairwoman acknowledged that “a stable net 
asset value product that has met many of [investors’] needs”.        
972
 17 CFR § 270.30b1-7 Monthly disclosures are available with a 60-day lag through the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s maintained database of public filings.   
973
 Since the web-site disclosure requirements came into effect in October 2011, a number of 
private vendors have developed money market fund-specific portfolio analytics services, e.g., 
www.cranedata.com, www.imoneynet.com. Bloomberg has developed its own analytics based on 
portfolio holding information disclosed by eight largest US money market funds, see RADI KHASAWNEH 
& ALBERTO FUERTES, U.S. Prime Money-Market Funds Pull $8 Billion From Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg 
11 November 2011. Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-11/blackrock-among-u-s-
money-market-funds-cutting-deutsche-bank-investments.html. In addition, rating agencies and asset 
managers have been covering trends in money market fund portfolio composition, e.g., a series of money 
market fund portfolio holdings reports published by Fitch Ratings supra note 110 and ROBERT CALLAGY 
& DANIEL SERRAO, Money Market Funds Navigate Risks From Europe’s Credit Concerns  (Moody's 
Investors Service / Special Comment  13 July 2011) Available at www.moodys.com. See also SYLVAIN 
BROYER, et al., US money market funds: shifts in funding for French and European banks  (Natixis / 
Special report  15 November 2011). Available at http://cib.natixis.com/DocReader/index.aspx?d= 
784F482F682B466554547A2B586756523763637646513D3D.     
974
 European money market funds’ disclosure framework is built upon the UCITS Directive (for 
those USITS-authorised money market funds) and governed applicable national laws. A common 
definition of European money market funds contains few references to information disclosure. See 
sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.4 supra. See also exhibit 12 supra for comparison of the US and European money 
market fund regulation.    
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by exhibit 12 in section 5.2, none of the valuable elements of good disclosure is available to the 
investment public under the European regulatory framework for money market funds. The latest 
enhancement to the UCITS transparency regime in a form of KIID is expected to be of only 
marginal utility for money market fund investors.975 The reluctance of European regulators to 
adopt more open information channels between investment public and asset managers could be 
attributed to a number of factors including the industry capture, national protectionism and 
bureaucratic inertia. Moreover, as noted in section 4.3.4, the recently implemented CESR’s 
Guidelines for European money market finds attempted to adopt the US prudential framework 
omitting the disclosure requirements thus eliminating a powerful investor protection tool.976 The 
normative proposals in section 6.3 seeks to remedy this deficiency.               
6.2.2 Systemic stability  
This section conducts an examination of the existing money market fund regulation from 
the standpoint of reduction of systemic risk – what is deemed in this thesis to be the other 
essential public policy objective related to money market funds. The aspect of systemic stability 
has only entered the realm of money market funds in the fall of 2008 when a failure the Reserve 
Primary Fund, one of the largest US money market funds ignited a wide-spread liquidity 
squeeze.977 The post-mortem of this event has produced a vast literature that tries to empirically 
document inter-linkages of money market funds and other parts of capital markets.978 It is 
important to note that while referencing money market funds generically, other academic studies 
are focused almost exclusively on the US prime money market funds, i.e., those money market 
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 KIID is envisioned as a document providing investors with essential information in a concise 
format, but not meant to serve as venues for detailed portfolio analytics. See, e.g., UCITS Disclosure 
Testing Research Report. Prepared for European Commission By IFF Research and YouGov  (June 2009)    
976
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. 
977
 See, e.g., TARA SIEGEL BERNARD, Money Market Funds Enter a World of Risk, The New 
York Times 17 September 2008. See also section 2.4 supra.  
978
 See section 1.3.5 supra referencing just a few of such studies. See also Guidance to Assess the 
Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations—
Background Paper. Report to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors  (International 
Monetary Fund / Bank for International Settlements / Financial Stability Board October 2009) at 21. The 
report erroneously points to a run on the entire money market mutual fund industry of $3.5 trillion, when, 
in fact, government money market fund experienced significant inflows resulting from prime money 
market funds’ outflow. The total assets under management of money market funds remained largely 
unchanged.     
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funds that invest in corporate securities, maintain constant net asset value per share and 
governed by Rule 2a-7.979 
Other categories of money market funds such as those investing in government securities 
or located in other countries seem to be of little concerns for academic researches.980 This lack of 
distinction could be attributed to the size of the US prime money market fund segment, which 
approached its all-times high of $2.2 trillion in September 2008, dwarfing other segments of the 
money market fund industry.981 In addition to the size of the industry, the other most important 
factor arguing for the systemic importance of the US prime money market funds relates to their 
track record.982 Because the US money market funds almost never lose money, “...consumers 
developed unrealistic expectations about money market funds...” and such expectations per se 
could result in a run should any concern about safety of these fund surface.983 If indeed such a 
run materialises, an instantaneous demand for sizable liquidity could not be met by the market, 
but only by a government intervention.984 Therefore, the developing views on supervision of 
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 See, e.g., Global Financial Stability Report. Chapter 1: Overcoming Political Risks and Crisis 
Legacies  (International Monetary Fund  September 2011) at 24. The report states that given their sizable 
holdings of European bank papers, the US money market funds are a potential transmission channel of the 
European sovereign debt crisis. See also section 2.2 supra contains a detailed explanation of all money 
market fund categories. 
980
 Section 1.3.6 supra provides an overview of those limited studies of money market funds 
operating in international markets.   
981
 Since then, the US prime money market fund sector has contracted to almost a half of its peak 
size and currently does not exceed assets under management of European money market funds. Source: 
www.ici.org. See also exhibit 3 supra for the current size of each segment of the US and European money 
market funds. Given the asset decay from the sector exacerbated by regulatory uncertainty created by 
expectations of the future structural reforms of the US money market funds analysed in section 3.5, the 
sheer size is unlikely, in my opinion, to cause systemic implications in the future. Importantly, the US 
money market funds do not incur leverage; therefore the size of the industry is easily trackable. See 
exhibit 1 supra for an illustration of money market fund structure. 
982
 See also section 3.2 supra outlining the performance track record of the US money market 
funds.   
983
 See, e.g., RICHARD A. BOOTH, Things Happen, 55 VILL. L. REV. 57 (2009) at 8: “...no fund 
could afford to break the buck. [Because] the illusion of absolute safety would be shattered and depositors 
would make a run on the fund”.   
984
 A substantial body of finance and economic research exists showing that if potential buyers of 
assets are financially constrained, the price of such assets in fire-sale liquidation may fall below their 
fundamental value and be determined by the available liquidity. Such available liquidity, in turn, depends 
on pledgeability of the assets to the ‘lender of the last resort’. See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. 
VISHNY, Liquidation Value and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 Journal of Finance 
1343,  (1992) See also a seminal work related to liquidity risk DOUGLAS W. DIAMOND & PHILIP H. 
DYBVIG, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 Journal of Political Economy 401 (1983). The 
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systemically important non-banking institutions may, under certain scenarios, include the largest 
US prime money market funds under its guidelines.985   
European money market funds, especially those domiciled in Continental Europe are 
unlikely to trigger systemic stability-related concerns based on their moderate size and an 
investment objective that does not purport cash-like assets. Indeed, as illustrated by a discussion 
in section 2.4, the role of risk transmitters in the global financial crisis is exclusively attributed to 
the US prime money market funds. Furthermore, according to the analysis presented in section 
4.2, European money market funds domiciled in different counties have historically been 
targeted to different investor bases and utilise diverse investment strategies. The existing 
diversity, while presenting an obstacle for crafting uniform regulatory guidelines, serves as a 
substantial mitigant to the accumulation of systemic risk.986 Given this discussion, a question 
arises whether prudential rules imposed on European money market funds under the banners of 
investor protection could lead to the unintended consequences of systemic risk accumulation.987   
To conclude, this section underscores two paradoxes in the existing regulatory models for 
money market funds in the US and the EU. First, there is a discord of the underlying theories and 
                                                                                                                                                             
authors studied contracts that can prevent bank runs and showed that under certain circumstances 
government provision of deposit insurance can produce a superior contract.        
985
 The Dodd-Frank Act Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173 Title I – Financial Stability, Subtitle A – 
Financial Stability Oversight Council. The Financial Stability Oversight Council, the US systemic risk 
regulator created by the Dodd-Frank Act was charged with a responsibility to ensure that all financial 
companies, not just banks, whose failure could pose a threat to the financial stability of the US, will be 
subject to stronger oversight. See 12 CFR § 1310 RIN 4030-AA00 Authority To Require Supervision and 
Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies  (Financial Stability Oversight Council) The notice 
of the proposed rulemaking was published on 11 October 2011. Such companies would include the 
largest, most interconnected and highly-leveraged companies and under the recently proposed rule, those 
US money market fund with assets under management exceeding $50 billion may, potentially, be 
presumed as systemically important and come under additional supervision of the Board of Governors. 
See, e.g., H. RODGIN COHEN, Designation of Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies 
Under Dodd-Frank, The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.  
(3 November 2011), at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/11/03/designation-of-systemically-
important-nonbank-financial-companies-under-dodd-frank/.   
986
 See ROMANO,   supra note 114. 
987
 The recent financial crises highlighted the dangers inherited in providing a regulatory license 
in favour of a particular strategy. See section 2.4 supra explaining that when one of the largest US money 
market funds experienced a run, investors in other money market funds pulled out their holdings. It could 
be envisioned that two processes inspired by a common definition of European money market funds: 
increased concentration of funds in a few countries and increased concentration of fund investments in 




the implemented policy measures with respect to both investor protection and systemic stability. 
Section 1.2 showed that, in line with the principles of neoclassical and behavioural economics, 
good disclosure and a set of thoughtful prudential rules could provide adequate investor 
protection. In fact, the extent to which transparency requirements are implemented in the 
European money market fund regulation is inadequate to provide consumers with the substantive 
information to make an investment decision and monitor investment risks. Instead, the EU 
regulation is focused on crafting harmonised investment rules that are most likely to reduce 
consumer choices in the European national markets.      
The second paradox relates to the systemic stability concerns. While the US money 
market funds could be viewed as transmitters of funding risk through the capital markets, 
European money market funds per se are unlikely to trigger systemic instability due to their 
limited size and diversity of investment policy.988 Remarkably, however, the recently introduced 
CESR’s Guidelines promote specific investment strategies thus adversely affecting existing 
investment diversity, which is one of the important factors limiting systemic risk.989 
Comprehensive proposals for the money market fund industry’s normative future presented in 
the following section ventures to resolve these paradoxes. It also seeks to address the systematic 
monitoring of the emerging risks not only in order to minimise the systemic stability threat of a 
money market fund failure, but, more importantly, to prevent accumulation of risks that the 
industry is yet to face.      
6.3 Normative proposals 
This section presents the new regulatory architecture arguing that despite the 
jurisdictional divide of the US and European money market funds examined in section 5.2, the 
regulatory goals of investor protection and systemic stability ought to be upheld equally on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Underscoring the challenge, exhibit 13 identified the substantial asymmetry 
in how these goals are currently understood by regulators in the US and the EU. These normative 
proposals purport to project a common international view of money market funds from the 
standpoint of the dual regulatory goal established in section 1.1.3 and further elaborated in the 
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 See section 2.4 supra for the role of money market funds in the financial crisis. See also 
section 4.2 supra explaining diversity of European money market funds.  
989
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. 
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above.990 Thus, the proposals emphasise the common feature of money market funds, i.e., their 
function as financial intermediaries and revolves around improving investor education and 
understanding of the funds’ investments and operations. On the other hand, these proposals de-
emphasise regulatory interventions dictating the fund investment strategies on the grounds that 
an international response that is focused on approving particular fund investments could not only 
be impractical and unworkable in different national markets, but also introduce greater systemic 
risk.  
6.3.1 Good disclosure for investor protection and systemic stability  
As discussed earlier in this thesis, the federal securities law in the US and the UCITS 
framework in Europe provide a strong foundation for establishing a comprehensive good 
disclosure regime as a coordinated public policy response to the development of money market 
funds internationally.991 Furthermore, as reported in section 3.3.3.4, a good disclosure regime 
targeting specifically the US money market funds has already been implemented and inspired a 
growing body of academic research, professional studies and media reports.992 In Europe, 
however, the UCITS Directive is mainly focused on regulating cross-border marketing of 
collective investment schemes under the stated goal of investor protection with only a tangential 
attention to disclosure.  
Good disclosure process is aimed at removing impediments to, and perfecting the 
mechanism of a free and open market, which benefit both investors and regulators. To achieve 
the said benefits, information about money market fund activities must be accurate, concise and 
                                                 
990
 There could be counter-arguments to such an approach as these funds often serve different 
purposes for their end-users depending on the fund domiciliation. The US money market funds are used 
mainly as a cash/liquidity management vehicle and an alternative to bank deposits. The secular rise of 
institutional cash pools created a need for cash management outside the banking system as there are not 
enough banks to spread out the volume of institutional cash. For example, in 2010 the size of institutional 
cash pools is estimated at $3.4 trillion, of which the US money market funds are a part. See POZSAR, 
(2011) supra note 154 at 10. European money market funds, depending on their types, serve different 
purposes. While short-term money market funds that are substantially similar to the US money market 
funds are used as cash/liquidity management vehicles outside the US, money market funds, mainly 
domiciled in the Continental Europe, are used as a low-risk investment option, but still not comparable to 
bank deposits. For the historical background of this dichotomy see sections 3.2 and 4.2 supra reporting on 
the origin and evolution of money market funds in the US and Europe, respectively.         
991
 Sections 3.3.1 and 4.3.1 supra.  
992
 Supra note 565. 
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specific to the decision making process and include both, the funds’ assets and liabilities. On the 
asset side, good disclosure ought to provide the full description of portfolio holdings and their 
market pricing for all collective investment schemes that market themselves as money market 
funds.993 On the liability side, the list of the largest fund investors must be made available to the 
public. Moreover, the informational aspect constitutes only the first pillar of the good disclosure 
regime. Its second pillar is a central depositary of such information accessible to the public for 
free.        
These policy steps towards good disclosure would align the response with the underlying 
theory outlined in section 1.1.3 coming in contrast to the principal focus of the recently 
established European regulatory framework on the direct money market fund regulation through 
prescribing specific investment standards. As shown in this thesis, this approach was imported 
from the US through the cross-border diffusion of substantially similar funds and not without the 
help of international credit rating agencies.994 These historical developments could be 
responsible for a distortion of the perceptions on where the emphasis of the pan-European and 
national supervisory efforts should be placed and supervisory resources devoted.  
Re-focusing regulatory efforts on implementing good disclosure by European money 
market funds offers a mechanism with which both central regulatory goals – investor protection 
and systemic stability – are achieved. It also removes the asymmetry of the current money 
market fund supervision regimes in the US and Europe. It equips investors and regulators with 
the information they need to assess money market fund risks both in terms of risks to investors 
and funding risks to fund borrowers. A centralised collection of portfolio holding data would 
enhance fund monitoring and provide a foundation for active supervision of idiosyncratic fund 
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 The full description of a holding includes its individual identification number assigned by the 
the Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (CUSIP) or its equivalent, the name of the 
issuer, the purchase date, the settlement price, identification of various structural attributes such put or 
call features, fix or floating rate, reference index, coupon, maturity date, additional credit or liquidity 
enhancements, availability of collateral and any other details that may affect investors’ decision to 
purchase such an asset.   
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 See section 4.2 supra describing historical origin of European money market funds and section 
4.4 supra for contribution of credit rating agencies in developing product-specific regulatory approach to 
these funds. As explained earlier, regulation of the US money market fund has been built on the 




risks and an analysis of cross-exposure to other market players, i.e., accumulation of systemic 
risks.995  
The national supervisors’ power to collect fund information should be strengthened by 
defining applicable reporting standards for all money market funds regardless of domicile and by 
establishing practices necessary to support the close monitoring of compliance by fund 
managers. This could be done by amending the recently implemented Level III guidelines996 of a 
common definition of European money market funds administered by the European Securities 
and Market Authority.997 The amendment process based on sound regulatory principles – a 
bottom-up approach, open consultation, impact analysis, early and thorough participation of 
market professionals – must also insure participation of all groups of stakeholder and, in 
particular, money market fund investors themselves.  
Broad investor participation is paramount to combat the evident industry capture which 
was manifested in the comments submitted to the consultation paper on a common definition of 
European money market funds: the comments exclusively represented national regulators, asset 
management associations and asset managers themselves, while not a single investor 
participated.998 A resolution of the technical complexity related to collection of the large volumes 
of data could greatly benefit from a similar process that is underway for European listed 
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 Despite a seemingly insurmountable task of processing the holding-level data for all money 
market funds, given the current level of technological development and data standardisation, this could be 
achieved in a quite reasonable time and with minimal costs. For example, portfolio analytics for the US 
prime money market funds with current assets under management of $1.4 trillion becomes available via 
private vendors generally within five to seven business days after such information appears on the funds’ 
public web-sites as required under the US money market fund regulation. Based on my experience, 
generally two or three employees are involved with collecting and processing portfolio information at 
organisations offering such services.    
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 Level III guidelines are meant to assist national regulators in consistent and equivalent 
transposition of pan-European legislation. See Initial report of the Committee of Wise Men on the 
regulation of the European securities markets  (The Committee of Wise Men under Chairman Alexandre 
Lamfalussy 9 November 2000). 
997
 CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. The guidelines came into effect in July 2011. See also 
section 4.3.4 supra. 
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 Amongst 28 comments submitted to the Committee of European Securities Regulators in 
response to a consultation paper on a common definition of European money market funds published in 
October 2009, there was a notable absence of comments from money market fund investors. See 




companies.999 A consultation process for developing the pan-European access to financial 
information on listed companies yielded positive responses to the proposal from virtually all 
market constituents from investors to issuers to market infrastructure companies.1000 
Lastly, the structure of the consultation process must ensure that active industry 
participation would not promote its self-interest and would not introduce a solution that is sub-
optimal from the standpoint of investor protection.  To avoid such industry capture, regulators 
should develop a process of placing a lower weight to those comments representing asset 
managers and higher weight to the opinion of end-users of money market funds as well as 
independent parties such as academia. From the standpoint of cost-allocation for regulators 
themselves, the responsibility for the monitoring of the industry’s risks could be functionally 
allocated between national supervisors (responsible manly for micro-prudential aspects) and pan-
European supervisors (responsible manly for macro-prudential aspects).1001   
The second pillar of the comprehensive good disclosure regime, that is, the creation of a 
central depository of money market fund information, could draw on an example of the EDGAR 
system established and maintained by the US Securities and Exchange Commission.1002 A 
central depositary under the auspices of the pan-European securities market regulator (European 
Securities and Markets Authorities) is necessary not only to confront a probable industry capture 
and political capture of the securities market supervisor at the domestic level, but more 
importantly, to maintain a uniform reporting structure and a public access mechanism. These two 
steps – information collection and dissemination – achieve both, a micro-prudential goal of 
monitoring fund investment activities and a macro-prudential goal of tracing cross-border 
exposure and interconnectedness of financial intermediaries.  
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 Development of Pan-European Access to Financial Information Disclosed by Listed 
Companies (Committee of European Securities Regulators / Consultation Paper July 2010) 
1000
 Consultation on the Development of Pan-European Access to Financial Information 
Disclosed by Listed Companies (24 September 2010), at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/index.php?page=responses&id=174. 
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 Given that the money market fund industry inspired both general public and research interest, 
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organisations such as the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund as well as financial 
media and academia. The greater available research in this field would, in turn, inform investor actions 
and policy decisions.    
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Placing good disclosure in the focus of the money market fund normative future, I would 
like to pre-empt concerns that are often raised on the basis of the perceived lack of analytical 
skills to process detailed information by even the most sophisticated investors. Section 3.2.2 
addresses these concerns describing the regime of enhanced information disclosure for the US 
money market funds, which itself prompted development of needed skills as more data became 
available.1003 A. A. Sommer, Jr., the Commissioner of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, aptly observed:  
...the disclosure philosophy [is] having its roots deep in American history and ideology: 
the belief that the "common man" had an innate wisdom, a natural capacity for the 
absorption of knowledge, an inborn facility for sound judgment if only he had the facts. 
This is reflected in many of our popular sayings; for instance, "let people know and the 
truth shall make them free." It is reflected in our commitment to education and the 
assumption, now perhaps discredited, that everyone has the capacity for the fullness of a 
classical education. This ideology has its origins, of course, in Rousseau and many 
others.1004 
It is a responsibility of securities regulators to ensure that investors have the information 
they need to make informed decisions. Whether investors do actually use it or not will be a 
matter of a continuing debate, but what is irrefutable is the fact that mandatory disclosure 
“leverages market discipline as a means of accountability that obviates the need for more 
substantive government regulation of securities-related activities”.1005  
The normative proposals presented in this chapter envisage empowering investors 
through a good disclosure regime that includes a fully transparent asset pricing and portfolio 
valuation mechanism. As discussed earlier in this thesis, the current state of the money market 
fund industry is characterised by lack of consistency in asset valuation.1006 “Two European 
money market funds with identical portfolios but domiciled in different member states might 
have different net asset values per share as a result of the valuation method established in each 
                                                 
1003
 Supra note 565. 
1004
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money market funds) and section 4.3.1 (for European money market funds). 
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jurisdiction”.1007 For example, France prohibits portfolio asset valuation based on amortised cost 
– a permissible valuation method under Directive 2007/16/EC.1008  
Inconsistencies of asset valuation and share price calculations amongst the Member 
States and, more broadly, between the US and European money market funds have so far 
disadvantaged fund investors from a standpoint of the risk and reward relationship.1009 Thus, my 
normative proposals include a recommendation to improve transparency of asset pricing and 
consistency in administering portfolio valuation methods. Investors ought to know the price of 
their investments, which behoves the funds to conduct market valuation of all portfolio assets. 
Money market funds may continue to offer constant net asset value per share using any of the 
share price volatility stabilising techniques discussed in section 3.3.3.3, while informing 
investors as to where the “true” market price is. This step is not only consistent with the 
underlying philosophy of disclosure, but offers an advantage of expanding consumer choices.1010 
These proposals intend to resolve a highly contentious debate as to the merits of constant 
net asset value money market funds and their susceptibility to runs versus variable net asset 
value funds.1011 The available sources discussed and cited through this thesis offered no certainty 
as to whether a particular accounting method makes the fund a riskier vehicle, while there are 
believers on both sides. It is certain instead that differences “evolved in the various markets due 
to a variety of factors, including local market perceptions and tolerances around risk, investor 
preferences for income or capital gains due to differing rates of taxation, operational simplicity 
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and accounting regulation”.1012 Therefore, a solution to this debate offered in my proposals allow 
for both types of funds as long as the pricing mechanism is explained and the ‘true’ market price 
is disclosed.1013           
6.3.2 Financial product regulation – specific risk-limiting standards  
The first part of this section presented a good disclosure regime as the primary means of 
investor protection. Nonetheless, academic sources argue that even the best disclosure may not 
be entirely sufficient to forestall a market failure and protect investors.1014 In the domain of 
money market fund regulation, risk-limiting standards, whether administered by governmental or 
non-governmental actors such as credit rating agencies, have served as an important mechanism 
of investor protection. As evident especially in Europe, the debates over investor protection in 
money market fund regulation are still focused almost exclusively on the funds’ investment 
parameters, but not on the requirements for fund information transparency.1015  
I argue that, notwithstanding its apparent practicality, product regulation in a form of 
establishing specific investment rules could only achieve its goal of investor protection when a 
well-developed market infrastructure is available. Moreover, transposing such rules into other 
markets with a different infrastructure may not be possible and will, at the end, be 
counterproductive to investor protection. Not surprisingly, the process of arriving at common 
investment standards for the diverse universe of European money market funds has been 
contentious due to the divergent infrastructure of the national markets and regulatory regimes.1016 
Indeed, the transposition of the CESR’s Guidelines into national laws was met with a degree of 
scepticism from national regulators exactly on the grounds of investor protection.1017  
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Furthermore, as demonstrated in the discussion in section 4.5, pan-European product-
specific standards that are aimed at containing idiosyncratic fund risks for funds could 
potentially be responsible for at least two counterproductive developments. First, rules that are 
hoarding the naturally diverse money market funds into a specific investment strategy could be 
responsible for greater risk accumulation. Second, uniform rules could disadvantage those 
national markets lacking issuance of such regulatory ‘approved’ securities. Quite obviously, 
these developments would lead to increased systemic stability concerns.  
Harmonised investment standards could also be harmful from the standpoint of investor 
protection as limiting consumer choice. Therefore, regulation of money market funds on the pan-
European level should avoid dictating specific investments. Rather, it should focus on defining 
the appropriate risk level that these funds can undertake relative to a pre-specific short-term 
market benchmark. I argue that the European investors would be better served under this 
approach as an option that preserves the natural diversity of investment strategies. Under this 
approach, good disclosure would be an essential tool for both investors and regulators to analyse 
the funds’ investments, to make educated decisions and to conduct fund supervision as well as to 
monitor market interconnectedness. Thus, even in the absence of uniform product rules, the dual 
goal of investor protection and systemic stability could be achieved. 
As reported in section 3.5, additional reforms to the US money market industry structure 
are currently considered by various US regulatory bodies.1018 According to the industry research, 
the continuing regulatory debate around money market funds has been driven mostly by the need 
to deliver a political statement rather than any objectively stated concerns.1019 The proposals 
presented in this chapter assume the business status quo for the US money market fund, which 
are legitimate cash management vehicles providing much needed services outside the banking 
                                                                                                                                                             
territory citing systemic stability concerns and their untested nature in France. See AMF's Procedures for 
implementing new classifications for MMFs supra note 822. For the opposite view, see CESR Press 
release 19 May 2010 supra note 187. The press release stated that “[t]he guidelines aim to improve 
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market fund”.    
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system.1020 The position maintained in this thesis is that the additional structural reforms for the 
US money market funds discussed in section 3.5 are unnecessary. Furthermore, the alternative of 
subjecting money market funds to bank-like regulation (i.e., establishing capital buffers) is 
regarded as counterproductive, as it would arguable reduce consumer choice and expose 
investors to greater systemic risk due to concentration of the money market funds within a fewer 
asset managers. 
To conclude, the blueprint of the international money market fund regulation ought to 
focus on good disclosure as the primary measure of investor protection. Good disclosure also 
addresses systemic stability concerns by empowering regulators to monitor distribution of 
funding risk in the global capital markets through money market fund investments. The 
presented proposals do not purport to do away with the rules limiting investment risks for money 
market funds in particular markets. Thus, for example, it endorses the rules that the US market 
adopted relating to the requirements of its domestic funds. However, the diversity of European 
money market funds could be impaired leading to systemic risk accumulation should harmonised 
investment standards be enforced across the EU. For example, for certain markets lacking 
issuance of high quality securities, an objective of stability of principal could be unachievable.                   
6.4 The non-role of non-governmental actors 
This thesis considers two types of non-governmental actors affecting the behaviour of 
money market funds: credit rating agencies and professional trade associations.1021 As reported 
in section 4.2, the evolution of European money market funds was, in a large part, affected by 
the development of their US peers; moreover, the current regulatory views on European money 
market funds was shaped by the diffusion of the US money market fund regulatory practices 
internationally. Section 4.4 followed the mechanics of this process and described the quasi-
regulatory nature of credit rating agencies’ methodologies as a critical link. Indeed, all three 
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major international credit rating agencies that currently assign ratings to money market funds do 
so on the basis of rating methodology that are claimed to be applied ‘globally’.1022 
Professional trade associations, on the other hand, have historically played only a limited 
role in money market fund regulation, but served as consulting and organisational venues for the 
industry regulatory lobby efforts.1023 The Institutional Money Market Fund Association has been 
a notable exception pioneering risk limiting standards for European money market funds, given 
lack of government-administered regulation.1024 It is worth noting that the IMMFA’s Code of 
Practice did not lose its significance after the recent implementation of the pan-European 
definition of money market funds, but continues to fill the regulatory gap for those funds 
considering the common definition guidelines and the overall UCITS framework falling short of 
providing sufficient investor protection.1025             
The normative proposals presented in this chapter do not reserve a particular role for non-
governmental actors given their lack of enforcement powers. Yet, both credit rating agencies and 
asset management trade associations are expected to continue to play valuable roles in at least 
two respects: stirring the industry behaviour in a desirable way through means of developing 
voluntary principles and providing investor education. As shown earlier in this thesis, the 
Institutional Money Market Fund Association uses its Code of Practice to require better 
information disclosure from the IMMFA’s funds well above and beyond of what has become the 
norm under the pan-European definition of money market funds.1026 It is likely that the 
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Association will continue to pioneer self-regulatory developments, which will be tested on a 
limited universe of funds and will later become enshrined in the government-administered 
regulation, the process that has already taken place with respect to fund information 
disclosure.1027    
 The value adding proposition for credit rating agencies can be found in their core focus 
on serving investors “beyond the rating through independent and prospective credit opinions, 
research and data”.1028 Even in the realm of good disclosure, when ample information is 
available, individual investors may find it too complex for their comprehension.1029 Thus, the 
role of rating agencies is envisaged in bridging the gap in analytical skills and making sense of 
the ocean of disclosed data for a financial layman. The information value of the credit ratings for 
money market funds may, nevertheless, diminish in the future against the backdrop of 
availability of data supplied by the funds themselves under an obligation policed by the 
government regulator.  
Furthermore, given a limited ability of rating differentiation on the basis of current rating 
criteria discussed in sections 3.4 and 4.4, investors’ interest in credit ratings per se could also 
decline if no longer supported by statutory or voluntary rating requirements for approved 
investments in charters of institutional investors.1030 Credit rating agencies could improve their 
credibility with investors by reviewing their market assumptions and providing better risk 
differentiation among money market funds. Better risk differentiation could emerge from 
rejecting a long-standing practice of deriving money market fund ratings from fundamental 
credit ratings for individual portfolio securities. Because fundamental credit ratings are a lagging 
indication of liquidity risks, money market fund ratings are inevitably lag negative portfolio 
developments.1031 Lastly, if the current focus on the standardisation of rating methodologies were 
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to prevail, the value of the information provided by the analysis of money market funds would 
inevitably decrease as diversity of analytical opinions could be missing.  
I conclude that credit rating agencies could not realistically become the anchoring point 
for money market fund-specific regulation since the dual regulatory goal is not achievable on the 
basis of credit ratings alone. Nonetheless, credit rating agencies, as well as professional trade 
associations, can play a useful role of investor educator.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The regulatory architecture I propose for money market funds on both sides of the 
Atlantic introduced a good disclosure regime as the primary measure to achieve the dual 
regulatory goal of investor protection and systemic stability despite jurisdictional divides and 
structural differences in the respective capital market. Good disclosure includes full transparency 
of the fund portfolio assets and their market prices as well as their largest investors, freely 
accessible to the public via a central depository of money market fund data. Good disclosure is 
conducive to preservation of systemic stability by enabling regulators to track market 
interconnectedness and distribution of funding risk. The information regarding money market 
fund investors provides an insight into those entities that manage cash outside the conventional 
banking system. Thus, the risk of investor run could be monitored, measured, controlled and pre-
empted thereby limiting market failures. 
 A good disclosure system benefits the money market fund industry indirectly in at least 
three significant ways. First, it empowers investors to make educated decisions and encourages 
prudent investment behaviour on the parts of the asset managers. Second, it provides regulators 
with a monitoring mechanism to follow funding linkages in the global capital markets. Third, it 
offers academia an invaluable source of financial data that could be studied and used to further 
inform the market stakeholders and regulators. It was noted that good disclosure has been largely 
implemented in the US with an exception of disclosure of the fund’s investors. In the EU, a good 
disclosure regime is yet to be established.   
In addition, the money market fund data storage recommended in this thesis could be 
accompanied by several ‘collateral’ advantages, especially for the European markets, that are 
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outside the scope of this thesis, but nonetheless worth mentioning. First, it provides a practical 
example of cooperation and information sharing, a critical link of building a single market in 
Europe. Second, ample disclosure would render European money market funds more attractive 
due to better information availability. Lastly, good disclosure per se could amount to a first 
significant step towards a truly ‘global’ regulatory model capable of being extended to other 
jurisdictions that were left beyond the scope of this thesis. Agreeing on good disclosure practices 
can potentially pave the way for the normative and supervisory practices’ integration that are 
currently lacking in money market fund regulation. 
On the other hand, traditional product regulation in money market funds by a means of 
establishing risk-limiting standards, while considered useful, is de-emphasised under these 
proposals. Sections 3.5 and 4.5 revealed significant limitations of this regulatory approach on 
both sides on the Atlantic. Limitations include unanticipated side effects on the market upon the 
rule changes, lack of available investment alternatives under the overly prescriptive rules, 
reduction in product diversification and, ultimately, reduction in consumer choices. Most 
importantly, an international approach to money market fund regulation would be unachievable 
if it relied exclusively on product regulation due to significant differences in the market 
infrastructure between the US and the EU as well as within the European national markets.              
Lastly, this thesis considers the role of non-governmental actors and any self-regulatory 
measures that can be developed under their auspices as insufficient to meet the dual regulatory 
goal of investor protection and systemic stability. This conclusion is based on a review of 
contributions of credit rating agencies and the Institutional Money Market Fund Association in 
developing, promoting, monitoring and enforcing practices consistent with the established 
regulatory objectives. It was established that, with respect to credit rating agencies, the value of 
credit ratings as an investor protection tool is diminished by a lack of risk differentiation among 
money market funds, which mainly receive the highest triple-A rating. With respect to the 
Institutional Money Market Fund Association, which caters to the US-style money market funds 
in Europe, its limited focus prevents a broader adoption of the industry-developed Code of 
Practice. Thus, any measure focused on investor protection and systemic stability in the realm of 
money market fund regulation ought to be a part of government-administered regulation to 
ensure proper supervision and enforcement.  
257 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION        
7.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter reports on the four contributions to knowledge that the thesis 
sought to achieve.1032 The first contribution relates to the categorisation of money market funds, 
establishing their essential functions and detailing the role of these funds in the financial crisis as 
well as in the European sovereign debt crisis. Indeed, as pointed out in chapter 1, academic 
sources are rather undeveloped with regard to the categorisation of money market funds 
especially on the international scale. A fast growing body of academic research in relation to 
these funds is conducted on the erroneous assumption of their categorical and functional 
isomorphism. Chapter 2 addressed this issue by identifying the categories of money market funds 
and analysing the related variances in funds’ riskiness. Section 7.2 below summarises these 
findings.  
The second contribution concerns the regulatory framework of money market funds. 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed top-down analysis of a comprehensive regulatory scheme under the 
federal securities laws applied to the US money market funds, while chapter 4 studies the 
European Community rules governing activities of money market funds operating in Europe. In 
addition, both chapters consider the effect of non-governmental actors on the international 
development of the money market fund industry that contributed to the diffusion of the US law 
to European counties. The third contribution relates to a comparative analysis of the US and 
European regulatory systems in the context of money market funds, which was presented in 
chapter 5. A summary of the analysis and comparison of the US and EU regulation are presented 
in infra section 7.3.   
Section 7.4 provides my response to the research question: “how should money market 
funds be regulated?”. The response first establishes that there are two overarching goals in 
money market fund regulation: investor protection and systemic stability. It consequently argues 
that these two goals could be achieved through a comprehensive good disclosure. 
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7.2 Money market fund categories, their essential functions and risks 
Section 1.1.1 of chapter 1 defined the subject of my research and established the generic 
structure of a money market fund as a simple pool of investors’ cash invested in a diversified 
portfolio of high quality short-term securities. Investors acquire ownership interests in the 
portfolio, participate in the pool’s profit, share losses and expenses and can sell their share of 
ownership back to the fund at any time. Money market funds are seen as the least risky 
investment option available to investors in a given market owning it to the high quality and short 
duration of portfolio securities.  
As pointed out in section 1.3, although money market fund types are many and more can 
be found especially in different countries not covered in this thesis, academic studies tend to 
focus on one particular type of the US money market funds, so-called prime funds. The findings 
they present and the policies they suggest are extrapolated from these narrowed studies that 
blatantly overlook the variances occurring in the funds’ risk profiles. Chapter 2 fills this gap in 
the understanding and appreciation of the variability of the international money market funds 
landscape by presenting their essential characteristics as well as establishing a detailed 
categorisation of the money market fund universe in multiple dimensions. Exhibit 3 in section 
2.2 illustrated the significance of each money market fund category through their size of assets 
under management. While US money market funds dominate the landscape with approximately 
$2.6 billion in assets, European funds still represent a substantial part of this market just shy of 
$1.5 billion.1033       
Chapter 2 established that the geographic location dictates not only the regulation 
affecting the funds and the portfolio’s base currency, but also the funds’ operational and 
accounting practices and the funds’ investment preferences. It was also established that the 
funds’ shareholder base has a significant impact on the fund risk profile with funds offered to 
retail investors being less susceptible to a run as illustrated by an analysis of the cash flows in 
and out of different types of funds during the tumultuous period of the fall of 2008. Most 
importantly, it was shown that money market funds incur in a different degree of risks depending 
on the nature of their investments. Prime money market funds investing in short-term securities 
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issued by corporate entities assume substantial credit risk, while funds investing in government 
or municipal securities are less likely to face losses stemming from credit quality deterioration of 
the portfolio assets. 
Finally, this thesis categorises money market funds on the basis of their asset valuation 
practices. There were two types of funds established: those funds selling and repurchasing their 
shares at a constant net asset value and those funds with variable net asset value per share. It was 
also established that seemingly inconsequential details of accounting methods have a profound 
effect on the acceptance of funds by various groups of investors even though the overall 
economic experience of investing in either type of funds is substantially similar.1034 For example, 
the US institutional investors have an overwhelming preference for constant net asset value 
money market funds.1035 Thus, abrupt regulatory changes affecting the money market fund 
industry structure and, in particular, its accounting methodology as the ones contemplated by the 
Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets “Money Market Fund Reform 
Options” are likely to jeopardise the viability of the US money market funds.1036              
Chapter 2 further established that in the space of 40 years, when the first money market 
fund was launched in the US, these funds have become an essential part of the global capital 
markets. A sample of the recent academic studies (presented in section 1.3.5) dedicated to 
financial intermediaries acting outside traditional banking system dubbed as ‘shadow banks’ 
included money market funds as investors in ‘shadow banks’. These studies were often 
conducted with the implicit assumption of a somewhat illicit nature of ‘shadow banks’ activities 
aimed solely at avoiding banks’ regulatory tenets (and costs). Nonetheless, section 2.3 reports 
legitimate reasons for cash management outside the regulated banking system through money 
market funds. First, at the initial stages of their developments, money market funds provided 
returns superior to those of regulated banks in the countries where interest rates on bank deposits 
were subject to a cap.1037 
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Since then the interest rate ceiling on bank deposits was lifted, yet the appeal of money 
market funds as a safe and convenient cash management option remained intact and multiplied 
by the wide socio-economic gains resulting from money market fund activities. Moreover, a 
growing body of the post-crisis analysis of the traditional banking system warns of eroding 
effectiveness of an official safety net for banks and deposits that explains the rise of money 
market funds amongst other institutional cash pools.1038  Thus, my second contribution adds to 
this literature assessing the role of money market funds as key intermediaries facilitating the 
global flow of capital (in section 2.3) and analysing their risk transmitting role in both the 
financial crisis and the European sovereign credit crisis of 2011 (in section 2.4). 
Section 2.3 reported that money market funds enabled development of the short-term 
capital market expanding a choice of funding opportunities for various issuers. Serving as 
intermediaries between investors and issuers, money market funds channelled investments from 
cash-rich households to cash-strapped businesses and governmental entities, including municipal 
authorities and sovereign states.1039 The danger, however, is that if money market funds cease to 
function because of cash withdrawals by investors, these markets would freeze leaving the 
borrowers without sources of funding. This has happened in the fall of 2008 leaving a deep 
trauma on the short-term markets from which they are yet to recover.1040 Money market funds’ 
role in the financial crisis and the European sovereign debt debacle described in section 2.4 
earned these funds an ill-fated association with systemic risk.   
Thus, one of the two goals that according to this thesis the regulation of money market 
funds ought to achieve is systemic stability. To be clear, whether money market funds cause 
systemic risk remains debatable in the academic literature and in industry sources.1041 
Nonetheless, the role of money market funds in transmitting systemic risk has been established 
(in section 2.4) and, therefore, policy steps are considered on both continents to address it. These 
steps include: (1) the structural reform of the US money market funds in line with the proposals 
outlined in the President’s Working Group report and additional options;1042 and (2) Regulation 
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of European money market funds as “shadow banks” as per recommendations published by the 
Financial Stability Board.1043 Unintended consequences of these regulatory efforts are also 
critically analysed in chapters 3 and 4 related to the US and European money market funds, 
respectively. 
7.3 Money market funds in the US and the EU – comparative analysis 
The third contribution of my research is an original comparative analysis of money 
market fund regulatory models in the US and the EU. This analysis specifically focuses on the 
efficiency of both models with respect to the attainment of the dual regulatory mandate 
established in section 1.1.3, namely investor protection and systemic stability. In order to do so, I 
study the development of money market funds on both sides of the Atlantic, including 
contributions of non-governmental actors, and related regulatory processes in the respective 
jurisdictions. Chapter 3 was focused on the US money market funds and chapter 4 followed these 
funds in the EU. Both chapters 3 and 4 are similarly structured to facilitate the comparative 
analysis presented in chapter 5. 
In particular, chapter 3 provides an analysis of the US money market fund regulation as a 
part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme under the federal securities law put in place after the 
Great Depression, as subsequently amended. Under this scheme, measures relating to investor 
protection are rooted in the philosophy of disclosure, which, in case of money market funds, is 
operationalised through ultimate transparency of portfolio information – referred to as good 
disclosure in this thesis. Chapter 3 also demonstrates that specific policy steps inspired by 
stability concerns are more difficult to be agreed on, despite multiple regulatory reform options 
and academic proposals, as their very rationale for such measures, namely whether money 
market funds are systemically risky, is still being debated (see infra). 
Chapter 4 presents European money market funds from multiple dimensions. The 
empirical study of these funds as set up in different countries shows that the diversity of 
European money market funds is rooted in the historical developments of the respective 
countries’ financial markets. Moreover, law and regulation have played a key role in the 
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development and acceptance of these funds. Still, the research shows that not every state has 
developed targeted money market fund regulation at the national level.     
At the EU level, a definition and regulation of money market funds were put in place as 
recently as July 2011. Until then, it was noted, non-state actors – credit rating agencies and 
professional trade associations – filled the gap by developing their own bodies of rules 
concerning activities of money market funds, which were voluntarily adopted by the industry. 
This thesis points out two general tendencies in the development of rules by non-state actors that 
shaped the European money market fund industry: (1) use of the industry best practices as a basis 
for subsequent regulatory development; (2) introduction of stricter regulation imported from 
other jurisdictions. For example, European subsidiaries of the US asset management companies 
introduced the US-style money market funds to meet the demand for cross-border cash 
management services from multinational corporations and, despite European domiciliation of 
these funds, they continued to conform to the rules mandated for the US money market funds in 
the absence of domestic regulation. 
Thus, this thesis provides an appraisal of the dynamics of the development of the law 
concerning money market funds by explaining how money market funds were developed in the 
US and Europe and how these funds were offered to investors and traded in the initial absence of 
regulation. Another remark (presented in chapter 3) relates to the unintended consequences of 
regulation, namely, to the very stimulation of the avoidance of legal rules. Much of the research 
conducted in this thesis revolves around the circular relationship between law and financial 
markets development. Therefore, chapter 3 traced the legislative history of Rule 2a-7, which 
governs activities of the US money market funds. It its initial draft published in 1983 was 
informed by the existing best industry practices and was subsequently amended a number of 
times to strengthen fund regulation following the significant market events until the latest 2010 
amendments were implemented as the regulatory response to the events of the fall of 2008. 
Likewise, chapter 4 analyses the work process on the publication of a common definition 
of European money market funds by, first, tracing national-level definitions, albeit only found in 
a limited number of states; second, reporting on multiple proprietary definitions utilised by 
various regulatory agencies for their purposes; and, third, commenting on the consultation 
process with the industry stakeholders. The chapter points to the heterogeneity of European 
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capital markets as well as the investors’ cultural preferences and local investment traditions as 
the main reasons for the diversified landscape of the European money market fund industry. It 
should be noted that while the publication of a harmonised definition was portrayed as an 
investor protection-motivated step, the need for such a definition should be attributed to the 
general drive for harmonisation of financial services regulation in the European Union, but not to 
the genuine investor need.       
Indeed, this thesis points out that in the field of asset management the concept of 
harmonisation, more often than not, is in conflict with the basic concept of investment 
diversification. Specifically to the subject of this research, harmonisation of money market fund 
investment strategies may work counterproductively to the principle of investor protection by 
reducing diversification options and consumer choices. Moreover, given that the common 
definition guidelines were in many ways imported from the much broader and more liquid US 
short-term market, some of the smaller European capital markets may not be able to support the 
investment requirements of the harmonised money market funds. Thus, inter alia, chapter 4 
pointed out the limitations of the harmonised definition for European money market funds to 
guide and redress their regulation. 
Finally, chapter 5 presents a comparative analysis of money market fund regulation on 
both sides of the Atlantic vis-à-vis my theory of a dual regulatory goal - investor protection and 
systemic stability. It was established that despite functional similarities of the US and European 
regulatory models and their shared goals, the differences are significant. The major point of 
discordance relates to the development of investment standards workable in both the US and the 
EU markets. This is hardly achievable given their significant differences. In effect, it was shown 
in this thesis (in section 4.5) that when such uniform investment standards are sought and 
implemented, they may lead to a reduction in consumer choices and diversification options thus 
weakening investor protection and leading to a potential accumulation of systemic risk thus 
defeating the established regulatory goals.  
This thesis further contributes to the development of a comparative view on the US and 
European regulatory approaches to money market funds regulation by pointing out the most 
significant departure related to information transparency. As explained in section 1.2, the 
theoretical foundation of the US securities regulation is deeply rooted in the seasoned culture of 
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disclosure. Consistent with this culture, the rules governing the activities of the US money 
market funds create a substantially enhanced disclosure regime – referred in this thesis as good 
disclosure – so that everyone, from investors to regulators, can better monitor the risk 
characteristics of these funds. Moreover, the US Securities and Exchange Commission called for 
building a database of money market fund information making it available to the public, albeit of 
a delayed basis.1044  
Again, the strong focus on disclosure as well as the Commission’s activities to ensure a 
broad access to this information for the investment public is based on the underlying theory that 
informed investors could impose a discipline on fund managers to avoid taking undue risks. 
Thus, the good disclosure regime for the US money market funds is found entirely consistent 
with a dual regulatory goal of investor protection and systemic stability. This is in contrast to the 
regulation of European money market funds, which emphasises development of the harmonised 
prudential rules, while de-emphasising transparency above and beyond prospectus regulation and 
fairly generic KIIDs for those UCITS-authorised investment schemes. As pointed out earlier in 
this section, the prudential rules may or may not achieve the investor protection goal, while lack 
of good disclosure clearly impedes investors’ ability to monitor fund risks.        
In a way, de-emphasising good disclosure and not participating in facilitating investors’ 
access to fund information, regulatory actions seem to work to protect the asset managers, not 
the investors. Thus, the contemporary money market fund regulatory framework in the EU that 
features harmonised prudential rules as its cornerstone is unlikely to achieve the stated goal of 
investor protection, while also working counterproductively in terms of systemic stability 
concerns. The problems and paradoxes identified in analytical chapters 3 and 4 and in 
comparative analysis in chapter 5 are further elaborated in the next section that provides my 
answer to the research question.     
Lastly, this thesis contributes to the comparative study by considering the role of the non-
governmental actors – credit rating agencies and professional trade organisations – in the 
development and regulation of money market funds, a subject not so far covered in the academic 
literature. The analysis of the criteria for money market funds utilised by the credit rating 
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agencies revealed that while credit rating agencies indeed attempt to measure risks in the US and 
European funds with the same benchmark, seeking a global comparability, such comparability is 
achieved on the basis of a crude assumption of homogeneity of international capital markets and 
their infrastructure.1045 The lack of discrimination on the basis of the national market 
infrastructure undermines the ability of credit rating agencies to capture idiosyncratic risks. This 
leads to rating analysis to be overly generic, concentrated in triple-A ratings and, therefore, 
unsuitable to be considered an essential tool for improving investor protection or systemic 
stability.1046 
Professional trade organisations, another type of non-governmental actors, were 
identified mainly as aiming to investor education and the lobbying venues of the industry on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Nonetheless, they contributed to informing the regulatory debate by 
summarising the best industry practices and providing a link between legislators and the 
industry. This with an exception of the Institutional Money Market Fund Association, which 
developed its Code of Practices to guide investment activities of European money market funds 
in the absence of regulation targeting these funds. The study of the role of the Association 
contributes to the broader research on the development of money market fund regulation and the 
role of non-governmental actors. The study found that while de jure the Code of Practice has no 
power, de facto it establishes an additional level of self-imposed regulation on those European 
money market funds voluntarily adopting the Code. 
The study found that the initial version of the Code of Practice was informed largely by 
the investment practices of the US money market funds and credit rating agencies’ criteria. Thus 
in the absence of money market fund-targeted regulation in Europe, the Code of Practice served 
as the only regulatory guidance for these funds. The Code was motivated by concerns for 
investor protection and is mainly centred on a set of standards aimed at limiting idiosyncratic 
fund risks. However, bridging a wide disclosure gap between the US and European money 
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 Ironically, only the US and European money market funds are approached on the basis of 
global criteria. Money market funds operating in other continents are mainly rated on the basis of so-
called national scale and rating criteria. 
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 It should be mentioned that credit ratings do not seek to achieve investor protection, but rather 
provide an input in the overall investor decision making process in a form of their rating opinion. See 
rating definitions on respective rating agency web-sites, e.g., www.fitchrating.com, www.moodys.com 
and www.standardandpoors.com.   
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market fund regulatory models, albeit partially, the Code calls to disclose a number of useful 
items above and beyond of what is required under the pan-European definition of money market 
funds and the UCITS Directive.   
A somewhat enhanced disclosure regime and more restrictive investment standards for 
the IMMFA’s funds are advocated by the members of the Association themselves as a measure 
aimed at additional investor protection in European money market funds. This demonstrates the 
industry’s self-interest in additional guideposts promoting investor confidence. The study 
nonetheless identified at least two aspects that are likely to weaken the effectiveness of the Code 
for the European money market fund industry: (1) lack of enforcement power of the Association 
and (2) its limited applicability given the voluntary nature of the Code and the diverse industry 
landscape with a significant number of funds operating outside the Code’s investment and 
disclosure standards. For these reasons the normative proposals presented in chapter 6 do not 
afford a regulatory role to non-governmental actors, while still considering their positive 
influences on behaviour of fund managers.                       
7.4 How should money market funds be regulated? 
So, how should money market funds be regulated? It was established in this thesis that 
money market funds, particularly those operating in the US, are already subject to extensive 
regulatory oversight and, arguably, are some of the most regulated financial products.1047 
Nonetheless, money market funds remain on the forefront of the regulatory agenda on both sides 
of the Atlantic. In effect, the ongoing debates cloud the future of the industry as documented in 
sections 3.5 and 4.5. 
Building on the theory of the dual regulatory goal – investor protection and systemic 
stability – this thesis provides two main normative contributions. First, it critically evaluates the 
existing US and pan-European regulatory models and, second, it introduces an alternative 
framework.  
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 BRIAN REID, Time to Stamp Out the Confusion Around ‘Shadow Banking’, Investment 
Company Institute (6 December 2011), at http://www.ici.org/viewpoints?tag=Fund%20Regulation. The 
articles states that the US money market funds are among the most strictly regulated financial products 
offered to American investors.  
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Sections 3.3 and 4.3 offered detailed analysis of money market fund regulation in the US 
and Europe, respectively, and illustrated that, with respect to investor protection-motivated 
measures, regulators on both sides of the Atlantic rely heavily on product regulation by 
developing a set of risk-limiting standards deemed consistent with the function of money market 
funds.1048   However, as pointed out in sections 3.3 and 4.2, such an approach overlooks the fact 
that the different states and infrastructures of the local markets are the very reasons for the 
existence of money market funds in different countries. Such differences underpin the observed 
heterogeneity in funds’ risk profiles as well as local investment preferences and practices. In 
addition, every national market differs in terms of accounting and taxation. Thus, this thesis 
concluded that the risk-limiting rules promulgated in a particular market (e.g., in the US) and 
based on the assumption of local markets homogeneity are unlikely to be transferred to a 
universal financial product that meets the needs of other markets and investment communities. 
Nevertheless, it has been an aspiration of the European regulators to achieve a single market and 
a single regulation of financial products and services including, in particular, money market 
funds.       
Under the banner of investor protection, the harmonised rules for European money 
market funds not only have an explicit goal to make all these funds look alike in Europe, but also 
an implicit ambition to achieve a greater global comparability (i.e., with the US money market 
funds).  However, as illustrated in chapter 5, the harmonisation of long-standing investment 
practices in Europe has been subject to a contentious debate. Thus, despite the wide consultation 
process, it has not been possible to identify a convincing regulatory framework for the European 
money market fund industry.1049 Moreover, it is argued in this thesis that for money market funds 
in many European countries – outside Ireland and Luxembourg fund administration centres 
mainly hosting the US-style money market funds – harmonisation is impractical and entirely 
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 Essential functions of money market funds are identified in section 1.1.1 supra. 
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 Guidelines for a common definition of European money market funds outlines a two-tier 
industry structure, where two types of funds with a vastly different risk profiles are, supposedly, have the 
same investment objective “of maintaining the principal of the fund and aim to provide a return in line 
with money market rates”. See CESR's Guidelines supra note 9. Clearly, given that one type of finds is 
riskier than the other, less risky ones have higher probability of achieving the stated objective of 
maintaining principal. See also section 4.3.4 supra.    
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unnecessary on both regulatory grounds: these funds were not known for harming investors nor 
they have been seen as culprits of the systemic stability concerns.1050      
Thus, this research has identified the important limitations of regulation prescribing 
specific investment standards in money market funds and thereby providing investor protection. 
Such standards aim to select harmonised products that tend to simplify and ignore existing 
investor preferences and market infrastructure as demonstrated in this thesis. Indeed the 
contribution of finance to the productive sector of the economy, to which finance is supposed to 
be a servant – one of the political‐economic objectives widely professed by regulators today – is 
almost always neglected in the debates relating to reforming the global money markets. Instead, 
this thesis envisages the objective of systemic stability as contingent on the positive role of 
money market funds of contributing to the livelihood of other economic actors.1051  
Thus, this thesis proposes to reform money market funds in ways that favour ‘active’ 
rather than ‘passive globalisation’, that is, “the engagement of local market actors with the world 
economy without abandonment of their distinctive strategies”.1052 The first recommendation for 
the coherent approach to money market fund regulation on both sides of the Atlantic is therefore 
to give up the emphasis on regulating the fund’s investment standards, and instead allow local 
money market funds to develop their own approaches that service the needs of investors. These 
proposals stand in contrast to the ongoing efforts to develop a single ‘harmonised’ view based on 
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the best practice accepted in the most developed markets for a specific type of money market 
funds.1053    
  Further, with respect to investor protection, the underlying theory outlined in section 
1.1.3 calls for information disclosure detailed enough as to empower the fund investors to 
influence the fund managers’ behaviour by virtue of the on-going monitoring of portfolio risks. 
While the normative proposals outlined in this thesis call for homogeneous information 
transparency requirements for money market funds on both sides of the Atlantic, the need for 
good disclosure is underscored for European money market funds in particular. Furthermore, to 
facilitate access to this information, a global money market fund information depository should 
be developed. Such depository could be modelled on the successful experience in this area of the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission and private information portals.1054 
With respect to the goal of systemic stability, this thesis has demonstrated that neither of 
potential money market fund industry reforms – change in accounting practices or introduction 
of capital buffer – is certain to eliminate the possibility of a run, the main regulatory concern 
with respect to these funds.1055 At the same time, each of these proposals carries its own 
weaknesses and shortcomings that substantially overweigh any marginal improvements.1056 
Critically, this thesis argues that the on-going financial regulation reforms in banking regulation 
following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US and the implementation of the provisions 
of Basel III are redressing the risk profiles of global capital markets. This would affect the 
investment activities of money market funds in unexpected and unintended ways.1057   
Without further study of how the most current changes to financial regulation have 
altered the markets any additional reforms to the money market fund industry are premature, at a 
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minimum, but most likely unnecessary.1058 Therefore, this thesis does not consider any proposed 
changes to the industry structure described in section 3.5 as achieving the dual regulatory goals – 
investor protection and systemic stability – with certainty giving the changing landscape of the 
international capital markets. The solution for the money market fund industry regulation should 
be found in (1) education of the investment public through good disclosure; (2) making 
information available to all; and (3) promoting those money market fund investment strategies 
that both serve funding needs of the national capital markets and meet expectations of local 
investors for a safe and liquid investment product.       
With respect to the jurisdictional aim of the proposals, which mostly concern European 
money market funds, the recommendation is to enhance the powers of the European Securities 
and Markets Authority with respect to money market fund registration, operational and 
governance oversight and data collection function. This regulatory structure facilitates two 
fundamental objectives: (1) enforcing a rule-based definition of European money market funds 
and (2) monitoring of cross-border movements of cash investments as a proxy for assessing of 
funding needs, which will be facilitated by virtue of a good disclosure regime.       
I conclude this assessment of my contributions to knowledge by acknowledging these 
four contributions as providing both a theoretical framework and generous details that are of 
practical use for informed debate about individual money market funds, the money market fund 
industry structure and its regulation in the US and Europe. Furthermore, given the reach of 
money market funds far beyond these two markets, it is wished that the findings of this research 
may be appreciated by international regulatory bodies and other investment communities. 
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List of the US Government Liquidity Programmes 
 
Source: Morgan Stanley Investment Management. Available at 
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Temporary Guarantee U.S. Guarantee $3,355.3 Billion
Program for Money Treasury
Market Mutual Funds
Commercial Paper Federal Liquidity $349.9 Billion
Funding Facility Reserve
Temporary Liquidity U.S. Treasury/ Guarantee $834.5 Billion
Guarantee Program FDIC
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